The State ex rel. Fath v. Henderson

• Citation: 60 S.W. 1093,160 Mo. 190
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. FATH et al. v. HENDERSON, Judge of Probate
• Decision Date: 19 February 1901
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

60 S.W. 1093

160 Mo. 190

THE STATE ex rel. FATH et al. v. HENDERSON, Judge of Probate

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 19, 1901

Motion to quash denied.

Silas B. Jones and Lyon & Swarts for relators.

(1) Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislative power of a State to raise money for public purposes, that is, for the support of the government and for all public needs. Cooley on Taxation (2 Ed.), p. 1; State ex rel. v Switzler, 143 Mo. 287; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo 479; Railroad v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 500; Sheehan v Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 158; Deal v Mississippi Co., 107 Mo. 470. A succession tax, or the price imposed by the State for the privilege of taking an estate by will or inheritance, is referable only to the taxing power of the State. It is an excise or duty laid by the State upon the right of a person to receive property by devise or inheritance from another under the regulation of the State. It can be lawfully exacted for public purposes only, that is to defray the necessary expenses in administering the government. State ex rel. v Switzler, 143 Mo. 315, 327, 328; Medicine Co. v. Ziegenhein, 145 Mo. 368; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 489. Revenue is the annual yield of taxes, excise, customs, duties, rents, etc., which a nation, state or municipality collects and receives into the treasury for public use. Webster's International Dictionary, p. 1233; Century Dictionary; 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 920; Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1040; Anderson's Law Dictionary, p. 889. The maxims on the subject of taxation assume that taxes are laid for the purpose of obtaining a revenue. Cooley on Taxation (2 Ed.), p. 11; 1 Desty, Taxation, sec. 1, pp. 1 and 2. The word "revenue," as applied to the income of a government, does not mean simply funds raised by taxation, but includes all public moneys which the state collects and receives, from whatever source and in whatever manner. State v. Ewing, 22 Kan. 712. When money is once raised by taxation it is revenue. Railroad v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 503; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 490. The Constitution enjoins a uniform rule as to the imposition of taxes on all property, but does not abridge the power of the Legislature to provide for a revenue from other sources. Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 491; Ex. Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 680. Taxation is divided into two general classes: (a) that which is laid to raise a revenue for the State or for some political subdivision thereof, and (b) that which is assessed for benefits arising from local improvements. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Newby v. Platte Co., 25 Mo. 271; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 509; Sheehan v. Hospital, 50 Mo. 158; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 529; St. Louis v. Clemens, 52 Mo. 143; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 387; Independence v. Gates, 110 Mo. 381; St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 455; City of Clinton v. Henry Co., 115 Mo. 564. From the foregoing it follows that all money derived by the State from the exercise of the taxing power for public purposes is accurately denominated the revenue of the State. Constitutional provisions, which prescribe the forms of laws or other methods of levying taxes, and the objects to which the revenue raised thereby shall be applied, are mandatory and self-executing; and all legislative enactments, as well as other procedures on the subject, which fail to comply therewith are void. Cooley Taxation (2 Ed.), p. 327; People v. Kings County, 52 N.Y. 566; Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Texas 272; Bank v. Barber, 24 Kan. 534; Graham v. Horton, 6 Kan. 354; Morton v. Comptroller, 4 S.C. 458; State v. Johnson, 28 La. Ann. 511; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 131; Railroad v. Thornton, 152 Mo. 575; State v. Payne, 151 Mo. 663; Andrew Co. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 31. (2) A statute which is in conflict with the evident purpose and intent of the Constitution is void. Railroad v. Thornton, 152 Mo. 574; State ex rel. v. Payne, 151 Mo. 672; Andrew Co. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 38, 41; Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 252. The Constitution, like an enactment of the Legislature, must be construed according to its plain intent. State v. Holladay, 66 Mo. 388; State ex rel. v. Macon Co., 41 Mo. 458; Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 254; State ex rel. v. Holladay, 64 Mo. 527; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (6 Ed.), p. 69. In construing the Constitution, the true intention of the framers must be arrived at if possible, and when necessary the strict letter of the instrument must yield to the manifest intent. State ex rel. v. Emmerson, 39 Mo. 89; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 266; State ex rel. v. King, 44 Mo. 285. In construing the Constitution the whole instrument is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part. Cooley, Const. Limitations (6 Ed.), p. 72; State ex rel. v. Holladay, 64 Mo. 526; Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 536. A thing which is in the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter. Coonce v. Munday, 3 Mo. 375; Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 535; Bryant v. Russell, 127 Mo. 430. To appropriate public money is to set it apart for, or to assign it to, a particular person or use, in exclusion of all others. Webster's International Dictionary, p. 74. The provisions of the Constitution in regard to appropriations of the revenue, and limiting the life of every appropriation act to two years after its passage, are self-executing. State ex rel. v. Holladay, 64 Mo. 526; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 268. "Regular appropriations made by law," are those only which are made at the regular sessions of the General Assembly occurring biennially. State ex rel. v. Holladay, 64 Mo. 526; State ex rel. v. Seibert, 123 Mo. 434, 435, by Sherwood and Burgess, JJ. (3) The general rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, applies to the construction of Constitutions as well as of statutes. Every positive direction of the Constitution contains an implication against anything contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint the purpose of the provision. Constitutional inhibitions need not always be express; they are equally effective and not the less to be regarded when they arise by implication. When the Constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition. State ex rel. v. Seibert, 123 Mo. 434, by Sherwood and Burgess, JJ.; State ex rel. v. Macon Co., 41 Mo. 458; People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 544; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 345; Commonwealth v. Williams, 79 Ky. 46; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 286; Railroad v. Railroad, 130 U.S. 25; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), pp. 78, 79, 93, 94; State ex rel. v. Withrow, 133 Mo. 513; State ex rel. v. Woodson, 128 Mo. 514; State v. Laughlin, 73 Mo. 447; Ex parte Snyder, 64 Mo. 61; Maguire v. State S. Ass'n, 62 Mo. 346. (4) If an act of the General Assembly is a whole and indivisible scheme, and its purpose is to accomplish a single object only, if the object designed to be attained is unconstitutional, the whole act is void. If the provisions of a statute are so mutually connected together as to warrant the belief that the Legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect the Legislature would not have passed the residue independently, then, if some parts of the act are unconstitutional, the whole is void. Cooley, Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), pp. 211, 212; State ex rel. v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 684; State v. Newell, 140 Mo. 287; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 353; State ex rel. v. Field, 119 Mo. 612; Railroad v. Brick Co., 85 Mo. 334; State v. Kring, 74 Mo. 624.

