Tafero v. State
Decision Date | 11 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 49535,49535 |
Citation | 403 So.2d 355 |
Parties | Jessie Joseph TAFERO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Craig S. Barnard, Chief Asst. Public Defender, and Jerry L. Schwarz, Richard B. Greene and Jack A. Goldberger, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Benedict P. Kuehne, Basil S. Diamond and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, and Michael J. Satz, State Atty., and Linda DeBene, Asst. State Atty., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
Tafero was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count each of robbery and kidnapping and received two death sentences and two prison terms. He appeals these convictions and the attendant sentences. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. We affirm.
In the early morning of February 20, 1976, Trooper Phillip Black and Donald Irwin approached a Camaro parked at a rest stop on Interstate 95. Asleep in the driver's seat sat Walter Rhodes; at his side was Jessie Tafero. In the back seat sat Sonia Jacobs and her two children. As Black looked into the car, he noticed a gun at Rhodes' feet, ordered Rhodes out of the car, and ran a radio check on Rhodes and the gun. Eventually Black ordered Tafero out of the car, and, as Tafero exited through the driver's door, he and Black began to scuffle.
Eyewitness accounts vary as to what occurred next. A truck driver who was stopped at the rest area testified that Rhodes stood with his hands in the air while Irwin grabbed Tafero and held him against the patrol car. The witness then heard a single shot and a cry from the trooper, "I'm shot." Several rapid shots followed, and both the trooper and Irwin fell to the ground. The witness concluded that the shots came from the back seat of the Camaro.
A second eyewitness, another truck driver, also testified that Tafero and Black struggled, but added that Black pulled a gun on Tafero and Rhodes. While passing the Camaro on his way out of the rest area, the driver noticed Jacobs in the back seat. He then heard several shots and saw both Black and Irwin fall.
A third eyewitness was co-indictee Rhodes. Rhodes testified that when Black took the gun from the Camaro, Tafero passed another gun to Jacobs in the back seat. Black ordered everyone out of the car and, as Black assisted Tafero from the car, the two began to scuffle. Rhodes, with his back to the scuffle, then heard two shots which sounded as if they were fired from different guns. He turned and saw Jacobs holding a gun which Tafero then grabbed and fired at Black and Irwin, who fell to the ground. All three eyewitnesses agree that Rhodes, Tafero, Jacobs, and Jacobs' children fled in Black's patrol car. Later, the group commandeered another car and took its owner hostage. They were finally apprehended at a police roadblock.
Tafero challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of murder, but the evidence against him is overwhelming. In addition to the eyewitness testimony, bullets removed from the victims match the gun in Tafero's possession at his arrest. We do not accept Tafero's contention that Rhodes' testimony was unbelievable in that Rhodes actually did the shooting. Rhodes' testimony is corroborated by both the physical evidence and the other eyewitnesses' testimony. Additionally, both truck drivers noticed Rhodes' hands in the air when the first shots were fired. The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Tafero is guilty of the premeditated murder of both Irwin and Black.
Similarly, we conclude from our review of the record that the state presented sufficient evidence to support Tafero's kidnapping and robbery convictions.
We next consider alleged trial procedure violations. The appellant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by what he describes as an inherently prejudicial atmosphere surrounding the proceedings. He claims that while in jail police officers taunted and physically assaulted him. The trial judge took action to correct any mistreatment, and there appears to be no way that such conduct, if it occurred, affected the trial itself.
Tafero also complains of widespread publicity of the deaths and the fact that nearly every juror had heard something of the incidents. The trial judge carefully inquired into the prospective jurors' prior knowledge of the case and precisely instructed the jurors to avoid any outside influence. Although he did not sequester the jury, he admonished them not to discuss the case, not to listen to television or radio accounts, and not to read any newspaper articles about the trial.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the impact of pretrial publicity on a defendant's constitutional right of fairness in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975), where the Court stated:
The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have "a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.
At the same time, the juror's assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate "the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality."
Id. at 799-800, 95 S.Ct. at 2036 (citations omitted). 1
Neither the voir dire of the prospective jurors nor any other portion of the trial reflects that those selected to try this case were not impartial or unable to lay aside any impressions or opinions which may have resulted from pretrial publicity. The jurors vowed that they could and would decide the case on the merits from the evidence presented in open court. We are unable to discern that they violated this oath in any way.
Tafero contends that the general tenor of the proceedings precluded a fair trial. He complains of insufficient peremptory challenges, the flying of the courthouse flag at half-mast in memory of deceased police officers, and speeches made locally by the attorney general during the trial referring to the "turnpike murders." These circumstances do not appear to have affected the trial and are far from inherently prejudicial. Utilizing the test espoused in Shepperd v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), we find no reasonable likelihood that the matters described affected this trial. No irregularity at trial affected or changed the facts, prevented any party from presenting facts, or prevented the jury from impartially considering the facts. Tafero has failed to prove the existence of any prejudicial influence, and under the circumstances there was no constitutional unfairness. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).
We now turn to the testimony of Ellis Marlowe Haskew. Haskew is no stranger to the witness stands of this state. 2 At the start of the trial, shortly after learning that Haskew could help the prosecution, the prosecutor supplied Haskew's name to defense counsel. The trial court denied defense's motion for continuance. Four days later, on the morning of Haskew's testimony, defense counsel interviewed Haskew. The trial court denied a second motion for continuance which was based on Tafero's desire to further investigate the truthfulness of Haskew's story.
Haskew's testimony was brief. In essence, he stated that a few weeks prior to the shootings Tafero told him that he would never go back to prison. Haskew also said Tafero told him about a Taser gun and some armor-piercing ammunition that he had; such a gun and ammunition were used at the rest stop.
The trial judge permitted Haskew to testify only after a Richardson inquiry. 3 He found no prejudicial violation for the late giving of this witness's name. At most, any violation by the state was trivial, as was the testimony of Haskew. This is the significant difference between the instant case and Antone v. State, 355 So.2d 777 (Fla.1978), conviction aff'd. on later appeal, 382 So.2d 1205 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 287, 66 L.Ed.2d 141 (1980), in which a major thrust of the state's case was based on Haskew's testimony. Likewise, any alleged failure by the state to disclose that Haskew's attorney's fees were being paid by the Florida Department of Criminal Law Enforcement was harmless. Under the test in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), no new trial is required.
Tafero claims error in the admission of the fact he was on parole, the discussion of the Taser gun, and other items. He claims this evidence had no relevance to the charges against him, and, even if relevant, the volume of the evidence amounted to "prosecutorial overkill." We disagree. Some of this evidence was relevant to show that Tafero had a reason to kill any police officer who stood in his way, some of it was relevant to show that he participated in the shooting, and this evidence did not become a feature of the trial. The primary test for admissibility is relevance. 4 Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.1981).
The appellant protests the state's proceeding under the dual theory of felony murder and premeditated murder. Although this issue was settled in Knight v. State, 338 So.2d 201 (Fla.1976), the appellant attempts to distinguish that holding because here two other people were indicted for the same crimes. We fail to find this to be a valid distinction....
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