T.C. v. State, 42A04-0503-JV-120.
Decision Date | 30 December 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 42A04-0503-JV-120.,42A04-0503-JV-120. |
Citation | 839 N.E.2d 1222 |
Parties | T.C., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Stephen P. Murphy, Jr., Murphy & Murphy, Vincennes, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
T.C. appeals from his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing Receiving Stolen Property, as a Class D felony when committed by an adult. He presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered T.C. to pay restitution without inquiring into his ability to pay.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered T.C. to serve one day in secured detention for each missed payment.
3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the restitution order.
4. Whether the appropriate measure of the victim's damages is the retail value of the stolen merchandise.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
On August 7, 2004, T.C. and his friend T.T. broke into Bicycle Outfitters, which is a store located in Vincennes. The boys stole several items, including skateboards, skateboard accessories, clothing, and cash. The State filed a petition alleging T.C.'s delinquency for committing acts that would constitute receiving stolen property and theft if committed by an adult. T.C. admitted to having committed an act that would be receiving stolen property if committed by an adult, and the trial court adjudicated T.C. a delinquent child on that basis.
Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that T.C. be placed at Gibault's School for Boys, but the court suspended that placement and ordered that T.C. serve two years of formal supervised probation. The terms of his probation included: completing forty-nine hours of community service, continued counseling, paying restitution, and paying fees and costs. Following a restitution hearing, the trial court determined that Michael McLear, the owner of Bicycle Outfitters, sustained damages in the amount of $3120, and the court ordered T.C. to pay one-half of that amount in weekly payments of $12. This appeal ensued.
An order of restitution is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and we reverse only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. J.P.B. v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.
T.C. first contends that the trial court erred when it included restitution in the terms of his probation without first determining his ability to pay. The State asserts that the trial court was not required to determine T.C.'s ability to pay in ordering restitution. In the alternative, the State contends that any error was harmless. We agree with T.C.
Indiana Code Section 31-37-19-5 provides that a juvenile court may order a child "to pay restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of the victim's loss, which the child may challenge at the dispositional hearing." Unlike Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3, which governs restitution in the context of adult offenders, there is no express statutory requirement that the trial court inquire whether a juvenile offender has the ability to pay before ordering restitution. But this court has recently held that "equal protection and fundamental fairness concerns require that a juvenile court must inquire into a juvenile's ability to pay before the court can order restitution as a condition of probation." M.L. v. State, 838 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind.Ct.App., 2005).
Here, because the trial court ordered restitution as a condition of T.C.'s probation, the court was required to determine his ability to pay but did not do so.1 This was an abuse of discretion.2 T.C. is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his ability to pay and to modification of the existing restitution order if the court determines that he is financially unable to meet its terms. See id. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's restitution order and remand for a new restitution order contingent upon the court's inquiry into T.C.'s ability to pay.
T.C. next contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that T.C. would serve one day in secured detention for any week that he fails to make a restitution payment. In particular, he maintains that the trial court cannot order that he be placed in detention without a hearing to determine whether he violated the terms of his probation. The State asserts that there is no error because the trial court's order does provide for such a hearing. We agree with the State.
Any change in a juvenile's disposition order, including revoking his probation, should be treated as a modification of the original order. In the Matter of L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). Indiana Code Section 31-37-22-3 provides:
(a) If the petitioner requests an emergency change in the child's residence, the court may issue a temporary order. However, the court shall then give notice to the persons affected and shall hold a hearing on the question if requested.
(b) If the petition requests any other modification, the court shall give notice to the persons affected and may hold a hearing on the question.
Here, the trial court's order states in relevant part:
That further, the Court determines that [T.C.] shall serve one (1) day in secured detention at the Southwest Indiana Regional Youth Village at the Court's discretion for any week that the Juvenile fails to make a restitution payment. In the event the Court imposes this penalty upon [T.C.] following a hearing, the parents of [T.C.] shall be financially responsible for the cost of said placement at the rate of one hundred ten dollars ($110.00) per day.
Appellant's App. at 48 (emphasis added). Because the trial court expressly provides for a hearing in the event that T.C. misses a restitution payment, there is no error.
T.C. next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at the amount of restitution. In particular, he maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support the award of $3120. We must agree.
Indiana Code Section 31-37-19-5(b)(4) provides that the trial court may order a juvenile delinquent to pay restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of the victim's loss, which the child may challenge at the dispositional hearing. It is well settled that restitution must reflect actual loss incurred by a victim. Smith v. State, 471 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). The amount of actual loss is a factual matter which can be determined only upon presentation of evidence. Id.
Here, at the restitution hearing, the State submitted an itemized list of merchandise that T.C. and T.T. had stolen from Bicycle Outfitters, and the total amount of stolen cash and merchandise was $2741. Michael McLear testified in relevant part as follows:
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