Tarrant Cnty. v. Carter-Jones
| Decision Date | 25 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-17-00177-CV,02-17-00177-CV |
| Parties | TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS APPELLANT v. MARGIELENE CARTER-JONES APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
While accompanying a family member to pretrial services on the morning of October 8, 2014, Margielene Carter-Jones slipped and fell on water in a hallway of the Tarrant County Corrections Center in downtown Fort Worth. She sued Tarrant County, Texas, and it filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming that governmental immunity barred Carter-Jones's claims. The trial court denied theplea, and the County appealed. Because Carter-Jones failed to plead and prove claims for which the County's governmental immunity is waived—in particular, because she has not shown that the County actually knew about the puddle on which she slipped—we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment dismissing Carter-Jones's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Background
On her way into work that October morning, Cynthia Marks—a Tarrant County pretrial-services caseworker who offices in the corrections center—saw a puddle of water directly in front of a locked men's restroom.2 The restroom is in an alcove that is separated from the hallway where Carter-Jones fell by a wall with an opening directly in front of the restroom. According to Marks, when she happened upon it, the puddle was roughly two feet long, was confined to the alcove, and did not extend into the hallway. She reported the puddle to support staff whose procedure was to call maintenance. She assumed that staff did so but did not "know for a fact" that they did. Regardless, the County does not deny that it knew about the puddle in the alcove.
About an hour later, Carter-Jones entered the corrections center through the same entrance Marks had used, and slipped and fell on water that was nowinto the hallway.3 Marks did not actually see Carter-Jones fall but saw her on the floor afterwards. Marks testified that the puddle in the alcove had expanded into the hallway where Carter-Jones fell—that is, beyond its original location behind the partition. But when asked if she had seen the initial water "moving" or had heard it "flowing" when she had first encountered it, Marks was unequivocal: "No."
Carter-Jones sued the County for personal injuries under the Texas Tort Claims Act (the TTCA), asserting negligence and premises-defect claims. Carter-Jones specifically pleaded that the County's governmental immunity was waived under the TTCA because her injuries were "caused by a premises defect that posed an unreasonable risk of harm, about which [the County] had actual knowledge and [she] did not, and for which [the County] would be liable to [her] under Texas law if it were a private person." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021(2), 101.022(a) (West 2011). The County answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. In its jurisdictional plea, the County asserted that Smith had failed to plead and could not prove claims for which the TTCA waived the County's governmental immunity. Specifically, the County argued that (1) Carter-Jones failed to plead negligence claims that were within the TTCA's governmental-immunity waiver, and (2) the evidence showed that the County did not know about the water on the hallway floor before Carter-Jones fell.
The County attached the following evidence to its jurisdictional plea: (1) Marks's deposition and affidavit; (2) an affidavit with the corrections center's floorplan attached from William Paul Patton, the operations manager for all county-owned buildings in downtown Fort Worth; (3) excerpts from Carter-Jones's deposition; (4) affidavits from Prentis Goss and Ashlei Belcher, two Tarrant County Hospital District employees who were working at the corrections center on October 8, 2014, and were summoned to help Carter-Jones after her fall; and (5) an affidavit from David Phillips, the County's facilities-management director and business-records custodian. Phillips attached to his affidavit photographs of the hallway and alcove and video-surveillance footage of Carter-Jones's fall from two vantage points. In support of her response, Carter-Jones submitted excerpts from her own and from Marks's depositions.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the County's plea. The County has appealed,4 asserting two issues: (1) the TTCA does not waive the County's governmental immunity for Carter-Jones's negligence claims because those claims do not involve the use or condition of personal property, and (2) the TTCA does not waive immunity for her premises-liability claim because the County's evidence proved that the County did not have actual knowledge of the water inthe hallway at the time of the accident, and Carter-Jones's evidence failed to raise a fact issue about the County's actual knowledge.
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question, and so we review de novo a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004).
When a plea challenges the pleadings, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 226. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor, accept all factual allegations as true, and look to the plaintiff's intent. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). If the pleadings do not suffice to establish the trial court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively show an incurable jurisdictional defect, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. But if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction altogether, then a jurisdictional plea may be granted without allowing a (necessarily futile) chance to amend. See id. at 227.
When a plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court must consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties to resolve thejurisdictional issues raised. Id. If the evidence raises a fact question on jurisdiction, the trial court must deny the plea and let the factfinder resolve the question. Id. at 227-28. In contrast, if the jurisdictional evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question, the trial court must rule on the plea as a matter of law. Id. at 228. This standard generally mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment. Id.; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
The TTCA's Immunity Waiver
Unless waived, governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the State, including counties, from suit. See Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). Relevant to this case, the TTCA provides a limited immunity waiver for personal injuries caused by the condition or use of tangible personal or real property if Texas law would impose liability on a private person for the same condition or use. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (), § 101.025 (West 2011) (); see also id. § 101.001(3)(B) (West Supp. 2017) ().
Merely referring to the TTCA in a petition does not establish an immunity waiver under the act. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) ( . To invoke the TTCA's immunity waiver, "the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity." Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003) (citing Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). In determining whether Carter-Jones met this burden, we consider the facts she alleged and, to the extent relevant to the jurisdictional issue, the parties' evidence. See id.; see also Biermeret v. Univ. of Tex. Sys., No. 2-06-240-CV, 2007 WL 2285482, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("We must look to the terms of the TTCA and then determine whether the liability theories pleaded, the facts pleaded, and the evidence presented demonstrate a claim falling within the TTCA's waiver of immunity.").
Carter-Jones's Negligence Claims
In its first issue, the County argues, and Carter-Jones concedes, that her negligence claims do not fall within the TTCA's immunity waiver because they do not involve the use or condition of personal property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2). We agree.
Carter-Jones did not specifically allege that the use or condition of personal property caused her injuries. She alleged that the County breached its duty of ordinary care owed to her by (1) failing to place warning signs; (2) failing to instruct or train its agents, servants, and employees to maintain a hazard-free environment; and (3) failing to supervise its agents, servants, and employees to ensure invitees' safety. We construe Carter-Jones's pleadings liberally in her favor, accept all factual allegations as true, and look to her intent. See Heckman...
To continue reading
Request your trial