Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D.

• Citation: 830 S.W.2d 88
• Decision Date: 06 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. D-0592,CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS,D-0592
• Parties: 75 Ed. Law Rep. 608 TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, William N. Kirby, Commissioner of Education, Randy Gritzner, Ronnie Thompson, Joe Jacques, and Golda Davis, Petitioners, v.I.S.D., Newton I.S.D., Rockwall I.S.D., and Lyford I.S.D., Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 88

830 S.W.2d 88

75 Ed. Law Rep. 608

TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, William N. Kirby, Commissioner of Education, Randy Gritzner, Ronnie Thompson, Joe Jacques, and Golda Davis, Petitioners, v. CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS I.S.D., Newton I.S.D., Rockwall I.S.D. and Lyford I.S.D., Respondents.

No. D-0592.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 6, 1992.

Rehearing Overruled July 1, 1992.

Truman Dean, Jr., Houston, Mark W. Robinett, George A. Warner, Jr., Jefferson K. Brim, III, Austin, for petitioners.

John T. Fleming, Ted Mishtal, Austin, for respondents.

OPINION

GAMMAGE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment suit. We must decide whether a district court has jurisdiction, before a final administrative decision is made, to declare the standard of review the Commissioner of Education must apply in rendering his final administrative decision or to preclude the Commissioner from hearing certain claims. The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and held that four school districts were entitled to have the district court direct how the Commissioner must conduct the administrative hearing. 797 S.W.2d 336. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the district court's judgment dismissing the suit.

This cause arises from unrelated employment disputes in four different school districts. The conflicts arose when: the Cypress-Fairbanks ISD terminated a teacher, Joe Jacques; the Newton ISD refused to elevate a teacher, Golda Davis, to career ladder Level III; the Rockwall ISD terminated an administrator, Ronnie Thompson; and, the Lyford ISD considered a challenge by a teacher, Randy Gritzner, to a district policy that prohibited teachers from wearing beads to school. After hearings, the school boards of each district ruled adversely to each employee.

The employees appealed to the Commissioner pursuant to the Texas Education Code. ¹ In addition to claiming that the decisions against them were wrong, all four employees asserted that their due process rights under the United States Constitution had been violated, two of them contended that their rights under the Texas Constitution had been breached, and two alleged violations of Title 42 of the United States Code.

Subsequently, Cypress-Fairbanks ISD moved the hearing officer assigned by the Commissioner to limit his review of Jacques appeal to whether there was substantial evidence to support its decision. When its motion was denied, the Cypress- Fairbanks ISD filed suit in the district court. Shortly thereafter, the other school districts intervened. Together, the school districts sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Commissioner from conducting a de novo review of the boards' decisions and from considering the employees' constitutional and Title 42 claims. The school districts asserted the Commissioner could determine only whether there was substantial evidence to support the boards' respective decisions. They also argued that the Commissioner's statutory appellate jurisdiction over matters "arising under the school laws of Texas" did not extend to constitutional and Title 42 claims.

The district court dismissed the school districts' suit for want of jurisdiction. The district court based dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, rejecting, in turn, each of the district court's reasons for dismissal. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals reached the merits of the school districts' claims concerning the proper standard of review or the Commissioner's authority to hear the employee's constitutional and Title 42 claims. We conclude that the school districts' failure to exhaust administrative remedies precludes the district court from granting declaratory relief before the Commissioner issues a final administrative decision.

The Education Code must be read in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA). Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.1986). APTRA provides for correction of agency error only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp.1992). As a rule, a party to an administrative proceeding is not entitled to judicial review until the party has pursued correction through the prescribed administrative process. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 162 Tex. 1, 7, 343 S.W.2d 242, 246-47 (1961). An exception to the rule is that a trial court may intercede before administrative remedies are exhausted where the administrative agency lacks jurisdiction. Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex.1978).

Here, the court of appeals concluded that because the Commissioner intended to apply a particular standard of review, he overstepped jurisdictional bounds. Section 19(e) of APTRA lists agency errors that may be corrected after exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, including decisions in violation of statutory provisions, those made upon unlawful procedure, and those made in excess of statutory authority. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(e) (Vernon Supp.1992). ² The parties must complete the agency process before seeking a judicial...