Thompson v. Waits
Decision Date | 28 May 1913 |
Citation | 159 S.W. 82 |
Parties | THOMPSON et al. v. WAITS. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Falls County; Richard I. Munroe, Judge.
Action by P. V. Thompson and others against J. M. J. Waits. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.
Scott & Ross and Spivey, Bartlett & Carter, all of Waco, and Tom Connally, of Marlin, for appellants. O. L. Stribling, of Waco, for appellee.
Findings of Fact.
Appellants brought suit to recover an interest in certain lands in Falls county, Tex., alleging that said lands were formerly owned by J. M. Jackson and wife, Eleanor Jackson; that J. M. Jackson died in 1898, leaving a will, which was duly probated, by which he bequeathed all of his property to his said wife; that Eleanor Jackson died intestate April 8, 1910, leaving surviving as her only heirs her brothers, P. V. and J. M. Thompson, four children of a deceased sister, and one grandchild of said sister, viz., appellee herein; that by reason of said facts appellants P. V. and J. M. Thompson were each entitled to one-third of said land; that the four children of said deceased sister and appellee were each entitled to one-fifteenth thereof. Appellants further alleged that appellee had taken exclusive possession of said land, and was claiming the same in fee simple, by virtue of the following instrument:
That no children were ever born to said J. M. and Eleanor Jackson, and that at the time of the execution of said instrument they had reached an age at which they did not expect any children to be born to them. Said instrument was recorded in the office of the county clerk of Falls county April 20, 1887. Appellees excepted to said petition upon the ground that said written instrument showed that appellee was the owner in fee simple and entitled to the possession of the land herein sued for. The court sustained this exception, and, appellants declining to amend, have brought this action of the trial court before us, on this appeal, for review.
1. The law with reference to adoption, in so far as applicable to this case, is as follows (Acts 1849-50, c. 39; R. S. [1895] arts. 1, 2):
2. The contentions of appellee, as we gather from the brief and argument of his able counsel, are substantially as follows: (1) The first part of said instrument is a full compliance with our statute with reference to adoption; (2) the subsequent part of said instrument should not be construed as evidencing an intention contrary to the first part, for the reason that it is so vague and uncertain that the intention of the makers cannot be deduced therefrom; (3) looking to the whole instrument, it appears that the controlling purpose of the makers thereof was to adopt appellee, and to "confer upon him all the rights and privileges" provided for in our statute of adoption. These contentions have appealed to us with considerable force, and it is with much hesitancy that we have felt ourselves constrained to reject them.
3. If the appellee was adopted, as provided for in said statute, he is, under the facts of this case, the only heir of Eleanor Jackson, and the owner in fee simple of the land in controversy, the interest of J. M. Jackson in said land having been bequeathed to said Eleanor Jackson. If the first part of said instrument be alone looked to, it constitutes a full compliance with our statute as to adoption.
4. A primary rule of construction of a written instrument is that, if possible, effect must be given to every clause thereof. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15, 122 S. W. 16; Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 806; Smith v. Brown, 66 Tex. 545, 1 S. W. 573; Moore v. Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S. W. 61-63. Hence it is our duty not to reject the second clause of said instrument, if under a reasonable construction of the whole instrument both clauses can be given an effect that will harmonize the apparent contradictions. In order to determine whether or not this can be done, we must look to the entire instrument, in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 50 Am. Rep. 542; Hearne v. Gillett, 62 Tex. 26; Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 652; McHugh v. Gallagher, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 201, 20 S. W. 1115.
5. Should the apparent contradictions in the second clause be rejected, for the reason that it is manifest that the leading purpose of the makers of said instrument was to adopt appellee as their legal heir, as provided for in our statute? If a contrary purpose is inferable from the second clause, does it appear that such purpose was subsidiary to the main purpose, and therefore should not be given effect? It is a rule of law that where two purposes or intents may be inferred from the language used in a written instrument, and the main purpose of such instrument clearly appears, such main purpose will control. Hancock v. Butler, supra; Parrish v. Mills, 102 S. W. 187, and authorities there cited.
6. But this rule means that where language is used which is...
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...The rule is that repugnant clauses which cannot be reconciled destroy each other, and render the contract void. Tompson v. Waits (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 82. These clauses are not merely "apparently repugnant"; they are glaringly inconsistent and conflicting, and are not ambiguous, and fo......
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...by the entire contract. We, therefore, decline to attribute to such words their strict technical meaning and effect. Thompson v. Waits, Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W. 82, 84, writ refused. The parties could not by such language have intended them in their strict technical meaning and signification.......
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