Thornton v. Thyssen Krupp Elevator Mfg., Inc., No. W2006-00254-SC-WCM-WC (Tenn. 4/24/2007), W2006-00254-SC-WCM-WC.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. W2006-00254-SC-WCM-WC.,W2006-00254-SC-WCM-WC. |
| Parties | JAMES W. THORNTON v. THYSSEN KRUPP ELEVATOR MFG., INC. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Art D. Wells, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, James W. Thornton.
Gregory D. Jordan and Todd D. Siroky, Jackson, Tennessee for the Appellee, Thyssen Krupp Elevator Mfg., Inc.
Robert E. Corlew, SP. J. delivered the opinion of the court, in which Janice M. Holder, J. and Donald P. Harris SR. J., joined.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee suffered an injury to his leg when his knee buckled while he walked across the floor of the Employer's warehouse. The trial court dismissed his cause of action, finding that the injury was idiopathic and not compensable because the Employee had not proven any hazard incident to the employment that caused or exacerbated his injury. The Employee appealed. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the decision of the trial court.
Before the Court is an action in which the facts are largely uncontested. On March 15, 2004, James W. Thornton ("the Employee") suffered an injury to his right leg while at his place of employment and working within the course and scope of his duties as a shipping clerk. The Employee related the history to the treating physician, Mark Harriman, M.D., who testified the Employee was 1 The Employee claims that he is entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law, while Thyssen Krupp Elevator Manufacturing, Incorporated ("the Employer") asserts that the Employee simply suffered an idiopathic2 injury for which no compensation is due.
The Employee had worked for the Employer and its predecessors for twenty-seven years. For the last fifteen of those years, he served as a shipping clerk. He testified he sustained an injury to his right knee on March 15, 2004, when he was searching for a "skid"3 to find a part that he needed to complete the filling of an order. The Employee testified he was walking within the Employer's warehouse, and, when he thought that he saw the skid for which he was looking, he stopped walking. At that moment, his right knee gave way. The Employee described the incident by stating, He reported the incident immediately to his supervisor. The Employee attempted to work the next day. Dr. Harriman found the Employee had suffered an acute medial meniscus tear. He performed an arthroscopy and arthroscopic partial medial meniscectomey and chondroplasty of the patellofemoral joint. Post surgery, Dr. Harriman found the Employee had suffered a complex tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus. He had Grade II chondromalacia of the medial femoral condyle, Grade II chondromalacia of the patella, and Grade III chondromalacia of the trochlear groove.
The Employee was fifty-one years of age at the time of trial. He attended two years of high school before leaving to help his ailing father. He was unable to obtain a GED on two occasions. Before commencing work for the Employer herein, the Employee hung paneling for a mobile home manufacturer, ran a molding machine for a telecommunications company, worked as a parts receiver for a store fixture company, and worked as a general laborer and performed utility work for two construction companies. When he began work for the Employer, the Employee first worked as a utility man and as a packer and crater. For fifteen years prior to his injury, the Employee was a shipping clerk. As a shipping clerk, he pulled parts to complete orders for shipment, placed bar codes and address labels on the orders, scanned the orders, and placed them on outgoing transportation. While working for the Employer, the Employee also worked for a time as a pastor of a church.
The treating physician, Dr. Harriman, described the Employee as a Dr. Harriman found that the Employee sustained two percent anatomical impairment apportioned to the right leg, or one percent to the whole person. He did not recommend any work restrictions.
There was testimony that before the March 15, 2004 incident, the Employee had never had any buckling or difficulty with the right knee. The claim was treated as compensable by the Employer until after Dr. Harriman performed surgery. Dr. Harriman assigned a two percent right leg anatomical impairment due to the meniscectomy. He did not award any impairment for the chondromalacia of the patella, trochlear groove, or femoral condyle.
Dr. Harriman testified that he did not know why the Employee's knee buckled and explained:
This did not look like a degenerative tear. They have a certain look to them. This looked like a tear that had happened probably about when [the Employee] said it did, and it most likely happened as he's struggling to stay on his feet after his knee buckled. I don't know why his knee buckled. It could be his arthritis, it could be his weight, it could be that he just got unlucky and his knee buckled, you know, we don't know.
Dr. Joseph C. Boals, III, M.D. conducted an independent evaluation of the Employee on October 11, 2004. Dr. Boals opined that the causation was the work the Employee did. Dr. Boals explained the incident as related to him by the Employee who informed him that
I walked from my desk approximately fifty to seventy-five feet to a rack looking for a job number, looking up, stopped, top of my right knee went out over the bottom of the right knee. I caught myself with my left leg. I was unable to bear weight on the right knee for a while. My knee became very painful as I was walking to the office.
In response to questioning about causation and whether there was a permanent physical or anatomical impairment as a result of this injury, Dr. Boals testified that
So that's sort of what he said. It was that incident I think that sort of really came—brought all this to a head.
. . .
[A]s an examiner I'm going to agree that some of these arthritic changes found at surgery were probably already there, it's pretty obvious that Mr. Thornton had an incident that increased his symptoms and brought it into an aggravated state and required the surgery that he had; and even though part of the surgery involved removing some of this arthritis, it was still—the necessity was created by his injury in my opinion; and the most—the greatest functional loss here in the fact that he can't straighten his knee out any longer.
Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(2). Thus, we are required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine the preponderance of the evidence. With respect to the testimony of the Employee, the trial court had the opportunity to determine his credibility based upon his testimony in person before the court. When the trial court has observed the witnesses and heard their testimony, especially where issues of credibility and the weight of testimony are involved, we must extend considerable deference to the trial court's findings. Whirlpool Corp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002). When the medical proof is presented by deposition, however, we must determine the weight to be given to the expert testimony and draw our own conclusions with regard to the issues of credibility with respect to the expert proof. Bohanan v. City of Knoxville, 136 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tenn. 2004); Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn. 1997); Elmore v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 824 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tenn. 1992). Conclusions of law established by the trial court come to us without any presumption of correctness. Perrin v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 120 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tenn. 2003).
The primary issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee's injury arose out of his employment. Whether an injury resulting from an idiopathic fall is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act is a question of law. Phillips v. A & H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tenn. 2004) Whether an injury arose out of and in the course of a worker's employment is a question of fact. Id. We have recognized that the causal relationship between the Employee's employment and the injury must be established by the preponderance of the expert opinions supplemented by the lay evidence. The proof of the causal connection may not be speculative, conjectural, or uncertain. Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2004); Simpson v. H.D. Lee Co., 793 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tenn. 1990); Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987). Absolute certainty with respect to causation is not required, however, and the Court must recognize that, in many cases, expert opinions in this area contain an element of uncertainty and speculation. Fritts v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp.,163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005).
The trial court determined that the Employee had not shown that there was any particular hazard incident to his employment which was causally connected to his injury. The...
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