Suprenant v. City of New Britain

• Decision Date: 25 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10871,10871
• Citation: 611 A.2d 941,28 Conn.App. 754
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lawrence SUPRENANT v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN.

Page 941

611 A.2d 941

28 Conn.App. 754

Lawrence SUPRENANT v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN.

No. 10871.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 4, 1992.

Decided Aug. 25, 1992.

Kristin A. Dorney, Milford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Joseph M. Musco, City Atty., with whom was Seth Feigenbaum, Asst. City Atty., for appellee (defendant).

Before DALY, LANDAU and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the compensation review division (review division) of the workers' compensation commission. The review division reversed the finding and award of the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) which awarded disability benefits to the plaintiff under General Statutes § 7-433c. ¹ On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the review division incorrectly determined that the commissioner's finding of evidence of the plaintiff's preemployment hypertension precluded an award under § 7-433c for his subsequent disability due to heart disease. We affirm the decision of the review division.

The plaintiff became a regular member of the New Britain fire department on June 26, 1972. Prior to his employment he underwent two preemployment physical examinations. After the first examination, it was determined that he was not qualified for the duties of a firefighter. After the second examination, he was found to be qualified for the position. These preemployment physical examinations revealed evidence that the plaintiff suffered from hypertension, but no evidence of heart disease was found. ² The plaintiff became disabled due to heart disease and was out of work from January 6, 1985, through and including December 15, 1985. He first became aware that he suffered from heart disease on January 16, 1985.

The plaintiff commenced this action to receive benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c for his disability due to heart disease. Section 7-433c provides in pertinent part that a member of a paid fire department may receive benefits for disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease if he or she "successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease...." After a formal hearing, the commissioner issued a finding and award granting the plaintiff such benefits. The commissioner found that the plaintiff "was aware of his hypertension condition prior to his employment by the [city of New Britain] in June of 1972." The commissioner also found, however, that the medical testimony presented to it "unanimously differentiated between hypertension and heart disease" and that his "preemployment physical in 1972 made no mention of any heart disease found in the claimant." The commissioner concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to all of the benefits afforded under § 7-433c because of his heart disease.

After the commissioner denied a motion by the city of New Britain to correct the commissioner's finding and award, the city appealed the decision of the commissioner to the review division. The city claimed that the commissioner improperly concluded that the plaintiff was eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c even though the plaintiff's preemployment physical examinations showed evidence of hypertension. The review division reversed the commissioner's finding and award. The review division concluded that a preemployment physical examination that revealed evidence of either hypertension or heart disease prohibits an employee from receiving benefits under § 7-433c for hypertension or heart disease.

The plaintiff appealed the decision of the review division to this court. He claims that the commissioner had correctly interpreted § 7-433c and that the review division improperly reversed the decision of the commissioner. The essence of his argument is that because his preemployment physical examinations revealed evidence only of hypertension, not heart disease, he is entitled to receive benefits under the statute for his subsequently discovered heart disease. The implicit suggestion of his argument is that the preemployment evidence of his hypertension precludes him from receiving benefits under § 7-433c only for hypertension during the course of his employment.

The sole question, which is dispositive of this appeal, is whether a member of a paid fire or police department whose preemployment physical reveals evidence of hypertension, but not heart disease, may receive benefits for disability or death caused by subsequently discovered heart disease. We answer the question in the negative.

We review the review division's construction of § 7-433c in light of well established rules of statutory construction. " 'A fundamental tenet of statutory construction is that "statutes are to be considered to give effect to the apparent intention of the lawmaking body." ' Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 220, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982). When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we assume that the words themselves express the legislature's intent and there is no need to look further for interpretive guidance. Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666, 560 A.2d 975 (1989)." Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 309-310, 592 A.2d 953 (1991).

In Horkheimer v. Stratford, 4 Conn.Worker's Comp.Rev.Op. 139 (1987), the compensation review division aptly stated that "[i]n order for [a] claimant to come within the group for which the protection provided in § 7-433c is intended, certain requirements must be met: (1) the claimant must be a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department ... (2) whose pre-employment physical examination revealed no evidence of hypertension or heart disease; (3) who suffers a condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease; (4) resulting in death or temporary or permanent total or partial disability; and (5) economic loss resulting therefrom." (Emphasis added.) Id., 141. In Horkheimer, the review division...