Swenson v. Culberson County

• Decision Date: 23 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. P-94-CA-35.,P-94-CA-35.
• Parties: Bradford SWENSON and George Lagarde v. CULBERSON COUNTY, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

925 F. Supp. 478

Bradford SWENSON and George Lagarde v. CULBERSON COUNTY, et al.

No. P-94-CA-35.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Pecos Division.

April 23, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Antonio Rodriguez, Farr, Texas, and David Horton, Dallas, Texas, for Plaintiffs.

Keith Stretcher, Midland, Texas, and Denis Dennis, Odessa, Texas, for Defendants.

NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY OFFICERS STEVE LAUDERDALE, FRANK DIESHLER, AND BRUCE WILLIAMS

BUNTON, Senior District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT is a motion to dismiss¹ filed by Officers Lauderdale and Dieshler, and a motion for summary judgment filed by Officer Williams. Also on file with the Court are the Plaintiffs' responses to Defendants' motions which have also been reviewed by the Court.

Plaintiffs Bradford Swenson and George Lagarde filed this lawsuit pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that their civil rights were violated by Defendants Steve Lauderdale, Frank Dieshler and Bruce Williams. All three Officers are being sued in their official and individual capacities, and are therefore claiming the defense of qualified immunity. Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," any claims to the immunity are to be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation before any other action is taken by the District Court. Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir.1993); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991).

After due consideration of the facts, pleadings, and applicable law, this Court is of the opinion the affirmative defense of qualified immunity should be upheld and that the three Officers named above should be dismissed from this cause of action for the reasons discussed below.

I. Factual Background

On November 10, 1993, City of Midland Police Officer Bruce Williams was in Culberson County, Texas, approximately three miles south of Van Horn on Highway 90 training and certifying Culberson County Deputy Sheriff Steve Lauderdale on the use of moving radar. The Officers were in a fully marked Culberson County Sheriff's vehicle and were both in full uniform. At approximately 4:15 p.m., Officer Lauderdale clocked with his radar a truck traveling 67 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour speed zone on Highway 90. Officer Lauderdale turned on his overhead lights and pursued the truck until it stopped on the side of the highway. While approaching the truck, Officers Lauderdale and Williams noticed it had a handmade license plate which read:

Officer Lauderdale informed Plaintiff Swenson that he was stopped for exceeding the speed limit and asked to see his driver's license and proof of liability insurance. Swenson informed Officer Lauderdale he had no driver's license, liability insurance, vehicle registration, and furthermore that his speedometer did not work. Officer Lauderdale further observed that Swenson was not wearing a seat belt. Officer Lauderdale told Swenson to wait while he proceeded back to his vehicle to obtain a citation book. As Officer Lauderdale was walking back to his vehicle, Swenson put his vehicle in drive and began pulling away from the two Officers. Officer Williams yelled for them to stop. Swenson stopped the vehicle and Officer Lauderdale told Swenson to exit the vehicle. Swenson refused to exit. Officer Lauderdale asked, and Swenson refused numerous requests to exit the vehicle voluntarily. Officers Lauderdale and Williams proceeded to forcibly remove Swenson from the vehicle. Swenson refused to cooperate and attempted physical assault on the Officers at which point Officer Williams took Swenson down to the ground on his stomach and placed handcuffs on him. Likewise, Plaintiff Lagarde refused numerous requests to exit the vehicle and responded that he wanted to see an arrest warrant. Officers Lauderdale and Williams removed him from the vehicle and placed him under arrest. Lagarde alleges that while he was being forcibly placed in the rear of the police vehicle, one of the Defendants closed the door on Lagarde's head resulting in "substantial injuries." At some point during this interchange Officer Dieshler arrived on the scene to assist the other Officers. Dieshler is likewise being sued by Plaintiffs.

Ultimately, Swenson was charged with failure to have a driver's license in violation of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6687b, failure to maintain financial responsibility in violation of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701h, operating an unregistered vehicle by having a fictitious number plate in violation of TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6675b-7, disobeying a police officer in violation of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, speeding and failure to wear a seat belt in violation of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, and resisting arrest in violation of TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03. Lagarde was also charged with disobeying a police officer and resisting arrest. Both Plaintiffs were given a hearing a short time later by the Justice of the Peace and entered guilty pleas. Although the status of the adjudication of the charges is not entirely clear from the summary judgment evidence, it appears both Plaintiffs were given a hearing before a Justice of the Peace and it does not appear that any resulting convictions have been overturned or expunged.

II. Qualified Immunity

Once a prima facie case under Section 1983 is established, the question becomes whether a defendant is entitled to some kind of defense against or immunity from damages liability. Although Section 1983 on its face makes no provision for defenses or immunities, beginning in the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court, relying on the background of tort liability and on policy considerations, conferred a qualified immunity defense to police officers. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). This qualified immunity defense reflects a balance between the interest in preventing, and compensating for, constitutional violations and the interest in avoiding the overdeterrence of independent decision making by government officials. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 451 (2d ed. 1986).

Local law enforcement officers who are sued for constitutional violations are entitled to immunity from suit if their conduct does not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Supreme Court clarified the Harlow qualified immunity standard in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The Anderson Court explained that the general right of due process of law is quite clearly established by the due process clause, but that not every alleged violation of the due process clause violates a known constitutional right. "The right the individual is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. The Court must look to the facts with which the officer acted and question whether the unlawfulness of the officer's act was apparent. Unless the unlawfulness of the officer's act was so apparent that no reasonable officer in Defendants' position could have believed in the lawfulness of those actions at the time, the qualified immunity doctrine protects the official from suit. The burden is on the Plaintiffs to plead specific facts showing violation of clearly established law by the Defendants, or the complaint is subject to dismissal. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3020, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994); Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir.1989); Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir.1985) (Plaintiffs must "state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.").

a. Federal Law Claims

Although Plaintiffs' Counsel have filed three amended complaints since the inception of this suit, it is nonetheless arduous to comprehend the federal and state claims being asserted in the most recent Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs claim that "Defendants in bad faith and with malice filed meritless charges and sic `resisting arrest' against Plaintiffs." Fourth Amended Complaint, at 7, ¶ 26 (filed April 10, 1996). Plaintiffs further claim Defendants' conduct was "under color of state law and in violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights ... and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" Id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiffs also claim "Defendants' conduct has denied Plaintiffs' Rights to Due Process and ... of their liberty and property." Id. at ¶ 28. This Court construes all three claims above to be one in the same, that is, the Plaintiffs' claim the Officers violated their due process rights both during the arrest and afterward by filing "meritless" charges against them.

1. Unlawful Arrest

An individual has a federally protected right to be free from unlawful arrest and detention resulting in a significant restraint of liberty and violation of this right may be grounds for suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1992). An arrest or detention may be unlawful if it is accomplished without due process of law as required by the constitution. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694-95, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Police officers are, therefore, required under the Fourth Amendment to make a determination of probable cause before any significant pretrial restraint of liberty. Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir.1992). A police officer...