Thomas v. Greencastle Community School Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 67A05-9208-CV-286,67A05-9208-CV-286
• Citation: 603 N.E.2d 190
• Parties: 78 Ed. Law Rep. 984, 3 NDLR P 180 Shane R. THOMAS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. GREENCASTLE COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION and Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 190

603 N.E.2d 190

78 Ed. Law Rep. 984, 3 NDLR P 180

Shane R. THOMAS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. GREENCASTLE COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION and Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), Appellees-Defendants.

No. 67A05-9208-CV-286.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fifth District.

Nov. 24, 1992.

Delbert H. Brewer, Greencastle, for appellant-plaintiff.

Robert E. Cambridge, Bloomington, Robert M. Baker, III, Miller Woddell & Baker, P.C., Indianapolis, for appellees-defendants.

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge.

Shane R. Thomas appeals from the grant of summary judgment on behalf of the Indiana High School Athletic Association ("IHSAA") and Greencastle Community School Corporation ("Greencastle") on his complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in which he sought to bar enforcement against him of the IHSAA's Rule 4 regarding age limitations for participation in IHSAA sanctioned events. ¹ We affirm. ²

We find one restated issue to be dispositive of Thomas's appeal, that being:

Does Rule 4 violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? ³

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The IHSAA is a not-for-profit corporation, organized under Indiana law. Its membership consists of over 400 public and private Indiana high schools, including Greencastle. In exchange for their membership, Greencastle and other high schools have agreed to conform to the rules, regulations and policies of the IHSAA. IHSAA Rule 4 reads as follows:

"A student who is or shall be nineteen (19) years of age prior to the Age Eligibility Cutoff Date shall be ineligible for interschool athletic competition during all of the sports contest seasons of the ensuing school year; a student who is nineteen (19) years of age on or after the Age Eligibility Cutoff Date is eligible as to age during all of the sports contest seasons of the ensuing school year. The Age Eligibility Cutoff Date is August 15; in 2003 it is August 1; in 2004 it is July 1; and in 2005, and thereafter, it is June 1."

(Supplemental record, p. 16.)

Shane Thomas was a star running back for the Greencastle football team in his junior year. He turned 19 on July 7, 1992, the summer before his senior year. Thomas' advanced age was the consequence of his having repeated second grade due to a learning disability. In anticipation of his disqualification under Rule 4, Thomas followed the only administrative option available to him and proposed a rule change. The IHSAA considered and rejected his proposal. Thomas responded by initiating the present suit.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment against Thomas. The court based its judgment upon the dual conclusions that the IHSAA did not engage in state action and that the IHSAA rules were reasonably related to the objectives of promoting health and safety of the participants and of preserving competition.

Neither side in this case claims the existence of a genuine issue of material fact; rather, they each claim that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the parties have argued and the trial court has based its judgment upon two independently sufficient grounds, we will only address the latter dispositive issue of whether Rule 4 comports with equal protection.

The determination of whether a legislative or other classification violates the equal protection clause is often dictated by the standard of scrutiny applied to it. That standard, in turn, is determined by the nature of the classification itself. IHSAA v. Raike (1975), 164 Ind.App. 169, 178, 329 N.E.2d 66, 72. If the classifying criteria are grounded upon the "suspect traits" of race, national origin or alienage, or if they impinge upon a "fundamental right" such as the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, or the right to appeal a criminal conviction, we must subject the classification to strict scrutiny. Id. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the classification must be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest. Id. By contrast, where the classification neither is based upon suspect criteria nor involves a fundamental right, courts generally apply a low level of scrutiny to the classification. Under such an analysis, the classification must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. Id. Finally, an intermediate approach has been developed in cases where, although classifications are not drawn upon suspect criteria and do not involve fundamental rights, either the criteria used (such as gender) or the rights involved merit higher scrutiny than the traditional rational basis test. See Craig v. Boren (1976), 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, reh'g denied 429 U.S. 1124, 97 S.Ct. 1161, 51 L.Ed.2d 574; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495.

In Raike, the court applied middle level scrutiny to an IHSAA rule prohibiting married athletes from competing in high school athletics reasoning that, although neither marriage nor participation in high school athletics was in itself a fundamental right, a rule which simultaneously infringed upon both rights merited higher scrutiny. 329 N.E.2d at 76-77. In that vein, the Raike court cited Supreme Court cases that emphasized the vital importance of the right to marry, though those cases did not clearly define it as a fundamental right which triggers strict scrutiny. 329 N.E.2d at 74-75.

We believe that the rational basis test represents the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to Rule 4. Strict scrutiny is clearly inapplicable because Rule 4 does not base its classification upon a suspect trait or infringe upon a fundamental right. Raike 329 N.E.2d at 74. Middle level scrutiny is likewise inapplicable. Rule 4 only affects the right to participate in high school athletics. Unlike the rules in Raike and Haas it is neither coupled with some other vital right such as the right to marry nor gender based.

Thomas, however, relies upon Sturrup v. Mahan (1974), 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 and the recent case of IHSAA v. Schafer (1992) Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 540 for the proposition that something more than the traditional rational basis test is called for when reviewing IHSAA rules. In Sturrup, the court addressed an IHSAA rule which, with narrow exceptions, required students who had transferred to member schools to be enrolled in their new school for at least one year unless the parents actually changed their residence to the new school district. Sturrup, 261 Ind. at 464, 305 N.E.2d at 878-879. Without actually setting forth the level of scrutiny it was applying the court stated:

"The objective of the IHSAA bylaws regarding the transferee eligibility is to preserve the integrity of interscholastic athletics by minimizing recruitment, proselyting, and school "jumping" for athletic reasons. We believe that such practices at the high school level are despicable and odious and should, if possible, be eliminated by any reasonable method available. These transferee eligibility bylaws are reasonably related to the above-stated objective. That is to say, they are designed to and do, in fact, contribute to the realization of that goal. However, said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. [The rules] limit eligibility to those who move with their parents free of undue influence and to those whose move is necessitated by 'unavoidable circumstances' free of undue influence. All other transferring student-athletes, who cannot bring themselves within one of the above two categories, are automatically denied the opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletics for a period of one year. The bylaws, in essence, create an irrebuttable conclusion of law that all other transferees have been the victims of unscrupulous practices. This is precisely where the rules sweep too broadly, they create an over-inclusive class--those who move from one school to another for reasons wholly unrelated to athletics are grouped together with those who have been recruited or who have 'jumped' for athletic reasons. In short, the purported objective of the transferee eligibility rules is to prevent the use of undue influence...