Thibeault v. White
| Decision Date | 11 March 1975 |
| Citation | 168 Conn. 112,358 A.2d 358 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Carol THIBEAULT v. Henry C. WHITE, State Welfare Commissioner, et al. |
Francis J. MacGregor, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for appellants (defendants).
Robert P. Wenten, Hartford, with whom was Ralph U. Bergman, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, MacDONALD, BOGDANSKI and LONGO, JJ.
This appeal is from a declaratory judgment rendered by the Court of Common Pleas with regard to the disbursement of funds held in trust pending the resolution of this action. The matter was tried to the court upon a stipulation of facts, the relevant parts of which may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff was formerly a recipient of public assistance under the aid for dependent children program, hereinafter AFDC, administered by the state welfare department. The defendant White hereinafter commissioner, is commissioner of the welfare department. Prior to receiving public assistance and thereafter, the plaintiff was the owner of a certain parcel or real property, including a dwelling house which she occupied with her children, in the town of Stonington. In accordance with § 17-82c 1 of the General Statutes, the commissioner caused to be placed upon the land records of the town of Stonington a lien against the plaintiff's property for such sums as might become due to the state as a result of having furnished assistance to the plaintiff and her children.
Sometime prior to October 6, 1970, the plaintiff expressed to the commissioner her intention of selling the aforesaid real property. Thereafter, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the commissioner as to the disposition of the proceeds of the sale of the real property. The property was sold on October 6, 1970, the aforesaid lien was released, and after the state was reimbursed for the amounts due under § 17-82c, it was agreed by the parties that the remaining proceeds of the sale be placed in a trustee bank account pending determination of the ownership thereof by the Court of Common Pleas.
The commissioner claims the entire trust account as repayment for AFDC benefits, pursuant to § 17-83e. 2 The plaintiff, however, claims that in AFDC cases liability to repay from property owned prior to obtaining AFDC is limited to the extend of the lien obtained under § 17-82c. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff's contention and with her further claim that § 17-83e is limited to after-acquired property and ordered the fund disbursed to her, together with whatever interest it had accumulated.
The construction placed upon § 17-82c by the trial court ignores the plain meaning of the words contained therein, and thus violates a basic tenet of statutory construction. International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 133, 335 A.2d 236. When language is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by construction. State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835; Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36. The provision in § 17-82c for the recording of a lien to secure that portion of an AFDC award relating to amortization of a mortgage or other encumbrance is merely a limit upon the security the state may obtain to ensure repayment of benefits and is not a limit upon the obligation of the beneficiary to repay the full amount of public assistance. The meaning is clearly imparted from the phrase, 'in which case such lien shall secure the state only . . ..' Words in a statute must be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. General Statutes § 1-1; International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown,supra; State v. Briggs, 161 Conn. 283, 286-87, 287 A.2d 369. The crucial word in the above-quoted phrase is 'secure.' It has a special meaning in the law relative to protection of a debt against existing assets. In this context its meaning is defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary, page 2053, as: '3 . . . (1): to give pledge of payment to (a creditor) (2): to give pledge or payment of (an obligation) . . ..' and in Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), page 1154, as: '. . . To make certain of payment, guaranteeing against the possibility of nonpayment. . . .' Security is not a limit upon the debtor's duty to repay but merely delineates the extent of assurance of payment to the creditor from the debtor's assets. Thus, the statutes is not a bar to repayment of AFDC benefits beyond the amount of the lien.
After finding no inconsistency between § 17-82c and § 17-83e, the trial court proceeded to construe § 17-83e as applying only to after-acquired assets. It is obvious from a reading of these two statutes that the legislature intended to accord different treatment to families of beneficiaries of AFDC and beneficiaries of other forms of public assistance. It already had made provision in § 17-82c for full security for repayment of funds distributed to the latter. The intendment of § 17-83e was to grant to the state a priority claim for full repayment as against after-acquired property. As in the case of § 17-82c, it is not a limit upon the beneficiary's obligation to repay.
Further, § 17-83e has two distinct purposes. In the first part of the first sentence, before the semicolon, it creates a claim inuring to the state and grants that claim priority over other unsecured claims and unrecorded encumbrances. With regard to AFDC cases, the statute continues, after the semicolon, 'and, in addition thereto, the parents of an aid to dependent children beneficiary shall be liable to repay to the state the full amount of any such aid paid to or in behalf of either parent, his spouse, and his child or children.' That is, in addition to the claim given to the state against after-acquired property, the legislature has imposed upon parents of AFDC beneficiaries the liability to repay the state in full for benefits awarded. Such a construction is entirely consistent with the intendment of § 17-82c. Thus, the effect of § 17-82c is to secure to the state repayment, in AFDC cases, of whatever amounts represent the amortization of the mortgage or other encumbrance upon the homestead owned prior to obtaining benefits, the legislature recognizing the need to maintain a proper home for AFDC beneficiaries. The effect of § 17-83e in AFDC cases is to allow a claim against after-acquired property, 'and, in addition...
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