Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Mid-Ohio

• Decision Date: 21 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2013–0892.,2013–0892.
• Citation: 32 N.E.3d 413,142 Ohio St.3d 425,2014 Ohio 4531
• Parties: FRIEBEL, Appellee, v. VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION OF MID–OHIO et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

142 Ohio St.3d 425

32 N.E.3d 413

2014 Ohio 4531

FRIEBEL, Appellee,

v.VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION OF MID–OHIO et al., Appellants.

No. 2013–0892.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 9, 2014.

Decided Oct. 21, 2014.

Plevin & Gallucci, Frank Gallucci III, and Matthew P. Cincione, Columbus; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, Cleveland, for appellee.

Willacy, LoPresti & Marcovy, Timothy A. Marcovy, and Michael S. Lewis, for appellant Visiting Nurse Association of Mid–Ohio.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, Cheryl J. Nester, Principal Assistant Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Stephen P. Buehrer, Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

O'CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal we address whether the doctrine of dual intent or dual purpose is applicable when determining eligibility for workers' compensation benefits in Ohio. We hold that it is not. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and judgment.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Beginning in November 2006, appellee, Tamara Friebel, was employed by appellant Visiting Nurse Association of Mid–Ohio ("VNA") as a home health nurse to provide in-home health-care services to VNA clients.

{¶ 3} On a typical work day, Friebel traveled from the home of one patient to another in her personal vehicle. At times, she stopped at the office to pick up mail or supplies or to attend meetings. If working on the weekend, Friebel was paid for travel time and mileage from her residence to her first patient's home as well as for her travel throughout the day and her return home. On weekdays, in contrast, Friebel was paid for travel time and mileage but VNA subtracted 24 miles from the mileage and 30 minutes from the travel time each day to represent the time and distance it would take Friebel to travel back and forth between her home and VNA's office, regardless of whether she actually reported to the office each day.

{¶ 4} On Saturday, January 22, 2011, Friebel was expected to travel from her home in Shelby, Ohio, to the home of her first patient of the day, who lived in Ontario, Ohio. Friebel decided to transport her daughter, her son, and two family friends to the Richland Mall in Ontario on her way to the patient's home.

{¶ 5} While stopped at a traffic light before dropping her passengers off, Friebel's car was hit from behind. Friebel sought workers' compensation for a neck sprain.

Procedural Background

{¶ 6} At every procedural step of this action, the conclusion reached was the opposite of the conclusion reached in the previous step.

{¶ 7} The administrator for the Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") initially allowed Friebel's claim for a neck sprain. VNA appealed, and a district hearing officer for the Industrial Commission vacated the administrator's allowance of the claim, denied the claim, and found that Friebel was not within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Specifically, the district hearing officer found that Friebel had not yet begun her employment duties at the patient's house when she was injured, and therefore, denied the claim.

{¶ 8} On Friebel's appeal, a staff hearing officer of the Industrial Commission vacated the district hearing officer's order and allowed the claim. The staff hearing officer determined that because the employer had conceded at a hearing that Friebel was to be paid both mileage and for her travel time from her home to the first patient's home on the day of the injury, the case was distinguishable from those on which the district hearing officer had relied to deny the claim. The Industrial Commission declined further appeal and VNA's request for reconsideration. VNA then appealed to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, where Friebel filed a complaint against VNA and the BWC seeking workers' compensation benefits.

{¶ 9} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of VNA. The court concluded that there was no dispute that Friebel was on a personal errand at the time she was injured, i.e., transporting her children and others to the mall, and thus, Friebel's injury neither arose out of nor occurred in the course of her employment. Diverging from the staff hearing officer's decision, the trial court concluded that it was "immaterial" that Friebel was paid for travel time and mileage on the weekends because at the time of the injury, Friebel was traveling to the mall and not to work. Friebel appealed.

