The State v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 16 June 1922 |
| Citation | 243 S.W. 89,294 Mo. 504 |
| Parties | THE STATE, by AUBREY HAMMETT, Prosecuting Attorney of Randolph County, ex rel. ARTHUR ROBERTS et al., Appellants, v. CLAUDE STEPHENS et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court. -- Hon. A. W. Walker, Judge.
Affirmed.
A. H Waller and J. W. Wight for appellants.
(1) Respondents' answer does not state facts sufficient to plead a legal defense to relators' information, in this that said answer nowhere avers that the notice required to be posted by the Act of 1917 was approved and signed by the county superintendent, nor does said answer aver that the plat, likewise required by said act, was signed and approved by him. These are jurisdictional facts that must be pleaded otherwise, said answer is insufficient and constitutes no legal return. Laws 1917, p. 510; R. S. 1919, sec. 11256. (2) The court erred in admitting in evidence, the notice and plat for the reasons (a) because said answer does not plead facts sufficient to show that said notices and plats were legally executed and validated as required by law; (b) because neither the one nor the other was legally executed or validated by said superintendent as required by law; and (c) because said plat was neither signed nor approved or authenticated in any manner by said superintendent, and was illegally posted, contrary to the express provisions of the statute forbidding the posting of such unsigned notice. Laws 1917, p. 510; R. S. 1919, sec. 11256; State ex rel. v. Curtright, 205 S.W. 248. (3) The court erred in finding and deciding that said alleged notices of said special school meeting were legally approved and signed by the superintendent, contrary to the evidence and the greater weight of the evidence admitted on this issue. (4) The court erred in refusing to find the facts to be that said superintendent was guilty of official misconduct and gross abuse of his discretionary powers in attaching to and including within said district territory situate in other neighborhoods so remote that the children residing therein could not possibly attend the high school to be located in Cairo. State ex rel. v. Jones, 266, Mo. 197; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 649.
Hunter & Chamier for respondents.
(1) No strict or technical construction is to be put upon the statute authorizing the organization of a consolidated school district. It is to be liberally construed, and no strict or technical compliance with it will be exacted. All doubts are to be resolved in favor of the district. State ex inf. v. Jones, 266 Mo. 201; State ex inf. v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 279; State ex rel. v. Glaves, 268 Mo. 100; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 577; State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371; State ex rel. v. Stouffer, 197 S.W. 248; State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 1; Critten v. New, 212 S.W. 46; State ex rel. v. Long, 275 Mo. 169. (2) The common-law rule that pleadings must be strongly construed against the pleader has, by the codes, been either modified or abrogated, in favor of liberal construction. Sec. 1831, R. S. 1919. (3) Accordingly, in the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties; and especially in cases of this kind. State ex rel. v. Long, 275 Mo. 181; Thompson v. Livery, 214 Mo. 487; Ackerman v. Green, 195 Mo. 124; Lee v. Railway, 195 Mo. 400; Sidway v. Mo L. & Co., 163 Mo. 342; Baird v. Cit. Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 265; Vogelsang v. St. Louis, 139 Mo. 127. (4) The same rules apply in quo warranto proceedings of this character, as in any kind of civil suit. State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 25; State ex inf. v. Beechner, 160 Mo. 85. (5) The objection raised to the answer, as to unsigned and unapproved plats and notices, is not well taken; it should have been made by motion to make more definite and certain. State ex rel. v. Long, 275 Mo. 183. (6) The presumption obtains that the plats and notices conformed to the requirements of the statute. State ex rel. v. Long, 275 Mo. 183. (7) The evidence shows that there was a sufficient signing and approval of the plats and notices, under the statute; and as no specific objection was made to such evidence on the ground of unsigned and unapproved plats and notices, and since the answer could have been amended to include specific allegations of such signing and approval, the appellate court will dispose of the case as though such amendment was made. State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 381; Darrier v. Darrier, 58 Mo. 233; Baker v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 547; State ex rel. v. McQuillen, 246 Mo. 594. (8) A quo warranto proceeding, such as this, is in the nature of an action at law, and findings of fact of the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive on appeal; therefore the finding of the trial court that sufficient plats and notices were posted, and that blank plats and notices were not posted, is binding on the appellate court. State ex rel. v. Wright, 270 Mo. 387; State ex inf. v. Hall, 228 S.W. 1055; State ex rel. v. Peoples Ice Co., 246 Mo. 200; State v. Alt, 26 Mo.App. 673. (9) On the objection raised to the action of the superintendent, in determining the boundaries of the proposed district, there are two reasons why the decision should go against relators: First, because that question is not subject to judicial review; and second, because there was substantial testimony to the effect that the county superintendent did his duty. State ex rel. v. Glaves, 268 Mo. 104; State ex rel. v. Wright, 270 Mo. 387; State ex rel. v. Schuster, 227 S.W. 60; State ex rel. v. Stouffer, 197 S.W. 248; State ex inf. v. Hall, 228 S.W. 1057; State ex rel. v. Ice Co., 246 Mo. 200; State v. Alt, 26 Mo.App. 673.
This is a proceeding by information in the nature of a quo warranto, filed by the Prosecuting Attorney of Randolph County, at the relation of resident voters, citizens and taxpayers of the territory involved, for the purpose of testing the validity of the organization of Consolidated School District Number Four in the county named. Respondents are the persons chosen as members of the Board of District No. Four.
The information is not assailed. It charges that the attempted formation of the district is invalid for several reasons; that the respondents and certain county officers are threatening to act upon the theory that the district is valid and that public money is about to be turned over to respondents and expended without authority, and that respondents are usurping authority they do not legally possess, and calls upon them to appear, answer and show "by what warrant or authority they claim to have, use and enjoy the rights, privileges, powers and offices aforesaid," etc. In due time respondents filed answer, in which they set up the facts upon which they base their claim to the offices they contend they legally hold. These include various steps upon which they rely to show that District Number Four was lawfully organized. No demurrer to the answer was filed, but relators filed a reply in which they specifically denied, in detail, the several averments of the answer.
The evidence is in conflict upon several of the issues in the case. No declarations of law were asked or given. Upon the evidence the trial court rendered judgment upholding the district, and this appeal followed. In view of the character of the questions presented, the evidence relevant to the questions raised may better be set out, so far as necessary, in connection with the discussion of the points urged by relators.
The errors assigned and briefed are: (1) the answer is insufficient in that it fails to aver that the county superintendent signed and approved (a) the notices or (b) the plats which the applicable statute requires to be posted; (2) that the court erred in admitting in evidence the notices and plats, because (a) of the insufficiency of the answer mentioned under (1) supra, and (b) because the notices and plats were not "legally executed or validated by said superintendent," and (c) because the notices and plats were not "signed, approved or authenticated in any manner by said superintendent;" (3) the court erred in finding, "contrary to the evidence and the weight of the evidence," that the notices were "legally approved and signed" by the county superintendent; (4) the court erred in refusing to find that the county "superintendent...
To continue reading
Request your trial