Supchak v. Pruitt
Decision Date | 27 May 1998 |
Docket Number | No. A98A0795.,A98A0795. |
Citation | 503 S.E.2d 581,232 Ga. App. 680 |
Parties | SUPCHAK et al. v. PRUITT et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Billy E. Moore, Jeffrey S. Gilbert, Atlanta, for appellants.
Bovis, Kyle & Burch, William B. Barrickman, John A. Love, Atlanta, for appellees.
Karl and Beverly Supchak appeal the grant of summary judgment to Ruth W. Pruitt and to Boyce Pruitt d/b/a Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed under OCGA § 9-11-56(h). The case remains pending below against Boyce Pruitt individually. Ruth Pruitt lives on her one hundred forty-acre farm in Gwinnett County, and her son Boyce Pruitt lives with his family on an adjoining seven-acre property that was deeded to him by his mother.
The Supchaks filed suit against Boyce Pruitt, individually, Ruth W. Pruitt, and also against Boyce Pruitt d/b/a Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed to recover for damages incurred by Karl Supchak when a vehicle driven by Mr. Supchak collided with a horse allegedly owned by the defendants. The complaint also contained a claim for Beverly Supchak's loss of consortium. Boyce Pruitt and Ruth Pruitt filed separate answers.
Boyce Pruitt denied that he had ever done business as Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed and asserted that he was not aware of any business entity or operation known as Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed. Although Boyce Pruitt admitted that he owned and had custody of the horse, he denied that Ruth Pruitt either owned or had custody of the horse and otherwise denied the material allegations of the complaint. Ruth Pruitt's answer also denied ownership or custody of the horse.
After discovery, Boyce Pruitt d/b/a Boyce Pruitt Trucking ("Pruitt Trucking") filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion asserted that Boyce Pruitt had never done business as Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed, that Pruitt Trucking never had an ownership interest in or exercised custody or control over the horse involved in the collision, and that the horse was not kept on Pruitt Trucking's property. This motion was supported by the affidavit of Boyce Pruitt.
The affidavit stated that Boyce Pruitt owned and did business as Boyce Pruitt Trucking and had never done business as Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed and that no such entity has ever existed. Boyce Pruitt's affidavit also stated that he was the owner of the horse that was struck by Mr. Supchak and that neither Pruitt Trucking nor Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed owned or had ever been responsible for the care, custody, or control of the horse. Boyce Pruitt's affidavit also stated that the horse had never been kept on the property of Boyce Pruitt Trucking or Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed.
Later, Boyce Pruitt submitted a second affidavit. This affidavit stated that Pruitt Trucking is in the business of hauling feed ingredients, does not engage in any other business, and does not engage in the purchase and sale of horses. The affidavit further stated that Pruitt Trucking is not associated with, does not have any financial relationship with, and does not have any jointly owned assets with Ruth Pruitt. Additionally, the affidavit stated that Pruitt Trucking has a separate checking account from Boyce Pruitt and the funds of Pruitt Trucking and Boyce Pruitt are not commingled.
Ruth W. Pruitt also moved for summary judgment; she contended that she was not the owner of the horse in question, and although she owned the pasture where the horse was kept, she breached no duty owed the Supchaks. Her motion was supported by her deposition and the deposition of her son, Boyce Pruitt. The Supchaks filed separate responses to the motions and submitted affidavits from two officers of the Gwinnett County Police Department Animal Control Unit and the affidavit of an expert. The police officers stated they responded to the call about Mr. Supchak hitting the horse and spoke to residents of the area who identified Boyce Pruitt as the owner of the horse. They also stated they spoke to Boyce Pruitt who admitted ownership of the horse and told them his son had been training the horse to open the gate and the horse had opened the gate and let itself out. The expert's affidavit stated the proper standards for fences used to contain horses and also stated that the fences around Ruth Pruitt's pasture were inadequate for the horse in question. The Supchaks also relied upon the depositions of Boyce and Ruth Pruitt to oppose the motions for summary judgment.
Subsequently, the trial court granted summary judgment to both Ruth Pruitt and Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed. The trial court's order states, "[b]ased on the evidence in the record, it appears that Ruth Pruitt did not own, nor did she exercise custody or control over, the horse in question." Then, in regard to Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed the order recited, "[l]ikewise, the evidence in the record shows that none of the businesses owned by Boyce Pruitt, if they in fact exist, owned or exercised custody or control over the horse." After the grant of summary judgment to these defendants, the action remained pending solely against Boyce Pruitt, and he, individually is not a party to this appeal. Held:
1. The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment generally are announced in Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga.App. 594, 595-596, 370 S.E.2d 843. Further, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence. Boulware v. Quiktrip Corp., 226 Ga.App. 399, 486 S.E.2d 662; Goring v. Martinez, 224 Ga.App. 137, 138(2), 479 S.E.2d 432.
2. Although Boyce Pruitt raised the issue of whether Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed was an entity capable of being sued, the trial court did not rule on this issue. Consequently, whether Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed is an entity capable of being sued is not properly before this Court.
3. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to Ruth Pruitt and Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed. Our law places the duty on owners of livestock to keep their animals from running at large: "No owner shall permit livestock to run at large on or to stray upon the public roads of this state or any property not belonging to the owner of the livestock, except by permission of the owner of such property." OCGA...
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