Swann v. Flatley
Decision Date | 06 November 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-1348-WD. |
Citation | 749 F. Supp. 338 |
Parties | Allen SWANN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas J. FLATLEY, d/b/a The Flatley Company, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Daniel J. O'Connell, III, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.
John J. Lang, Driscoll, Gillespie, Stanton & Davis, Lynnfield, Mass., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
LAWRENCE P. COHEN, United States Magistrate.
This is a slip and fall case brought within the diversity jurisdiction of this court. Plaintiff Allen Swann slipped and fell while exiting from the Sheraton Tara Hotel in Framingham on December 20, 1987, receiving substantial injuries.1 Defendant Thomas J. Flatley, d/b/a The Flatley Company, in its answers, concedes that the Sheraton Tara Hotel was in its custody, possession and control at the time of the accident. All parties consented to jury trial before this court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 4(c) of the Rules for United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
1. At the final pretrial conference, it appeared from the joint pretrial memorandum filed by the respective parties, as well as from the position of the parties at that conference, that the plaintiff slipped and fell on account of a natural accumulation of ice and/or snow upon exiting from the side door of the Sheraton Tara Hotel. At that conference, this court advised the parties that the United States Court of Appeals for this Circuit had recently canvassed Massachusetts law,2 and had apparently concluded that, under Massachusetts law, a landowner was not under a duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and/or snow.3
Trial was scheduled for November 5, 1990. During the course of a chambers conference immediately prior to empanelling a jury, it still appeared that plaintiffs' case rested on the assumption that Massachusetts law permitted recovery on the basis of a landowner's failure to remove a natural accumulation of snow and/or ice. Plaintiff maintained, however, that, particularly in light of the holding in Klein v. Boston Elevated Ry., 293 Mass. 238, 200 N.E. 6 (1936), the Athas Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79 (1st Cir.1990) court misconstrued applicable Massachusetts law.
A jury was empaneled, and plaintiffs made their opening statement. Based on that opening statement — which again relied exclusively on the failure of the defendant to remove a natural accumulation of ice — the defendant moved for a directed verdict. This court denied that motion without prejudice to renewal. This court conditioned the denial of the motion, however, on the directive that plaintiff introduce all evidence relating to liability exclusive of evidence dealing with damages, at which time this court would reconsider the motion for a directed verdict.
2. Consistent with the court's directive, plaintiffs presented all evidence bearing on the question of liability. Without exception, all of plaintiffs' evidence allowed but one reasonable conclusion — i.e., that plaintiff Allen Swann slipped on the platform just outside the side exit door on account of freezing rain which had resulted in a sheet of ice on that platform. Additionally, all witnesses who testified and who could recall, testified that the precipitation continued at the time of the accident — indeed throughout the remainder of the day.4
3. Plaintiffs having represented that all evidence had been presented on the matter of liability, this court revisited defendant's motion for a directed verdict.5 Upon consideration of the evidence and argument of counsel, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict is allowed, and judgment shall enter for the defendant on all claims.6
In Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79 (1st Cir.1990), decided on May 1, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, after canvassing relevant Massachusetts law, concluded that a landowner is not under a legal duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and/or snow. In this court's view, notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument that the Court of Appeals misconstrued current Massachusetts law, the Athas Court correctly concluded that, under Massachusetts law, a landowner is not under a legal duty to remove natural accumulations of ice or snow.7
Nothing in the authorities brought to the attention of this court by plaintiffs — i.e., intriligator v. City of Boston, 18 Mass. App. 703, 469 N.E.2d 1296 (1984); Willett v. Pilotte, 329 Mass. 610, 109 N.E.2d 840 (1953); Phipps v. Aptucxet Post # 5988 V.F.W. Building Ass'n, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 928, 389 N.E.2d 1042 (1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Klein v. Boston Elevated Ry., 293 Mass. 238, 200 N.E. 6 (1936); and Jakobsen v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 520 F.2d 810 (1st Cir.1975) — persuades this court to conclude that our Court of Appeals, in Athas, misconstrued controlling Massachusetts law. The holdings in Intriligator, Mounsey, Phipps, and Jakobsen, were specifically addressed and referred to in the course of the Athas decision. Those holdings notwithstanding, particularly in view of the fact that none of those cases specifically focussed upon the distinction of natural accumulations of ice and/or snow, the Athas Court specifically concluded that "Since the traditional rule in Massachusetts is that a landowner's liability for injuries incurred on his premises depends, inter alia, on the existence of a defect or hazard other than a natural accumulation of water, or ice, or snow, that is the rule we must apply until the Massachusetts courts decide differently." (Emphasis added). With respect to Willett, supra, that Court simply did not address the distinction, and was not called upon to do so. So too with Klein. The issue was not raised, and accordingly was not decided. Moreover, the holding in Klein can be squared with the holding in Athas9 on the basis that a common carrier, as was the case in Klein, is, under traditional Massachusetts law, held to a higher standard of care than that imposed on other landowners. See Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 401 Mass. 788, 519 N.E.2d 1341, 134310 and n. 5 (1988).
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