Taylor v. State
Decision Date | 30 April 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2009–KA–00560–SCT.,2009–KA–00560–SCT. |
Citation | 162 So.3d 780 |
Parties | Michael TAYLOR a.k.a. Michael A. Taylor v. STATE of Mississippi. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Office of State Public Defender by Mollie Marie McMillin, George T. Holmes, Alice Theresa Stamps, Virginia Lynn Watkins, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. The Circuit Court of Hinds County convicted Michael Taylor of aggravated assault and sentenced him to five years. On appeal, Taylor's counsel filed a Lindsey brief, stating that she had identified no appealable issues.1 After an independent review of the record and the briefs, we conclude that there are no reversible issues.
¶ 2. On January 6, 2007, Michelle Finney arrived at a child's birthday party and parked her car on the street, blocking Michael Taylor's car in a driveway. An argument and fistfight ensued. After bystanders broke up the fight, Taylor shot Finney in the arm and fled. Two days later, Taylor was at friend's house when law enforcement officers arrived to execute unrelated arrest warrants. Taylor was detained after he tried to flee out a window in the back of the house. The officers brought everyone present to the living room and searched for weapons. An investigator noticed a black coat on the couch, which Taylor claimed. Upon discovering a handgun and narcotics in the jacket, the officers arrested Taylor for possessing the narcotics and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Later that day, police obtained an arrest warrant for Taylor's alleged aggravated assault on Finney.
¶ 3. In May 2007, a Hinds County grand jury indicted Taylor for the aggravated assault on Finney and for being a felon in possession of a firearm on the day of the assault. Eighteen months passed from the time Taylor was indicted until his trial. He raised a speedy trial claim in the circuit court, but it was denied by the trial judge. Taylor's trial was held in December 2008. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the aggravated-assault charge; the felon-in-possession charge was retired to the files. Taylor was sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with three years suspended. On appeal, Taylor's counsel filed a brief stating that she had identified no appealable issues. The Court reviewed the record and requested supplemental briefing, which the parties submitted.
¶ 4. The instant appeal is governed by Lindsey v. State, 939 So.2d 743 (Miss.2005), in which the Court established the procedure to be followed when “appellate counsel represents an indigent criminal defendant and does not believe his or her client's case presents any arguable issues on appeal.” Lindsey, 939 So.2d at 748 (¶ 18).
Easley v. State, 46 So.3d 345, 347 (¶ 11) (Miss.2010). See also Lyons v. State, 125 So.3d 653, 656–57 (¶¶ 12–13) (Miss.2013).
¶ 5. Taylor's counsel complied with the requirements set forth in Lindsey and filed a brief stating that she had scoured the record and had identified no appealable issues. The State agreed that the case was devoid of arguable issues and asked that Taylor's conviction and sentence be affirmed. Taylor did not file a pro se brief. Pursuant to Lindsey, the Court reviewed the record and requested supplemental briefing on two issues—one issue being whether Taylor's right to a speedy trial was violated. After reviewing the briefs and the record, we conclude that there are no issues that warrant reversal. Because the dissent disagrees on the speedy-trial issue and addresses that issue in depth, we provide our analysis as well.
¶ 6. Speedy-trial claims are analyzed under the Barker test, which requires a balancing of four factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The Barker Court explained that each case must be considered “on an ad hoc basis” and that it sought only to “identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right” to a speedy trial. Id. The Court wrote:
We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.
Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. See also Bateman v. State, 125 So.3d 616, 633 (¶ 59) (Miss.2013) ( ).
¶ 7. Both parties recognize that fifteen months elapsed from the date Taylor was indicted in August 2007 until his trial in December 2008. However, Taylor was in custody for several months prior to being indicted, creating a total delay of eighteen months or 550 days. The Court has held that a “delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.” Johnson v. State, 68 So.3d 1239, 1242 (¶ 7) (Miss.2011) (citing Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989) ). The Johnson Court wrote: Johnson, 68 So.3d at 1242 (¶ 7). Thus, a delay exceeding eight months serves to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. Id.
¶ 8. The only reason for the delay cited by the State and evident from the record is the congested docket. The Court has held repeatedly that “[d]elays caused by overcrowded dockets are not to be weighed heavily against the State.” State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1282 (Miss.1994) (citing Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss.1991) ); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 817 (Miss.1986) ( ); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062–63 (Miss.1985).2 Speedy-trial claims are raised frequently in Hinds County prosecutions, and the crowded docket is almost always at least part of the reason for the delay. In Travis v. State, 13 So.3d 320 (Miss.Ct.App.2008), nearly three years passed from arrest to trial, and the delay was due, in part, to the crowded docket. Travis, 13 So.3d at 326–27 (¶¶ 18, 22). The Court of Appeals held that Travis did not suffer prejudice and that his right to a speedy trial was not violated.
Id. at 330 (¶ 32). Then–Chief Judge King recognized, “While lamentable, it is nonetheless true that courts in the more populated areas of our state maintain a criminal docket which is so large that delay in bringing defendants to trial is a rueful byproduct.” Id. at 329 (¶ 28).
¶ 9. In Jenkins v. State, 947 So.2d 270 (Miss.2006), the majority of the delay was “attributed to either the state crime lab or the private company subsequently hired to complete the DNA testing requested by the State.” Jenkins, 947 So.2d at 277 (¶ 17). Recognizing that the delays were unintentional and caused primarily by the crime lab, which was “an instrumentality of the State,” the Court held that the reason-for-delay factor did not favor either party. Id. at 277 (¶¶ 17–18). See also Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 176 (¶¶ 18–20) (Miss.2005) (factor weighed only slightly against the State where delays resulted from crime lab backlog and replacement of the prosecutor); Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 48 (¶ 34) (Miss.1998) ( )(citing Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 730 (Miss.1996) ); Magnusen, 646 So.2d at 1281 ( ). Because the crowded docket was the only reason for the delay in the instant case, the factor weighs only slightly against the State, if at all.
¶ 10. Taylor made a speedy-trial demand in August 2008,...
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