{¶ 10} In a split decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment and held that, as a matter of law, the accident and injury arose out of and occurred in the course of Friebel's employment. The court of appeals remanded for proceedings consistent with its holding. The appellate court found that even though Friebel had intended to drop her passengers off at the mall, she had had the dual intent to travel to her patient's home, and that when she was injured, she had not yet diverted from that path. 2013-Ohio-1646, 991 N.E.2d 279, ¶ 21, 5th Dist. The appellate court also found that Friebel would not have been at the place where the accident occurred if she had not been performing her employment duties because she was on the route to the patient's home when she was injured. Id . at ¶ 26–27.

{¶ 11} We accepted VNA's discretionary appeal from the appellate court's judgment on two issues: (1) whether the dual-intent doctrine applies in Ohio workers' compensation cases and (2) whether granting summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party was appropriate. 136 Ohio St.3d 1491, 2013-Ohio-4140, 994 N.E.2d 462.¹

ANALYSIS

{¶ 12} An injury compensable under the workers' compensation system must have occurred "in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). This court has recognized that both prongs of this statutory definition must be met. Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271 (1990).

{¶ 13} The "in the course of" prong relates to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Id . This prong limits workers' compensation benefits to employees who sustain injuries while engaged in a required employment duty or activity consistent with their contract for hire and logically related to the employer's business. Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120, 689 N.E.2d 917 (1998).

{¶ 14} The "arising out of" prong refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury, and whether there is sufficient causal connection to satisfy this prong " ‘depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including: (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident.’ " Fisher at 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271, quoting Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 423 N.E.2d 96 (1981) syllabus. This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and an employee may fail to establish one or more of these three factors and still be able to establish the requisite causal connection. Fisher at 279, 551 N.E.2d 1271, fn. 2 ; Ruckman at 122, 689 N.E.2d 917.

{¶ 15} In addition to the factors set out in Fisher, this court acknowledged that "similar fact patterns have promulgated their own set of rules." Fisher, 49 Ohio St.3d at 280, 551 N.E.2d 1271. For example, for employees who travel regularly for work and who are injured away from the workplace during an employment-related trip, courts have generally held that the employee is entitled to benefits unless the injury occurred while the employee was on a personal errand. Woodard v. Cassens Transport Co., 3d Dist. Union No. 14–11–22, 2012-Ohio-4015, 2012 WL 3801327.

{¶ 16} For employees with a fixed place of employment, the general rule is that the requisite causal connection is absent when an injury occurs while traveling to or from the workplace—the "coming-and-going rule." MTD Prods. Inc. v. Robatin, 61 Ohio St.3d 66, 572 N.E.2d 661 (1991), syllabus; Ruckman, 81 Ohio St.3d at 119, 689 N.E.2d 917. Whether a place of employment is "fixed" is a fact-specific inquiry and depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the employment. Ruckman at 119–120, 689 N.E.2d 917 (holding that even when the employment calls for "periodic relocation of job sites," it may still constitute fixed-situs employment).

{¶ 17} Courts recognize various exceptions to the coming-and-going rule. The exceptions apply, for example, when the injury occurred due to a "special hazard" inherent in the employment or when the totality of the circumstances otherwise demonstrates a causal connection between the injury and employment. MTD Prods., at 69–70, 572 N.E.2d 661 ; Ruckman at 120, 123, 689 N.E.2d 917. But whether an employee is a fixed-situs or non-fixed-situs employee, the causal connection must be established in order for the employee to demonstrate that his injuries arose out of his employment. See Crockett v. HCR Manorcare, Inc., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2919, 2004-Ohio-3533, 2004 WL 1486082, ¶ 21.

{¶ 18} Because workers' compensation cases are fact specific, no one factor is controlling and "[n]o one test or analysis can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility." Fisher, 49 Ohio St.3d at 280, 551 N.E.2d 1271. The overarching consideration is that the statute must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of awarding benefits. R.C. 4123.95 ; Fisher at 278, 551 N.E.2d 1271.

Dual–Purpose Doctrine in Ohio Workers' Compensation Law

{¶ 19} When an employee is injured while traveling for both business and personal purposes, some jurisdictions recognize a...