Taylor-Hurley v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 28667.,28667.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Paula TAYLOR-HURLEY, Petitioner Below, Appellee v. MINGO COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent Below, Appellant. Pamela Varney, Betty Sammons and Taunia Hale, Intervenors Below, Appellees.

551 S.E.2d 702

209 W.Va. 780

Paula TAYLOR-HURLEY, Petitioner Below, Appellee v. MINGO COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent Below, Appellant.

Pamela Varney, Betty Sammons and Taunia Hale, Intervenors Below, Appellees.

No. 28667.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted March 20, 2001.

Decided July 9, 2001.

John Everett Roush, Esq., Charleston, for Appellee Hurley.

F. Thomas Rubenstein, Esq., Harry M. Rubenstein, Esq., Kay, Casto & Chaney, PLLC, Morgantown, for Appellant.

Cynthia E. Evans, Esq., Charleston, for Appellee Hale.

James M. Haviland, Esq., Crandall, Pyles, Haviland & Turner, Charleston, for Appellee Sammons. McGRAW, Chief Justice.

This case concerns the effect of W. Va. Code § 18A-4-8g(i) (2000), which governs the treatment of multiclassified school service personnel during a reduction in force. The appellant Mingo County Board of Education ("BOE") asserts that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County erred as a matter of law in upholding the construction given to the statute by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the Education and State Employees Grievance Board ("Grievance Board"), which has the effect of exposing multiclassified employees to reductions in force within the separate classification categories contained within their titles. We affirm the ruling of the circuit court, finding that § 18A-4-8g(i) clearly and unambiguously supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ and circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stretches back some six years and is, in part, before this Court for the second time. The underlying facts are essentially undisputed. Appellee Paula Taylor Hurley worked as a secretary for the BOE, as did intervenor Taunia Hale, each holding the title of "Secretary II." During the 1994-95 school year, Ms. Hurley worked as a secretary at Red Jacket Grade School and Ms. Hale worked at Thacker Elementary School. Both held one year contracts.

Ms. Varney and Ms. Sammons, also intervenors in the present case, worked in the BOE's central office and were both multiclassified under W. Va.Code § 18A-4-8(i)(60).¹ Prior to September 1, 1994, Ms. Sammons held the position of "Clerk II," while Ms. Varney bore the lengthy appellation "Switchboard Operator/ Receptionist/ Clerk II." Effective September 1, 1994, the BOE reclassified both Ms. Varney and Sammons by adding the title of "Secretary III." Thus after that date, Ms. Sammons was a "Clerk II/ Secretary III," and Ms. Varney was a "Switchboard Operator/Receptionist/Clerk II/ Secretary III."²

At the end of the 1994-95 school year, the BOE decided that circumstances warranted the termination of two secretarial positions. As a result of this reduction in force, the BOE terminated both Ms. Hurley and Ms. Hale, and placed them upon its "preferred recall list." Ms. Sammons and Ms. Varney remained in the employ of the BOE at its central office.

Appellee Hurley subsequently filed a grievance asserting that the BOE should have retained her as a secretary pursuant to W. Va.Code § 18A-4-8b, in that she had more seniority in that position than either Ms. Sammons or Ms. Varney. After Ms. Hurley's grievance was denied at Level I, a Level II hearing was held on May 3, 1995, before an assistant school superintendent. Ms. Hale timely intervened, claiming that she had a similar right to be retained on the basis of seniority. Ms. Sammons and Ms. Varney likewise intervened at this juncture to protect their interests in the subject secretarial positions. On May 11, 1995, the decision to retain Ms. Sammons and Ms. Varney was upheld.

The parties waived a hearing at Level III, and the grievance proceeded to a Level IV hearing on July 20, 1995. The ALJ subsequently determined that Ms. Hurley had a right to retain her secretarial position based upon seniority, and that Ms. Sammons, having the least seniority, was required to give up her secretary classification. The ALJ went on to reject Ms. Hale's status as intervenor, concluding that intervention could only be used as a "shield" to defend against a claim, and not as a "sword" to achieve a remedy otherwise obtainable by filing a separate grievance.

The Circuit Court of Kanawha County later upheld the ALJ's determinations, but on appeal, this Court reversed and held that as an intervenor Ms. Hale was entitled to assert an affirmative claim for relief. See Hale v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., 199 W.Va. 387, 484 S.E.2d 640 (1997)

.

