Swanson v. Coffeen

• Decision Date: 08 July 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–1337 (FAB).
• Citation: 952 F.Supp.2d 390
• Parties: Ron SWANSON, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Kelsey COFFEEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

952 F.Supp.2d 390

Ron SWANSON, Plaintiff,

v.Patricia Kelsey COFFEEN, Defendant.

Civil No. 12–1337 (FAB).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

July 8, 2013.

Ronald D. Swanson–Cerna, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is plaintiff Ron Swanson's (“Swanson”) informative motion submitted in response to the Court's order to show cause that the Court has in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant Kelsey Coffeen (“Coffeen”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant Coffeen, and, accordingly, plaintiff Swanson's claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff Swanson alleges the following facts, which for the purposes of deciding whether sua sponte dismissal is appropriate, the Court takes as true and construes in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gonzalez–Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2001):

Plaintiff Swanson hired defendant Coffeen to work at his company, Novel, in March 2011. (Docket No. 12–1 at p. 2.) Defendant Coffeen's first assignment was in Tunica, Mississippi. Id. While on this assignment, as well as in two other Skype conversations, defendant Coffeen spoke to plaintiff about how fondly she thought of Puerto Rico, and how she visited there many times—both for vacation and for transferring flights on her way to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. Id. at pp. 2–3. In early April 2011, defendant Coffeen “moved to Mallorca, Spain, to continue her responsibilities with Novel in working on the Tunica project.” Id. at p. 3. On May 11, 2011, plaintiff Swanson arrived in Spain for a series of business meetings. (Docket No. 12–1 at p. 4.)

On the morning of May 12, 2011, defendant Coffeen accused plaintiff Swanson of rape. (Docket No. 1 at p. 1.) Following the rape accusation, plaintiff Swanson spent approximately two weeks in a Spanish prison. (Docket No. 1 at p. 4.) Once plaintiff Swanson was released from prison, however, he was still not permitted to return to the United States until the court in Spain returned his passport after the results of a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test confirmed that the semen found in defendant Coffeen's underwear was not plaintiff Swanson's. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 4–5.) Plaintiff Swanson returned to the United States the first week of March of 2012. Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiff Swanson alleges that defendant Coffeen made false allegations of rape to Don Locke, a client of Novel; David Spargo, a financier, a friend of defendant Coffeen and an alleged international fugitive; Patrick Coffeen, an investor and friend of plaintiff Swanson as well as defendant Coffeen's father; Martin Mayfield, a shareholder in Novel; James Bernard; Gary George; and Officer Y of the Spanish national police force.² (Docket No. 1 at pp. 2, 6, 9 & Docket No. 12–1 at pp. 3–4.) He also alleges that each alleged false accusation is a separate and distinct cause of action for defamation.³ (Docket No. 1 at p. 6.) As a result of the false allegations, plaintiff Swanson alleges, among other damages, that he incurred significant legal expenses to defend himself; was unable to support several businesses that have subsequently failed; was unable to pay for one of his homes in Puerto Rico that was ultimately repossessed by the bank; could not pay child support which resulted in his ex-wife filing a “dead-beat dad” claim against him; and that he went through “horrific” experiences in the Spanish prison. Id. at pp. 6–10.

B. Procedural History

On May 5, 2012, plaintiff Swanson, a citizen of Puerto Rico, filed a complaint alleging that defendant Coffeen, a citizen of Tennesee,⁴ defamed him by falsely claiming that he raped her. (Docket No. 1 at p. 1.) On May 25, 2012, the Court issued an order to show cause, ordering plaintiff Swanson to show that the Court has personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant Coffeen. (Docket No. 6.) On July 13, 2012, plaintiff Swanson filed a memorandum in support of jurisdiction in response to the Court's order. (Docket No. 12–1.) Plaintiff Swanson amended the complaint on September 19, 2012, to indicate that defendant Coffeen had moved back to Tennessee from Spain. (Docket No. 14.) On November 30, 2012, plaintiff filed an informative motion to support a finding of personal jurisdiction that includes an attached affidavit of defendant Coffeen's testimony to a Spanish court. (Docket No. 15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDSA. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL STANDARD

“ Sua sponte dismissals are strong medicine, and should be dispensed sparingly.” Gonzalez–Gonzalez, 257 F.3d at 33. The general rule is that the party facing sua sponte dismissal must have an opportunity to amend the complaint or otherwise respond. Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.2002). Overall, sua sponte dismissals are only appropriate when “the allegations contained in the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are patently meritless beyond all hope of redemption.” Gonzalez–Gonzalez, 257 F.3d at 37.

B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION STANDARD

“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.2002). The most commonly used method of determining whether a case should be dismissed “for want of personal jurisdiction is for the district court to consider only whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Boit v. Gar–Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir.1992). When the Court relies on this method, “the plaintiff must make the showing as to every fact required to satisfy ‘both the forum's long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Constitution.’ ” Id. (quoting U.S.S. Yachts, Inc. v. Ocean Yachts, Inc., 894 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir.1990)); see also Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.2005) (stating that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant must be authorized by state statute and must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution). “Because the Puerto Rico long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the outer bounds permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court is limited only by judicial Due Process analysis.” Eon Corp. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 879 F.Supp.2d 194, 201 (D.P.R.2012) (citing LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2000)); Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir.1994).

III. DUE PROCESS PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a court to render a valid personal judgment against an out-of-state defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). “The Due Process Clause requires that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he not be present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Phillips, 530 F.3d at 27 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). “Due process requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of either general or specific jurisdiction. The critical factor in the personal jurisdiction calculus—both general and specific—is the existence of ‘minimum contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum.” Negron–Torres v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). “General jurisdiction exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant's forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.” United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir.1992). “Specific personal jurisdiction, by contrast, is narrower in scope and may only be relied upon ‘where the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant's forum-based contacts.’ ” Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1088). The Court will analyze general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction in turn.

A. General Jurisdiction

Plaintiff Swanson contends that the Court has general jurisdiction over defendant Coffeen. To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, “(1) the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state, (2) those contacts must be purposeful, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.” Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.2005). “Although a showing of ‘minimum contacts' is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, the standard for establishing general jurisdiction is ‘considerably more stringent.’ ” Cossaboon v. Maine Medic. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1st Cir.1984)). The first requirement, sufficient contacts, is satisfied when the out-of-state defendant's contacts “with the [forum] State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile....” Id. at 2853.

To support a finding of general jurisdiction over defendant Coffeen, Plaintiff Swanson contends that defendant Coffeen has admitted to “her wonderful vacations in Puerto Rico[,]” and “her fondness for Puerto Rico as her preferred layover destination to reach her family's properties in Punta Cana.” (Docket No. 12–1 at p. 14.) Plaintiff Swanson, however, fails to...