Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion v. Grove

• Citation: 96 N.E. 159,176 Ind. 356
• Decision Date: 24 October 1911
• Docket Number: 21,892
• Parties: Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion v. Grove
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

96 N.E. 159

176 Ind. 356

Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion v. Grove

No. 21,892

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 24, 1911

From Superior Court of Allen County; Owen N. Heaton, Judge.

Action by Maxwell J. Grove against the Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under § 1405 Burns 1908, Acts 1901 p. 590.

Affirmed.

Breen & Morris, for appellant.

Walpole G. Colerick, for appellee.

OPINION

Myers, J.

The Catholic Benevolent Legion is an association composed of a supreme council, and state and subordinate councils. The supreme council is an incorporated body, with power to make its own constitution, rules of discipline, and laws for the government of the entire legion. It is the body to which final appeals are to be made in all matters of importance emanating from state and subordinate councils.

On October 19, 1886, appellee became a member of the Catholic Benevolent Legion, and there was issued to him what is known as a fourth-grade certificate, whereby appellant promised to pay to appellee's wife, Emma J Grove, upon the death of appellee, a sum not exceeding $ 3,000, and also promised to pay appellee a sum not exceeding $ 1,500, upon due proof that he had arrived at the age of expectancy, and that he was permanently disabled, unable to earn a living, and was destitute of the means of support. This action was brought by appellee to recover from appellant one-half the amount of said benefit certificate, on the ground that he had arrived at the age of expectancy as fixed by the laws of the association, was permanently disabled, was unable to earn a livelihood, and was destitute of the means of support.

The complaint was in one paragraph, the material allegations of which are that at the time the benefit certificate was issued, appellee was, ever since has been, and still is, a member in good standing in Saint Julian Council in said legion; that at all times and in all things he has faithfully observed, complied with and performed all duties and obligations required of and imposed upon him by the laws of appellant; that he has promptly paid to appellant all dues and assessments imposed upon or required to be paid by him under its laws; that during said period he paid appellant about $ 2,000; that since January 15, 1903, he has been and still is out of employment, by reason of his physical inability to perform labor; that on or about October 31 1905, in accordance with the laws of appellant, he presented to Saint Julian Council, of which he was then, and still is, a member, his written application to obtain the benefits to which he was then, and still is, entitled by reason of the benefit certificate issued to him by appellant; that the grounds on which he bases his application for the payment of $ 1,500 to him is that he is seventy-one years old, and permanently disabled from attending to his business or gaining a livelihood, and is destitute of the means of support. The facts are then alleged in detail as to the presentation of this request in the manner prescribed in the by-laws of appellant, which are set out, its disallowance by the president of the supreme council, who "wrongfully and unjustly rejected said application, and wrongfully and unjustly disallowed appellee's claim, * * * and disapproved his application," from which decision he appealed to the supreme council, and that the decision of the president was sustained, on the ground that appellee was not destitute of means of support. Appellee's claim was refused, and is due and unpaid; and the action of appellant under its laws is declared to be final.

The portions of the constitution and by-laws of appellant material to the cause are sections two and six of Chapter I, reading as follows:

(2) "Five thousand dollars shall be the largest amount paid by this legion on the death of a member. And $ 2,500 shall be the largest amount paid for permanent disability benefit. Five thousand dollars shall be paid on the death of every sixth-grade member; $ 4,000 on the death of every fifth-grade member; $ 3,000 on the death of every fourth-grade member; $ 2,000 on the death of every third-grade member; $ 1,000 on the death of every second-grade member; $ 500 on the death of every first-grade member, and $ 250 on the death of every industrial-grade member. And one-half the amount of each grade may be paid to a member of that grade who shall become permanently disabled from attending to his business or gaining a livelihood, and who is destitute of means of support, when he shall arrive at the age of expectancy as determined in the following table, unless otherwise provided by the law of the state in which the council is located, in which case the age of expectancy shall conform to the law of said state. Provided, however, that should a death occur, or a permanent disability be approved by the supreme council when one assessment on each member of the legion would not amount to $ 5,000, then the sum paid shall be a proportionate amount of one assessment on each member in good standing in the legion on the date of its call, according to the grade of the deceased or disabled member; and such proportionate amount shall be all that can be claimed by anyone."

