Supreme Malt Products Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission

• Citation: 133 N.E.2d 775,334 Mass. 59
• Parties: SUPREME MALT PRODUCTS CO., Inc., v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION. Benjamin D. SOBLE v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION. MACY'S LIQUOR, Inc., v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION.
• Decision Date: 11 April 1956
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 775

133 N.E.2d 775

334 Mass. 59

SUPREME MALT PRODUCTS CO., Inc., v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION.

Benjamin D. SOBLE v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION.

MACY'S LIQUOR, Inc., v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 3, 1956.

Decided April 11, 1956.

James D. St. Clair, Boston, for Supreme Malt Products Co., inc.

Julius H. Soble, Boston, for Benjamin D. Soble, and others.

Harris A. Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen. for Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm.

John F. X. Gaquin, Boston (Vincent F. Leahy, Boston, with him) for intervenor.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

The first case is a bill in equity by a corporation, conducting a package store, so called, where intoxicating liquor is sold not to be consumed on the premises, brought against the defendants who comprise the alcoholic beverages control commission, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a six day suspension of its license imposed by the commission upon the plaintiff as a penalty for selling a bottle of whiskey below the price fixed in accordance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 138, § 25C, inserted by St.1952, c. 385, and c. 567, § 1. The remaining two cases are petitions for writs of certiorari to quash a similar penalty imposed upon the petitioners each of whom maintained a package store and is also alleged to have violated said section 25C. The cases were consolidated for trial in the Superior Court. They were presented to the judge upon statements of agreed facts. The plaintiff and the petitioners also saved exceptions to the exclusion of evidence. The trial judge reported the cases without decision to this court.

General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 138, § 25C, inserted by St.1952, c. 385, and c. 567, § 1, requires the owner, manufacturer or wholesaler of a brand or trade name to file with the commission at different times during the year a schedule of prices to be charged for different brands or trade named intoxicating liquors but no filing of schedules 'shall take effect unless within thirty days thereafter the commission has approved the said prices as not being excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.' Provisions are made for the display of the schedules where the goods are sold and also for penalties for a violation of the statute.

There is not much doubt that the plaintiff and the petitioners sold a small quantity of whiskey below the 'minimum consumer resale price list' appoved by the commission and that each seller was found guilty by the commission after a hearing and the license of each was ordered suspended for six days. The immediate object of these present proceedings was to avoid the suspension of these licenses.

It is first contended that the statute, said section 25C, providing for the fixing of the minimum consumer resale prices for alcoholic beverages, is contrary to both the Federal and the State constitutions.

A statute is not to declared void as contrary to our Constitution 'unless it is impossible by any reasonable construction to interpret its provisions in harmony with the Constitution,' Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 271, 115 N.E. 411, 412; Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Co-operative Central Bank, 287 Mass. 338, 343, 191 N.E. 921; Howes Brothers Co. v. Employment Compensation Commission, 296 Mass. 275, 284, 5 N.E.2d 720; and one attempting to show that a statute is contrary to the Federal Constitution has a similar burden. 'Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.' In re Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718, 25 L.Ed. 496; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357, 36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679. The liquor traffic has long been recognized as a source of danger to the public welfare, health and safety, and regulations governing the conduct of the business and frequently going to the extent of prohibiting it altogether have been sustained. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 32, 24 L.Ed. 989; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91, 11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 33 S.Ct. 44, 57 L.Ed. 184; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway, 242 U.S. 311, 320, 37 S.Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326; Seaboard Air Line Railway v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298, 38 S.Ct. 96, 62 L.Ed. 299; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 38 S.Ct. 98, 62 L.Ed. 304; Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 45 S.Ct. 264, 69 L.Ed. 568; Ziffrin, Inc., v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S.Ct. 163, 84 L.Ed. 128; Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 61 S.Ct. 219, 85 L.Ed. 98.

The power of the State to protect itself by an exercise of the police power is commensurate with the nature of the evil which it seeks to eliminate. If the Legislature came to the conclusion that the establishment of retail prices for customers of package stores would tend to promote temperance, to stabilize the package store business, to avoid price wars and cut throat competition, and to instill more observance for the law in those engaged in the business and would better protect the public, we cannot say its belief was so irrational that none of these objects would result from the passage of the act.

A price fixing device has been recently used to control the so called package store business. Gipson v. Morley, 217 Ark. 560, 233 S.W.2d 79; Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 99 A.2d 89; Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.W.2d 149; Gaine v. Burnett, 122 N.J.L. 39, 4 A.2d 37. It was held in Gipson v. Morley, supra, that the fixing of prices for the retail sales of intoxicating liquor was a valid exercise of the police power and did not violate any constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality and due process and forbidding special privileges; and in Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 99 A.2d 89, that price fixing is recognized as a method reasonably adapted to promote temperance, to avoid price wars, to stabilize the liquor industry, and to encourage the observance of the liquor law by those engaged in that business. The statute in that case was within the police power. After answering an argument that the statute gave special benefit to the retail dealer, and after citing cases in which price fixing was sustained, it was decided in Reeves v. Simons, supra, that the statute did not offend the Constitution. The statute fixing a maximum price for beer supplied to a retailer by the county liquor control board was held not to be unconstitutional in Fowler v. Harris, 174 Md. 398, 200 A. 825. It was said...