Tabor v. State

• Decision Date: 31 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 26143.,26143.
• Citation: 161 S.W.3d 862
• Parties: Lloyd E. TABOR III, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

161 S.W.3d 862

Lloyd E. TABOR III, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent.

No. 26143.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

March 24, 2005.

Motion for Rehearing and Transfer to Supreme Court Denied April 12, 2005.

Application for Transfer Denied May 31, 2005.

Ruth B. Sanders, Asst. Appellate Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Lacey R. Searfoss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge.

Lloyd Tabor ("Movant") appeals from an order overruling his Rule 24.035 motion after an evidentiary hearing.¹ His amended motion sought to vacate the judgment and sentence in two criminal cases filed against him. The motion asserted that the trial court lost jurisdiction to accept Movant's guilty pleas because of the protections afforded Movant by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law (UMDDL), §§ 217.450-217.485.² After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on the ground that Movant was not entitled to invoke the benefits of the UMDDL because he failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements concerning the notice that must be given to the prosecuting attorney. We affirm.

I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History

In July and August, 2000, the prosecuting attorney of Laclede County, Missouri, filed two felony complaints against Movant. At the time these complaints were filed, Jon Morris ("Morris") was the prosecuting attorney in Laclede County. The first complaint, which was filed on July 12 and assigned case no. CR300-896FX ("case 896"), alleged that Movant committed the class D felony of escaping from confinement in violation of § 575.210. The second complaint, which was filed on August 24 and assigned case no. CR300-1150FX ("case 1150"), alleged that Movant committed the class C felony of receiving stolen property in violation of § 570.080. After warrants were issued in each case, Movant was arrested and taken to the Laclede County jail.

Public defender Neal Frazier ("Frazier") was assigned to represent Movant in case 896 and case 1150. On September 18, 2000, Movant was still in the Laclede County jail. Hearings were scheduled in case 896 and 1150 that day. Prior to the hearings, Frazier met with Movant at the jail. During the meeting, Frazier said he intended to file a motion to have a special prosecutor appointed in both cases because of a potential conflict of interest. Although Movant did not get to attend the hearings, he was represented at each one by Frazier. On September 21, 2000, the Laclede County prosecutor filed a motion in case 896 and case 1150 requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor. On October 4, 2000, an order was entered in each case appointing Brian Keedy ("Keedy") as special prosecutor.

Sometime after September 18, 2000, Movant was taken from the Laclede County jail to the Fulton Reception and Diagnostic Center. He was then transferred to the Algoa Correctional Center for incarceration on another conviction. Movant arrived at Algoa in early October 2000.

On October 12, 2000, Movant learned that detainers had been placed on him by the Laclede County Sheriff's Department in case 896 and case 1150. On that date, a caseworker at Algoa gave Movant two forms entitled "Inmate's Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints (Missouri Only)." The first form referenced the detainer in case 896, among others. The second form referenced the detainer in case 1150. The case-worker had already filled out each form. Both contained the required director's certificate and both were addressed to "Jon Morris, Prosecuting Attorney." Movant read and signed each form, even though he knew a special prosecutor was going to be appointed in case 896 and case 1150 and the appointment might already have occurred. Movant did not tell the caseworker this information or make any effort to find out whether a special prosecutor had been appointed. Movant simply assumed, incorrectly, that the appointment had not yet occurred. After Movant signed the forms, the caseworker mailed copies to prosecuting attorney Morris and the Laclede County Circuit Court.

Movant's separate requests for disposition of the detainers in case 896 and case 1150 were received by the circuit clerk and filed on October 17, 2000. On November 2, 2000, the circuit clerk sent a copy of the docket sheets in case 896 and case 1150 to special prosecutor Keedy. Each docket sheet had an entry dated October 17, 2000 that stated, "Inmate's request for disposition of indictments, informations or complaints filed." Special prosecutor Keedy received only the docket sheets; he was not sent a copy of either request for disposition of detainer form on file with the circuit clerk.