(6) "When application shall be made by a member for a permanent disability benefit, the president of the council of which he is a member shall appoint a committee of three, who, with the medical examiner, shall investigate the application, and report in writing to the council the nature, cause, duration, and all other circumstances attending such disability. The secretary of the council shall notify all other councils within the district of such application, and give the names and addresses of the members of the committee so appointed. If the report of such committee be in favor of the application, the president shall announce that a ballot upon the granting of the same shall be taken at the next stated meeting of the council. At the next stated meeting such ballot shall be taken under the same rules as govern the ballot for admission to membership. If the application be granted by the council, notice of such action shall be forwarded to the secretary of the supreme council in the same manner as in case of death as provided for in § 3, so far as applicable. On the receipt of such official notice of permanent disability application, the secretary of the supreme council shall forward the same to the president of the supreme council, who shall make further investigation if deemed necessary and on his final approval he shall direct the secretary of the supreme council to draw an order on the treasurer of the supreme council in favor of the disabled member. The secretary of the supreme council shall thereupon draw such order for the amount specified, and on receipt of the treasurer's check, properly countersigned, forward it to the treasurer of the council of which the applicant is a member. The decision of the president in allowing or disallowing claims for permanent disability benefits shall be final and binding if no appeal be taken to the supreme council. Appeals may be taken to the supreme council within thirty days after notice of the president's decision shall have been given the applicant; and the decision of the supreme council on such appeals shall be final."

A demurrer was unsuccessfully interposed to this complaint, on the ground of insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of action, which ruling is the first alleged error assigned.

The first point made is that as the laws of appellant make the action of the supreme council final, appellee is without remedy, unless he alleges and proves that the action was fraudulent, or that he was deprived of a fair hearing, and that the allegation that the action of the president was wrongful and unjust is a mere conclusion. If the complaint were based upon that fact, appellant's position would doubtless be correct, but it is not based upon that fact, but upon the broader fact that the provision making the action of the president and council final is void, as being against public policy.

We are not advised of any statute of this State pertinent to the questions involved.

It would be futile to attempt to reconcile the decisions in the various states upon the question of making final the decisions of the supreme tribunals of fraternal orders, and thereby excluding members from resort to the courts of law. It is sufficient to point out that our own courts have steadfastly denied the right of exclusion, in which many other states concur. Supreme Council, etc., v. Forsinger (1890), 125 Ind. 52, 21 Am. St. 196, 9 L. R. A. 501, 25 N.E. 129; Supreme Council, etc., v. Garrigus (1885), 104 Ind. 133, 54 Am. Rep. 298, 3 N.E. 818; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, etc. (1885), 102 Ind. 262, 1 N.E. 571; Voluntary Relief Department, etc., v. Spencer (1897), 17 Ind.App. 123, 46 N.E. 477; People's Mut. Benefit Soc. v. Werner (1893), 6 Ind.App. 614, 34 N.E. 105; Supreme Lodge, etc., v. Raymond (1897), 57 Kan. 647, 47 P. 533, 49 L. R. A. 373 and notes; Pepin v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste (1901), 23 R.I. 81, 49 A. 387, 91 Am. St. 620, and cases cited; Robinson v. Templar Lodge, etc. (1897), 117 Cal. 370, 49 P. 170, 59 Am. St. 193 and notes; Railway Conductors, etc., Assn. v. Robinson (1893), 147 Ill. 138, 35 N.E. 168.

Upon the general question that there can be no agreement in advance of a controversy, whereby the jurisdiction of the civil courts is ousted, see Ditton v. Hart (1911), 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961; Board, etc., v Gibson (1902), 158 Ind. 471, 63 N.E. 982; McCoy v. Able (1891), 131 Ind. 417, 30 N.E. 528; Myers v. Jenkins (1900), 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. 1089, 81 Am. St. 613; Maitland v. Reed (1...