Thomas v. 5 Star Transp.

• Citation: 412 S.C. 1,770 S.E.2d 183
• Decision Date: 18 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 5298.,5298.
• Parties: George W. THOMAS, Employee, Respondent, v. 5 STAR TRANSPORTATION, Employer, and S.C. Uninsured Employers Fund, Carrier, Of whom 5 Star Transportation is the Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2012–211392.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina

412 S.C. 1

770 S.E.2d 183

George W. THOMAS, Employee, Respondent

v. 5 STAR TRANSPORTATION, Employer, and S.C. Uninsured Employers Fund, CarrierOf whom 5 Star Transportation is the Appellant.Appellate Case No. 2012–211392.

No. 5298.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 6, 2014.

Decided Feb. 18, 2015.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 2015.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 2015.

Michael E. Chase and Carmelo Barone Sammataro, both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, P.A., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Malcolm M. Crosland, Jr., of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Opinion

KONDUROS, J.

In this workers' compensation case, 5 Star Transportation appeals the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission's awarding benefits to Emily Thomas as George W. Thomas's putative or common law spouse. 5 Star contends the Appellate Panel erred in finding George's injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment because he suffered an aneurysm. 5 Star also maintains the Appellate Panel erred in finding Emily was George's surviving spouse because George was already married when they married. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5 Star employed George as a tour bus driver. On November 19, 2007, a bus George was driving on Interstate 26 left the road and collided with a tree. George was pronounced dead at the scene. The autopsy noted that George was “witnessed to slump over and become unresponsive prior to driving off the road.” Dr. Cynthia Schandl, who performed the forensic autopsy, found the cause of death was “full body blunt trauma complicating ruptured saccular aneurysm of the brain.”¹

George married Cynthia Whaley on February 9, 1995.² The two did not have any children together.³ George and Emily met in 1999 and lived together for about eight years prior to his death.⁴ On September 20, 2006, George and Emily had a marriage ceremony. George told Emily a day or two before the ceremony he and Cynthia were divorced. However, George and Cynthia's divorce was not final until February 9, 2007.⁵ Emily did not learn about the timing of the divorce until after George's death.

On June 26, 2008, Emily filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for George's death. 5 Star filed a Form 53, denying George sustained an injury. It also denied Emily was entitled to benefits because her marriage to George was void. The South Carolina Uninsured Employers Fund (the Fund) also filed a Form 53, denying George sustained an injury.

Dr. Schandl testified at her deposition that “there are so many different fatal injuries at that moment of the crash that it's kind of difficult to sort out which one would have made him more dead.” Dr. Schandl was unable to determine whether the aneurysm occurred before the collision or as a result of it but stated “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, this condition did not cause death.” Dr. Schandl noted two-thirds of patients with the same aneurysm would have survived with half of the survivors being “fine.” Dr. Schandl also determined “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, [George] died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision.”

The single commissioner conducted a hearing on the matter on December 19, 2008. The single commissioner found the marriage did not “ripen into a common law marriage” after George's divorce from Cynthia. Accordingly, the single commissioner granted 5 Star and the Fund's motion to dismiss the claim, finding Emily was not the surviving spouse. Emily filed a request for Commission review of the single commissioner's decision. The Appellate Panel reversed the single commissioner, finding it violated Regulation 67–215(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2012), which provides “[t]he Commission will not address a motion involving the merits of the claim, including, but not limited to, a motion for dismissal.” The Appellate Panel vacated the single commissioner's order and returned the claim to a commissioner for a de novo hearing.

A hearing was held on October 28, 2010, by a different single commissioner. The single commissioner determined George “sustained fatal compensable injuries by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment as a tour bus driver” for 5 Star. It further found Emily was the common-law wife of George at the time of his death and because of that and the putative spouse doctrine, she was entitled to all rights, benefits, and privileges of a surviving spouse.

5 Star filed a Form 30 requesting review of the single commissioner's decision. The Appellate Panel issued an order affirming the single commissioner's order. It determined George suffered compensable injuries because the evidence was that he probably would have survived the ruptured aneurysm and what most probably caused his death was the blunt force trauma suffered in the wreck. It found it was impossible to determine whether the ruptured aneurysm occurred before or after the wreck. The Appellate Panel noted George was driving at a high speed on an interstate and was therefore exposed to an increased risk of injury in the event a physical condition caused him to lose consciousness. The Appellate Panel also found Emily and George held themselves out as husband and wife to the public after George's divorce was finalized. The Appellate Panel accordingly determined Emily and George were common law spouses. The Appellate Panel concluded Emily should also be entitled to benefits under the putative marriage doctrine, which it believed South Carolina courts would adopt. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a workers' compensation appeal, an appellate court can reverse or modify the Appellate Panel's decision if the appellant's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.” S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–380(5) (Supp.2014). This court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the [Appellate Panel] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse whe[n] the decision is affected by an error of law.” Stone v. Traylor Bros., 360 S.C. 271, 274, 600 S.E.2d 551, 552 (Ct.App.2004).

“The substantial evidence rule ... governs the standard of review in a [w]orkers' [c]ompensation decision.” Frame v. Resort Servs. Inc., 357 S.C. 520, 527, 593 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.2004). The Appellate Panel's decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Shuler v. Gregory Elec., 366 S.C. 435, 440, 622 S.E.2d 569, 571 (Ct.App.2005).

Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.

Lark v. Bi–Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Arising out of and in the Course and Scope of Employment

5 Star argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding George's injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment because his death was caused by an aneurysm. We disagree.

“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). In workers' compensation cases, the Appellate Panel is the ultimate finder of fact. Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). When the evidence is conflicting over a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate Panel are conclusive. Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 290, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct.App.2004). “The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the [A]ppellate [P]anel.” Bass v. Kenco Grp., 366 S.C. 450, 458, 622 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct.App.2005). “[I]t is not for this court to balance objective against subjective findings of medical witnesses, or to weigh the testimony of one witness against that of another. That function belongs to the Appellate Panel alone.” Potter v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. 7, 395 S.C. 17, 24, 716 S.E.2d 123, 127 (Ct.App.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The general policy in South Carolina is to construe the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of coverage, and any reasonable doubts as to construction should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 S.C. 534, 541, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“To be compensable, an injury by accident must be one arising out of and in the course of employment.” Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 348, 656 S.E.2d 753, 758 (Ct.App.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether an accident arises out of and is in the course and scope of employment is largely a question of fact for the Appellate Panel.” Id. at 349, 656 S.E.2d at 758. For an injury to arise out of employment, the conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury must have a causal connection. Osteen v. Greenville Cnty. Sch. Dist., 333 S.C. 43, 50, 508 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1998). “If the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises out of the employment.” Crosby v. Wal–Mart Store, Inc., 330 S.C. 489, 493, 499 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Ct.App.1998). However, an injury does not arise from employment if it “cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and ... comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.” Id. The danger “need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its...