Daniel Dillon, also for relators.

(1) The Constitution provides that all revenue collected and money received by the State from any source whatsoever shall go into the Treasury. This is the first step. Having gotten the moneys of the State into the State Treasury, it expressly prohibits the General Assembly from diverting the same or permitting them to be drawn from the Treasury except in pursuance of regular appropriations made by law. It then specifically points out the order in which and the purposes for which the successive General Assemblies shall make appropriations. Then, so that there could be no room for doubt or cavil, it is expressly provided that no General Assembly shall have power to make any appropriation of money for any purpose whatever until the respective sums necessary for the purposes specified have been set apart and appropriated, or to give priority to a succeeding over a preceding item as above enumerated. See sec. 43, art. 4 Constitution. And section 19 of article 10 of the Constitution provides again that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury of the State except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor unless such payment be made, or a warrant shall have issued therefor, within two years after the passage of such appropriation act. And section 20 of article 4 provides that the General Assembly shall meet in regular session once only in every two years. These provisions clearly manifest the purpose of the framers of our Constitution in reference to the disbursement of the revenue of the State. In very plain and simple language they say that all revenue and moneys received by the State shall go into the State Treasury and that no General Assembly shall have power to divert same or permit it to be drawn out except in pursuance of regular appropriations made by law, and that all appropriations by the successive General Assemblies shall be made in the following order. Then follows seven distinct purposes specifically named and placed in a certain specific order. And, after mentioning the seventh purpose, viz., the pay of the General Assembly, this language is used: "And such other purposes, not herein prohibited, as it may deem...