Summers v. Gatson

• Decision Date: 18 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 25793.,25793.
• Citation: 205 W.Va. 198,517 S.E.2d 295
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Harold SUMMERS, Jr., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Cathy S. GATSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security and the City of Charleston, Defendants Below, Appellees.

517 S.E.2d 295

205 W.Va. 198

Harold SUMMERS, Jr., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Cathy S. GATSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security and the City of Charleston, Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 25793.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 14, 1999.

Decided June 18, 1999.

Mary McQuain, Esquire, Calwell & McCormick, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellant.

Mary B. McLaughlin, Esquire, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellee, Bureau of Employment Security.

Belinda B. Jackson, Esquire, Shuman, Annand, Bailey, Wyant & Earles, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellee, City of Charleston.

PER CURIAM:

The appellant, Harold Summers, Jr., worked for the City of Charleston (the "City") as a building inspector. The City terminated the appellant after he was accused of stealing an object from a condemned house. Appellant sought unemployment compensation benefits, which were awarded by an administrative law judge of the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security (the "Board"). The City appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which overturned the Board's administrative law judge and found the appellant to be disqualified from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. Appellant Summers now appeals this decision, claiming that the circuit court erred by reversing the decision of the administrative law judge, and by improperly substituting its judgment for that of the administrative law judge. We agree with appellant, and for the reasons set forth below, reverse.

I. Factual Background

Appellant Harold Summers, Jr., worked as a building inspector for the City of Charleston from April of 1993 until December of 1996. As part of his job, Mr. Summers would travel to buildings identified by his employer to inspect them for code violations. Often, Mr. Summers' duties would require him to enter the buildings he was inspecting.

On one occasion in November of 1996, Mr. Summers and a co-worker were inside a condemned home that had been vacated over a year before in August of 1995, and had been scheduled for demolition. Despite the lengthy absence of the occupants, various items of personal property remained in the home. It was alleged by the City that during this visit, Mr. Summers picked up a commemorative "coin" or "medallion" and took it with him when he left the property.¹

On December 5, 1996, the City terminated Mr. Summers from his employment. The City provided several reasons for Mr. Summers' termination, including his alleged theft of the coin from the condemned home.²

As a result of his termination, Mr. Summers filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the West Virginia Department of Employment Security, a department of the Unemployment Compensation Division, which is itself a division of the West Virginia Bureau of Employment Programs. The first person to rule upon such a claim, a "Deputy" in the Department of Employment Security, denied Mr. Summers' claim on January 23, 1997.

Mr. Summers appealed this decision to the Board of Review (the "Board"), which is the next step in the appeals process for one unsatisfied with the Deputy's decision. An administrative law judge (the "ALJ") for the Board conducted, de novo, a hearing, during which Mr. Summers and representatives for the City presented evidence, including live testimony, relating to Mr. Summers' termination.

The ALJ noted in his factual findings that the City admitted that the alleged theft of the coin was the primary reason for Mr. Summers' termination, and that the City had failed to introduce any evidence to show who owned the subject coin and whether it had any value other than a nominal value. As a result, the ALJ ruled on March 20, 1997, that the City had failed to meet its burden of proof to show misconduct, and therefore Mr. Summers was entitled to unemployment compensation.

The City appealed to the Board of Review, as a whole, which upheld the decision of the ALJ in a decision on May 21, 1997. The City then appealed the matter to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. After reviewing the appeal on briefs, the circuit court reversed the decision of the ALJ and the Board of Review. The circuit court found that Mr. Summers had been discharged for an act of gross misconduct and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.

Mr. Summers appeals that decision on the basis that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County erred by reversing the ALJ, and that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ. We agree with appellant, and for reasons set forth below, reverse.³

II. Standard of Review

We may not discard lightly the factual determinations made by an ALJ and affirmed by the Board of Review; however, we examine, de novo, conclusions of law:

Findings of fact by the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security, in an unemployment compensation case, should not be set aside unless such findings are plainly wrong; however, the plainly wrong doctrine does not apply to conclusions of law by the Board of Review.

Syl. pt. 1, Kisamore v. Rutledge, 166 W.Va. 675, 276 S.E.2d 821 (1981). Accord, Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994)

.

Among other factual findings, the ALJ found, and the Board affirmed, that Mr. Summers' alleged theft of the coin was the primary reason for his discharge, that Mr. Summers denied taking the coin, and that the City failed to introduce any evidence as to who might own the subject coin, or what value it might have. Such findings of fact, if not plainly wrong, must stand. Kisamore, Id.

However, accepting the findings as true, we still must examine the legal conclusions of the ALJ. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that the City's failure to address the ownership or value of the coin, combined with Mr. Summers' denial that he took it, caused the City's claim of misconduct to fail.

Had the ALJ simply stated, as a factual finding, that Mr. Summers never took the coin, this matter probably would not have reached this Court. However, because the ALJ connected Mr. Summers' denial with the lack of evidence relating to ownership or value, the ALJ was making a legal conclusion that such evidence would be necessary before one could find that Mr. Summers had committed a theft, even if he had admitted to taking the coin. We must examine, de novo, this conclusion. Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994).

III. Discussion

We note from the outset that precedent demands a liberal construction of any of our statutes relating to a worker's claim for unemployment compensation: "Unemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof." Syl. pt. 6, Davis v. Hix, 140 W.Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954); see, Mercer County Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 186 W.Va. 251, 412 S.E.2d 249 (1991)

; London v. Board of Review of Dept. of Employment, 161 W.Va. 575, 244 S.E.2d 331 (1978).⁴

An obvious corollary to this principal is that those aspects of the statute that might be used to deny a worker his or her unemployment compensation require a more restrictive interpretation. "Disqualifying provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law are to be narrowly construed." Syl. pt. 1, Peery v. Rutledge, 177 W.Va. 548, 355 S.E.2d 41 (1987).

Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the employer, when seeking a denial of benefits, to prove that the unemployed person should be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. "[T]he burden of persuasion is upon the former employer to demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's conduct falls within a disqualifying provision of the unemployment compensation statute." Peery v. Rutledge, 177 W.Va. 548, 552, 355 S.E.2d 41, 45 (1987) (citing, Bennett v. Hix, 139 W.Va. 75, 84-85, 79 S.E.2d 114, 119 (1953); Industrial Laundry v. Review Board, 147 Ind.App. 40, 44, 258 N.E.2d 160, 163 (1970); Gatlin v. Brown, 154 So.2d 224, 226 (La.Ct.App.1963) (footnote omitted)).

The statutory language at issue in the case before us is byzantine in its complexity⁵, but from the morass of dependent clauses one may distill the following: If one is discharged for misconduct, in general, one loses one's rights to unemployment compensation for six weeks, unless one is discharged (among other things) for theft or larceny in connection with one's work, in which case one is disqualified from receiving any unemployment compensation benefits until one has found a new job and worked for thirty days in covered employment. W. Va.Code § 21A-6-3 (1990).

In order for claimant in the position of the appellant to be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation, his or her employer must provide evidence to the fact finder and demonstrate by a preponderance of that evidence that the claimant did indeed commit an act of theft or larceny in connection with his or her employment. Peery v. Rutledge, 177 W.Va. 548, 355 S.E.2d 41 (1987).

We also note that, "[t]he...