The State ex rel. Baskett v. Woodson

• Decision Date: 30 October 1901
• Citation: 64 S.W. 774,164 Mo. 440
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. BASKETT, Supervisor of Building and Loan Associations, v. WOODSON, Judge
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

64 S.W. 774

164 Mo. 440

THE STATE ex rel. BASKETT, Supervisor of Building and Loan Associations, v. WOODSON, Judge

Supreme Court of Missouri

October 30, 1901 ^[*]

Order of circuit court quashed.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for relator.

The jurisdiction of State and Federal district courts are concurrent and the first court taking jurisdiction will continue in it to the exclusion of the other. Stanhart v Sibley, 19 A. 464; Works on Courts and Jurisdiction sec. 17; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U.S. 199; Merrill v. Lake, 16 Ohio St. 373; Booth v. Ableman, 16 Wis. 460; Powers v. Springfield, 116 Mass. 84; Desty on Removal of Causes, 74; Davis v. Life Association, 11 F. 781; Ward v. Todd, 103 U.S. 327; Walker v Flint, 7 F. 435. The rule is that one court of current jurisdiction has no power to interfere with the decrees and orders of other courts of the same jurisdiction. Mail v Maxwell, 107 Ill. 554; Dodge v. Worthrope, 85 Mich. 243. The jurisdiction of the Federal district court is statutory. It can be exercised only in the manner granted by statute. In re Barry, 42 F. 113; In re Barry, 136 U.S. 597. It has been the rule, with hardly an exception, since the days of Chief Justice Marshall, that as between courts of concurrent jurisdiction the court which secures possession of the subject-matter of the litigation will retain jurisdiction unto final judgment. Smith on Receivers, sec. 44; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608; Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473; Moran v. Sturgis, 154 U.S. 256; Stout v. Lye, 103 U.S. 66; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176; Railroad v. Vinet, 132 U.S. 478; Heidretter v. Oilcloth Co., 112 U.S. 294; Millikin v. Barrow, 55 F. 148; Remington v. Printing Co., 56 F. 148. Where two suits involving to a great extent the same subject-matter are brought, respectively, in a State and Federal court, that court whose process is first served obtains jurisdiction of all questions which legitimately flow out of the subject-matter in the case. Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago, 6 F. 443; Shields v. Coleman, 157 U.S. 168; Central Trust Company v. Railroad, 57 F. 3; Adams v. Mercantile Trust Company, 66 F. 617; Hughes v. Greene, 84 F. 833; Rodgers v. Pitt, 96 F. 668. A relinquishment of the right to administer upon the assets and property of the insolvent association, and a relinquishment of the duty of the receivers to report to the court, and of the court to hear and consider all actions taken by the receivers in the administration of the affairs of the estate, are not a relinquishment of jurisdiction. Indeed, it is elementary law that receivers must report to the courts which appoint them. They can not lawfully report to any other person or tribunal. It is the duty of the court appointing them to see that they make proper reports and if it is not done to remove them and appoint others. All of these duties, powers and privileges, we think, constitute questions of jurisdiction, and, when abandoned, work a complete destruction of authority and want of official duty. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 336; ex parte Crouch, 112 U.S. 178; In re James, 6 F. 853. It is well settled that when a court of equity obtains jurisdiction of an action for which it is authorized to render a decree, it will hold such jurisdiction for every purpose and for a complete determination of all the rights of the parties involved in the subject-matter of the cause before it, and will exercise its power in this regard to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and especially for the purpose of giving effect to its own decree. Kilgore v. Kilgore, 103 Ala. 614; Bivins v. Marvin, 96 Ga. 268; Wilson v. Dresser, 152 Ill. 387; Griffin v. Griffin, 163 Ill. 216; Railroad v. Walton, 150 Ill. 428; Blair v. Smith, 114 Ind. 142; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 49 N. J. E. 324; Balsley v. Balsley, 116 N.C. 472. The rule is well-nigh universal that after the appointment of a receiver, the property to which the receivership relates is to be deemed in custodia legis, and a levy of an execution or an attachment subsequent to such order will not be permitted, as it interferes with the receiver's right of possession. Railroad v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1; Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N.Y. 496; Skinner v. Maxwell, 68 N.C. 400; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315; Pickett v. Filer, 40 F. 313; Gates v. Bucki, 53 F. 966. The order transferring the property and the jurisdiction to the Federal court and requiring his receivers to report to that court and discharging them upon such report, being illegal, unwarranted and outside of the powers of the court, the district court, out of respect for the jurisdiction of the State court as well as of the comity which exists between them, which has heretofore been referred to, will, upon request, release its jurisdiction of the property and assets. Garner v. B. and L. Ass'n, 84 F. 3.

Vinton Pike for respondent.

OPINION

In Banc

Certiorari.

BURGESS C. J.

This is the second proceeding by certiorari in this case, the decision in the former case being reported at page 252, 61 S.W. A full statement of the facts as disclosed by the record which led to the decision in that case, to the effect that the circuit judge had no jurisdiction to make a final decree in vacation and the quashing of said decree is fully and fairly stated therein.

After the institution of the original proceedings in this case, Henry L. Gray, who was supervisor of building and loan associations in this State, died, and, thereafter, the relator Baskett, who was his successor in office, was substituted in his place.

On the sixth day of April, 1901, one George A. Cowden, who had not, theretofore, been a party to the proceedings in this case, filed in said circuit court the following petition to-wit:

"In the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri.

"State of Missouri ex rel. Henry L. Gray (now W. R. Baskett), Supervisor of Building and Loan Associations, Plaintiff,

"vs.

"The Phoenix Loan Association of St. Joseph, Missouri, A. L. Crawford, Susan Winter, Olivia M. Armstrong, Sallie Barnum, Thomas W. Ballew, Henry T. Allen, Joseph A. Jones, Frank C. McCutcheon, Lonnie T. Paley, James M. Irvin, Thomas I. Evans, Georgie B. Hill, Elizabeth Jones and Valentine Reigal, Defendants.

"Comes now George A. Cowden and shows to the court that ever since and long before the commencement of this suit, he was, and ever since has been, one of the shareholders of the defendant Phoenix Loan Association; that he was such shareholder when the intervening petition was filed herein by Crawford et al. in behalf of themselves and all other shareholders; and begs to refer to all proceedings in this cause as shown by the records and files as though the same were set forth and copied herein; and he respectfully shows to the court that he is a citizen and resident of the State of Iowa and that the Phoenix Loan Association, as shown by the record above referred to, is a corporation of the State of Missouri, having its office and place of business in Buchanan county in the State of Missouri; that he has commenced in the circuit court of the United States for the St. Joseph division of the western district of Missouri, a suit against said Phoenix Loan Association, said suit being for the object and purpose of settling and winding up the affairs of said association and to adjust the equities and rights of all parties interested in said suit, the scope of said action providing for bringing in all parties in anywise concerned or interested in the property and effects of said association; that your petitioner is advised that the action proposed by him is sufficient to accomplish a speedy, full and complete adjustment of all the rights and equities of the party aforesaid. Your petitioner is further advised that it is a matter of great doubt whether such adjustment could be accomplished in this suit in its present condition and that it is certain that if it can be accomplished in this action it could not be done without an expensive and a prolonged litigation. Your petitioner has in view and it is his purpose in this suit aforesaid, to have the receivers now in charge of the estate of defendant association dealt with on just and equitable terms, and to accomplish this it will be necessary to compel confirmation of certain acts done and performed by said receivers which could only be done by obtaining jurisdiction over all parties and persons who may have any interest or right to question or object to their acts; that this object can be completely, effectually and speedily effected in your petitioner's proposed action. He, therefore, prays the court to make an order directing the receivers herein to appear in said cause instituted by your petitioner and if receivers are appointed in said suit to transfer and turn over this estate to them and to account in said cause.

"Frank Hagerman, Attorney for Petitioner."

Indorsed thereon: "I hereby waive notice of this application.

"Stephen S. Brown, Attorney for Defendant."

Thereupon, the said petition was heard by the court, and the following order entered of record therein:

"In the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri.

"State of Missouri ex rel. Henry L. Gray (now W. R. Baskett), Supervisor of Building and Loan Associations Plaintiff,

"vs.

"The Phoenix Loan Association of St. Joseph, Missouri, A. L. Crawford, Susan Winter, Olivia M. Armstrong, Sallie Barnum, Thomas W. Ballew, Henry T. Allen, Joseph A. Jones, Frank G. McCutcheon, Lonnie T. Paley, James M. Irwin, Thomas I. Evans, Georgie B. Hill, Elizabeth Jones and Valentine Reigal, Defendants.

"Whereas the decree...