Thomas v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority

• Decision Date: 10 June 1983
• Parties: Susie THOMAS v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 600

450 N.E.2d 600

389 Mass. 408

Susie THOMAS v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 7, 1983.

Decided June 10, 1983.

Michael J. Kallis, Mattopan, for plaintiff.

Barbara A. Fay, Boston (James G. Fay, Boston, with her), for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

This case raises the question whether G.L. c. 161A, § 21, ¹ the statute of limitations applicable to actions against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), controls the time frame for commencement of actions of contract for personal injuries against the MBTA. We hold that § 21 governs actions of contract as well as tort for personal injuries sustained by a passenger of the MBTA.

While a passenger on an MBTA trolley car on March 19, 1979, the plaintiff suffered bodily injury. Almost three years later, on March 1, 1982, she commenced an action against the MBTA by filing a complaint which alleged that she was a passenger on the MBTA's trolley when she was injured as a result of the negligence of its employees. The plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to make clear that she sought recovery in contract, not in tort. The MBTA had earlier filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the two year statute of limitations in G.L. c. 161A, § 21. The judge allowed the motion to dismiss without acting on the plaintiff's motion for leave to file the amended complaint. The plaintiff countered with a motion purportedly within Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and 59(e), 365 Mass. 761, 827 (1974), in which she sought "to set aside" the order of dismissal. That motion was denied. The plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Court, and we took the case on our own motion. G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A).

1. Application of G.L. c. 161A, § 21. The plaintiff argues that G.L. c. 260, § 2A, the statute of limitations governing actions of tort and contract to recover for personal injuries, should govern her action instead of G.L. c. 161A, § 21, which governs actions against the MBTA. The three year limitation in § 2A would leave the plaintiff with an enforceable claim, whereas she would be barred under the two year limitation of § 21. The plaintiff's argument fails to reckon with the language of § 21 which declares the MBTA's liability "for the acts and negligence of ... the servants and employees of the authority." It is true that in the next paragraph of § 21 there is a provision for liability "in tort to passengers ... for personal injury." The plaintiff insists that this reference to tort liability excludes from operation of the statute any passenger who seeks recovery for personal injuries in contract. We do not agree. The thrust of § 21 is a limitation on actions for personal injury, death, and property damage. There is essentially little difference between the elements of proof in a tort action for personal injury and a contract action for the same. Negligence of the MBTA, damage to the plaintiff, and a causal connection between the negligence and the damage are elements of proof in both actions. The distinction between actions in tort and in contract is insignificant, if it exists at all, in this setting except that the plaintiff in contract must prove that she had been a passenger. See Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 370 Mass. 612, 618, 351 N.E.2d 202 (1976). Cf. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 587-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973) (comparison of tort and contract theories in the context of medical malpractice). The duty of the defendant is the same whether the action is in tort or in contract. Tefft v. Boston Elevated Ry., 285 Mass. 121, 124, 188 N.E. 507 (1934), and cases cited. It appears that the measure of recoverable damages is the same under both theories if negligence is alleged. In sum, the essential nature of the...