On May 11, 2001, Frazier filed separate motions to dismiss case 896 and case 1150 for lack of jurisdiction because Movant had not been brought to trial within 180 days of the date his requests for disposition of the detainers were filed with the court. Both motions were taken up simultaneously at an evidentiary hearing held on May 21, 2001. The only witness at the hearing was the circuit clerk. She testified that special prosecutor Keedy received copies of the docket sheets in case 896 and case 1150, but he was not sent the actual detainer forms on file with the court. Frazier argued that the copies of the docket sheets sent to Keedy were sufficient notice to start the 180-day time period running. Keedy argued against dismissal. Although he was not called as a witness, he did state to the court that the circuit clerk did not send him a copy of either one of Movant's detainer forms. According to Keedy, the first time he became aware that Movant had filed the detainers was on December 5, 2000. The trial court overruled both motions to dismiss.

On May 22, 2001, Movant entered pleas of guilty in case 896 and case 1150. On that same day, the court entered judgment and sentenced Movant to consecutive terms of four years in prison in case 896 and seven years in prison in case 1150.

On June 18, 2001, Movant filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment and sentence in case 896 and case 1150. Counsel was appointed, an amended motion was filed, and an evidentiary hearing was held. At the hearing, the motion court judge, who earlier had ruled on the motions to dismiss, agreed to take judicial notice of the criminal files in case 896 and case 1150. The motion court also heard testimony from Movant. In due course, the court entered an order overruling Movant's Rule 24.035 motion. The order included the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 24.035(j). The motion court concluded that: (1) a written demand for disposition addressed to the prosecuting attorney is a fundamental procedural requirement; and (2) Movant did not demonstrate substantial compliance with the UMDDL because special prosecutor Keedy did not receive copies of Movant's request for disposition of detainer forms from the circuit clerk. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

Appellate review of an order overruling a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Smith v. State, 141 S.W.3d 108, 110-11 (Mo.App.2004). We presume the motion court's findings and conclusions are correct. Gray v. State, 108 S.W.3d 86, 88 (Mo.App.2003). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Morehead v. State, 145 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Mo.App.2004). Movant bore the burden of proving his claim for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 24.035(i); Felton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Mo.App.2003).

We also note that a Rule 24.035 motion is a proper procedural vehicle to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction to accept Movant's voluntary guilty pleas. See Rule 24.035(a); Carson v. State, 997 S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo.App.1999); Jamison v. State, 918 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.App.1996) (a claim that the court imposing the sentence lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so may be raised in a direct appeal or, alternatively, in a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief).

III. Discussion and Decision

In Movant's sole point relied on, he contends the trial court clearly erred when it decided that it did have jurisdiction to accept Movant's guilty pleas in case 896 and case 1150. Movant argues the trial court lost jurisdiction because: (1) Movant made a good faith effort to invoke the protections of the UMDDL; (2) he substantially complied with its procedural requirements; and (3) he was not brought to trial within 180 days after November 2, 2000, which is when Movant claims the circuit court and special prosecutor had "actual notice" of Movant's request for disposition of the detainers in case 896 and case 1150.

To decide the issue raised by Movant's appeal, we must interpret the provisions of the UMDDL. In State ex rel. Clark v. Long, 870 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.App.1994), we summarized the rules of statutory construction which we find applicable here:

In interpreting a statute, we are mindful that, insofar as possible, legislative intent is to be determined from the language of the statute itself. In doing so, words used in statutes are considered in their plain and ordinary meaning. The legislature is presumed to have intended what the statute says, and if the language used is clear and unambiguous there is no room for construction.

Id. at 936 (citations omitted).

Keeping these rules in mind, we proceed to examine the text of the provisions of the UMDDL that are outcome-determinative here. Section 217.450.1 states:

Any person confined in a department correctional facility may...