Thygesen v. N. Bailey Volunteer Fire Co.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2013
• Citation: 106 A.D.3d 1458,964 N.Y.S.2d 816,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03202
• Parties: William J. THYGESEN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., Warren Holmes, Individually and in his Capacity as President of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., David Humbert, Individually and in his Capacity as Fire Chief of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., Daniel Strozyk, Individually and in his Capacity as Investigator for New York State Division of State Police and New York State Division of State Police, Defendants–Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

106 A.D.3d 1458

964 N.Y.S.2d 816

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03202

William J. THYGESEN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.NORTH BAILEY VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC., Warren Holmes, Individually and in his Capacity as President of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., David Humbert, Individually and in his Capacity as Fire Chief of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., Daniel Strozyk, Individually and in his Capacity as Investigator for New York State Division of State Police and New York State Division of State Police, Defendants–Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

May 3, 2013.

Hogan Willig, Amherst (Steven M. Cohen of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Underberg & Kessler Llp, Rochester (Elizabeth A. