Taylor v. Promedica Mem'l Hosp., S–17–004
| Decision Date | 04 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. S–17–004,S–17–004 |
| Citation | 95 N.E.3d 909,2017 Ohio 7110 |
| Parties | Sharon L. TAYLOR, Appellee v. PROMEDICA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Theodore A. Bowman, Toledo, for appellee.
Michael S. Scalzo and Meghan Anderson Roth, Toledo, for appellant.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
{¶ 1} Appellant, ProMedica Memorial Hospital ("ProMedica"), appeals the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas granting appellee's, Sharon Taylor, motion for summary judgment, thereby entitling her to workers' compensation benefits for a fracture to her right femur sustained as a result of a fall that occurred on April 22, 2015.
{¶ 2} On April 22, 2015, appellee, a ProMedica employee, arrived on the ProMedica campus approximately 15 minutes before her scheduled shift and parked in a designated employee parking lot. As appellee walked from the parking lot to the HealthLink building where she worked, she stepped off a sidewalk and walked down a grassy slope. A five to six inch high curb separated the grassy area from a parking lot in front of the HealthLink building. As appellee stepped from the curb to the parking lot, she fell forward and struck her right knee on the parking lot pavement. Appellee originally reported that her fall occurred while attempting to adjust her coat after a gust of wind blew the coat up and she stepped off a curb onto the parking lot. After returning to the scene of the fall and observing a damaged curb where she stepped down onto the parking lot, she testified in her deposition that the broken curb caused her fall. ProMedica contends that a gust of wind caused appellee's fall. As a direct and proximate cause of her fall, appellee sustained a fracture of her right femur.
{¶ 3} On August 19, 2015, the District Hearing Officer of the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted appellee workers' compensation benefits. ProMedica appealed the decision. Following a hearing, the staff hearing officer affirmed the order granting benefits. Subsequently, the Industrial Commission of Ohio rejected ProMedica's appeal.
{¶ 4} On November 23, 2015, ProMedica filed its notice of appeal in the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas. On December 16, 2015, appellee filed her complaint with the trial court, in which she alleged that her fall occurred in the course of, and arose out of, her employment with ProMedica. Motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties in November 2016. On December 23, 2016, the trial court filed its decision granting appellee's motion and denying ProMedica's motion. Subsequently, ProMedica filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case was placed on this court's accelerated docket.
{¶ 5} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error:
The trial court erred in this workers' compensation case by granting the motion for summary judgment of Appellee Sharon Taylor * * *, because it misapplied the test to determine causal connection.
{¶ 6} The standard of review of the trial court's granting of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). This same standard applies when reviewing a summary judgment ruling by a court of common pleas from an appeal of the Industrial Commission. Conley–Slowinski v. Superior Spinning & Stamping Co. , 128 Ohio App.3d 360, 363, 714 N.E.2d 991 (6th Dist. 1998). Therefore, we review the trial court's grant of summary judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist. 1993).
{¶ 7} Summary judgment will be granted only when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978) ; Civ.R. 56(C). The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls upon the party who moves for summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). However, once the movant supports his or her motion with appropriate evidentiary materials, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶ 8} In its sole assignment of error, ProMedica argues that the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. ProMedica contends that the trial court misapplied the test for workers' compensation claims and that there remains a question of fact regarding the cause of appellee's fall, which would preclude summary judgment.
{¶ 9} In order be eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits, an injured worker must demonstrate that he or she sustained an injury, "whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of , the injured employee's employment." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4123.01(C). Both prongs of the statute must be met. Fisher v. Mayfield , 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271 (1990). Whether an injury is received "in the course of" employment is dependent upon the "time, place and circumstances of the injury." Id. The "arising out of employment" element "contemplates a causal connection between the injury and the employment." Id. at 277–78, 551 N.E.2d 1271. The right to participate in the workers' compensation fund is not based on whether there was any fault or neglect on the part of the employer or its employees, but whether there is a causal connection between an employee's injury and his or her employment, either through the activities, conditions, or environment of the employment. Id. at 276–77, 551 N.E.2d 1271. Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
The "arising out of" prong refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury, and whether the (sic) there is sufficient causal connection to satisfy this prong "depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including: (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident." Fisher at 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271, quoting Lord v. Daugherty , 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 423 N.E.2d 96 (1981) syllabus. This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and an employee may fail to establish one or more of these three factors and still be able to establish the requisite causal connection. Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid–Ohio , 142 Ohio St.3d 425, 2014-Ohio-4531, 32 N.E.3d 413, ¶ 14, citing Fisher at 279, 551 N.E.2d 1271, fn. 2 ; Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc. , 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 122, 689 N.E.2d 917 (1998).
{¶ 10} We have also explained that an injury occurs in the course of, and arises out of, employment where "the injury follows as a natural incident of the work and as a result of exposure occasioned by the nature, conditions, and surroundings of the employment." Power v. Bay Park Community Hosp. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1133, 2015-Ohio-1272, 2015 WL 1452982, ¶ 17, quoting Remer v. Conrad , 153 Ohio App.3d 507, 2003-Ohio-4096, 794 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). As a general rule, the workers' compensation statute must be "liberally construed in favor of employees." R.C. 4123.95.
{¶ 11} Notably, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
[W]orkers' compensation cases are, to a large extent, very fact specific. As such, no one test or analysis can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility. Nor can only one factor be considered controlling. Rather, a flexible and analytically sound approach to these cases is preferable. Otherwise, the application of hard and fast rules can lead to unsound and unfair results. Fisher at 280, 551 N.E.2d 1271.
{¶ 12} In reaching its conclusions in this case, the trial court relied heavily on Griffin v. Hydra–Matic Division of General Motors Corporation , 39 Ohio St.3d 79, 529 N.E.2d 436 (1988). The Griffin court held that "an injury sustained by an employee upon the premises of her employer is compensable pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4123 irrespective of the presence or absence of a special hazard thereon * * *." Id. at 82, 529 N.E.2d 436. In Griffin , an employee fell on a driveway between the plant where she worked and its parking lot as she headed to her car after work. Id. at 79, 529 N.E.2d 436. The trial court found that appellee's injury occurred on the employer's premises and within the "zone of employment," and was not caused by idiopathic reasons.
{¶ 13} ProMedica argues that the trial court erred in its reliance on Griffin and the "zone of employment" in awarding appellee workers' compensation benefits. Further, ProMedica argues that in order for appellee's injury to arise under employment, the trial court should have evaluated the facts and circumstances of this case under the totality of the circumstances. Finally, ProMedica asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the wind or curb caused appellee's fall.
{¶ 14} Appellee argues that her injury is compensable since it occurred in the course of her employment on the premises of ProMedica and arose from a "neutral risk."1 Appellee further contends that the trial court's reliance on Griffin was appropriate.
{¶ 15} We begin by considering the meaning and application of the "zone of employment" test.
{¶ 16} "As a general rule, an employee with a fixed place of employment, who is injured while traveling to or from [her] place of employment, is not entitled to...
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