On remand to the Grievance Board, additional evidence was presented regarding the employment history of Ms. Hale, which resulted in a second decision being handed down on April 8, 1998. In that decision, a different ALJ made the following factual determinations regarding the relative seniority of the four employees:

Hale 25 months, 10 days Hurley 16½ months Varney 15½ months Sammons 12 months

Notwithstanding these factual findings, which are not disputed in the present proceedings, the ALJ inexplicably concluded that Ms. Hale and Ms. Varney should have been retained as secretaries, to the exclusion of Ms. Hurley and Ms. Sammons. Ms. Hurley thereafter sought review before the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which by a final order entered on February 28, 2000, found that although the ALJ's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence,³ Ms. Hurley rather than Ms. Varney was entitled to retain her secretarial position given the former employee's greater seniority.⁴

In reaching this result, the circuit court rejected the contention that W. Va.Code § 18A-4-8g(i) insulated the multiclassified Ms. Sammons and Ms. Varney from being displaced through a reduction in force aimed at employees holding single job classifications: "The Court reads this statute to permit a multi-classified employee to be bumped by any employee who is senior to the multi-classified employee in any of the multi-classified employee's classifications."⁵ It is from this decision, in favor of Ms. Hale and Ms. Hurley, that the BOE now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As we recently explained in Napier v. Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., 209 W.Va. 719, 551 S.E.2d 362 (2001), "[t]his Court undertakes de novo review of action taken by a circuit court under the judicial review provisions of W. Va.Code § 18-29-7, in that we are bound to employ the same standard as that which the statute imposes upon the lower courts." 209 W.Va. at 722, 551 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1995)). "In other words, we give no deference to the circuit court, but instead undertake to apply the criteria of § 18-29-7 directly to the findings and conclusions of the ALJ." Id. (citation omitted).

Under W. Va.Code § 18-29-7, a party aggrieved by a decision rendered by the Grievance Board

may appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the grievance occurred on the grounds that the hearing examiner's decision (1) was contrary to law or lawfully adopted rule, regulation or written policy of the chief administrator or governing board, (2) exceeded the hearing examiner's statutory authority, (3) was the result of fraud or deceit, (4) was clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or (5) was arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

In undertaking such judicial review,

[w]e must uphold any of the ALJ's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts.... Nonetheless, this Court must determine whether the ALJ's findings were reasoned, i.e., whether he or she considered the relevant factors and explained the facts and policy concerns on which he or she relied, and whether those facts have some basis in the record. We review de novo the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts.

Martin, 195 W.Va. at 304, 465 S.E.2d at 406; see also Smith v. West Virginia Div. of Rehab. Services and Div. of Personnel, 208 W.Va. 284, 286, 540 S.E.2d 152, 154 (2000)

(undertaking plenary review where "[t]he decisions of the circuit court and the administrative law judge were rulings strictly regarding matters of law").

III. DISCUSSION

This case presents a straightforward question of law. The BOE posits that "multiclassification," as that term is defined by W. Va.Code § 18A-4-8(i)(60) (2000),⁶ should be recognized as a separate and distinct classification category, such that a reduction in force in any one classification category should have no effect on multiclassified employees.

In support of this argument, the BOE points to the fact that the term "multiclassification" is defined in § 18A-4-8(i) together with a multitude of other classification titles. On this basis, the BOE contends that the Legislature must have intended that multiclassified service employees should be treated as falling within their own classification category, and, since the reduction in force in this case involved only the secretarial category, the multiclassified employees were immune from the effects of the subject layoffs.

At first blush, the inclusion of "multiclassification" among the classification titles set forth in § 18A-4-8(i) would seem to support the BOE's argument that the Legislature intended to make multiclassification a separate employment category. West Virginia Code § 18A-4-8b para. 4 (1996) expressly provides, in relevant part, that "each class title listed in [§ 18A-4-8] shall be considered a separate classification category of employment for service personnel, except for those class titles having Roman numeral designations, which shall be considered a single classification of employment." In accord with this language, the Grievance Board at one time determined, based in part upon an interpretation placed upon the statute by the State Superintendent of Schools, that "multi-classified positions are separate and apart from their individual assignments and that those...