Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott

• Decision Date: 01 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. B172127.,B172127.
• Citation: 129 Cal.App.4th 577,28 Cal.Rptr.3d 744
• Parties: Gil TELLEZ-CORDOVA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CAMPBELL-HAUSFELD/SCOTT FETZGER COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

28 Cal.Rptr.3d 744

129 Cal.App.4th 577

Gil TELLEZ-CORDOVA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CAMPBELL-HAUSFELD/SCOTT FETZGER COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B172127.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.

December 1, 2004.

Metzger Law Group, Raphael Metzger, and Gregory Coolidge, Long Beach, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Leck & Associates, Robert B. Leck III; Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Randall A. Miller, Hall R. Marston, and Tamra L. Bowman, Los Angeles,; and Bowman and Brooke, Jeffrey A. Swedo, Scott J. Stockdale, and Sonja Starins, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents.

ARMSTRONG, J.

This interesting product liability case was decided on demurrer. Plaintiff and appellants are Gill and Francisca Tellez-Cordova, and respondents are Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Company, Fisher Tool Company,¹ and Makita USA. The trial court found that the first amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. We reverse.

Facts²

Gill Tellez-Cordova worked as a lamp-maker. He cut, sanded, and ground metal parts, working "with and around" mini die grinders, angle head die grinders, straight shaft die grinders, disc grinders, random orbital sanders, and cut-off saws manufactured by respondents. (The complaint identifies each tool by manufacturer, and, for most of the tools, by model number.) He developed interstitial pulmonary fibrosis as a result of exposure to airborne toxic substances produced and released from the metal parts and from the discs, belts, and wheels used on the grinders, sanders, and saws.

As to respondents,³ the causes of action are negligence, strict liability based on failure to warn, strict liability based on design defect (that the tools lacked exhaust ventilation systems), fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranty, and (with Mrs. Tellez-Cordova as plaintiff) loss of consortium.

Factually, the complaint alleged that the tools were specifically designed to be used with abrasive wheels or discs, "for the intended purpose of grinding and sanding metals," that the tools "necessarily operated" with wheels or discs composed of aluminum oxide and other inorganic material, that when the tools were used for their intended purpose, respirable metallic dust from the metal being ground and from the abrasive wheels and discs was generated and released into the air, causing the injury, and that the "specifically designed, intended, and reasonably foreseeable use" of the tools resulted in the injury.

Appellants describe the complaint as alleging that the discs and wheels do not create respirable metallic dust unless they are used with respondents' power tools, because it is the speed and force of those tools which cause the dust to become airborne. This is perhaps not crisply alleged, but the complaint must be liberally construed (King v. Central Bank (1977) 18 Cal.3d 840, 843, 135 Cal.Rptr. 771, 558 P.2d 857), and the allegation is certainly inferable from the complaint's references to the "force and abrasive action" of the tools, alleged to create respirable dust.

The complaint alleges that respondents were aware of the danger, and that Mr. Tellez-Cordova was not.

On the design defect cause of action, the allegations are that the tools lacked "local exhaust ventilation devices necessary to prevent or minimize the release of metallic or inorganic dusts during the intended use of ..." the tools. The allegations on the failure to warn cause of action are the usual ones, that the tools lacked warnings that their intended use would result in the release of dust capable of causing disease, and lacked instructions concerning such safety precautions as use of a respirator. The fraudulent concealment cause of action alleges failure to disclose and concealment of hazards. The allegations of the breach of implied warranty cause of action are similar.

Legally, appellants relied on standard products liability law. They contended that respondents had a duty to warn of the known or knowable health hazards resulting from the intended use of their products. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549; Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal. App.4th 1218, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ["faultlessly made" product is defective if unreasonably dangerous to place in the hands of a user without a suitable warning and there is no warning].) On the design defect cause of action, they contended that they stated a cause of action under both the consumer expectations test and the risk benefit test. (Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181, 1185, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 580.)

The gist of respondents' demurrer was that they were not liable because the harm (if any) was caused by the wheels, discs, and belts, and not by their tools. That is, they contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because there was no allegation that the tools disintegrated or devolved into toxic dust—only the abrasives and the materials being ground did that. Respondents made this argument under several legal theories, including causation under Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 846, 980 P.2d 398, the component parts doctrine, and uncertainty. Citing Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 58 P.3d 450, Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 212 Cal.Rptr. 395, and other cases, they also argue that California has a bright-line rule that a manufacturer's duty to warn is restricted to its own products.

We are not persuaded that any of those theories support judgment on a demurrer here, under the facts alleged.

Discussion

The component parts doctrine

We begin with the component parts doctrine, the legal theory that is perhaps the best fit for respondents' contention. That doctrine "rests on `a line of cases holding an entity supplying a nondefective raw material or a component part is not strictly liable for defects in the final product over which it had no control.' (Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 772, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 322 citing Lee v. Electric Motor Division (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 375, 385-387, 215 Cal.Rptr. 195; Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 629, 157 Cal.Rptr. 248; and Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp. (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 669, 674, 96 Cal.Rptr. 803.) Under the rule of these cases, the manufacturer of a product component or ingredient is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product unless it appears that the component itself was `defective' when it left the manufacturer. (Lee v. Electric Motor Division, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 384, 215 Cal.Rptr. 195.)" (Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1550, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5.)

The policy reasons behind the component parts doctrine are well established: "`[M]ulti-use component and raw material suppliers should not have to assure the safety of their materials as used in other companies' finished products. First ... that would require suppliers "to retain experts in a huge variety of areas in order to determine the possible risks associated with each potential use."' [Citation.] A second, related rationale is that `finished product manufacturers know exactly what they intend to do with a component or raw material and therefore are in a better position to guarantee that the component or raw material is suitable for their particular applications. [Citations.]'" (Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1554, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 190.)

The Restatement explains that "A seller ordinarily is not liable for failing to incorporate a safety feature that is peculiar to the specific adaptation for which another utilizes the incomplete product. A safety feature important for one adaptation may be wholly unnecessary or inappropriate for a different adaptation. The same considerations also militate against imposing a duty on the seller of the incomplete product to warn purchasers of the incomplete product, or end-users of the integrated product, of dangers arising from special adaptations of the incomplete product by others." (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. d, p. 135.)

The doctrine applies to "`generic' or `off-the-shelf' components, as opposed to those which are `really a separate product with a specific purpose and use.' [Citation.]" (Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at p. 1554, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 190.)

Respondents claim to be suppliers of generic multi-use parts, asserting in their briefs that their tools have many uses, could come into contact with "a universe of grindable products," could be assembled using a variety of attachments from different manufacturers, and could be used to "manipulate all types of materials, including wood, plastic, glass, and most types of metals."

As appellants argue, these facts contradict the allegations of the complaint, and have no relevance on demurrer. The facts before us are not that respondents manufactured component parts to be used in a variety of finished products, outside their control, but instead that respondents manufactured tools which were specifically designed to be used with the abrasive wheels or discs they were used with, for the intended purpose of grinding and sanding metals, that the tools necessarily operated with those wheels or discs, that the wheels and discs were harmless without the power supplied by the tools, and that when the tools were used for the purpose intended by respondents, harmful respirable metallic dust was released into the air.

The policy reasons identified in the case law and Restatement have no application to these allegations. In order to provide warnings, respondents would not have to employ a huge variety of experts, but would only be required to know what happened when their tools were used for their sole intended purpose. Respondents ...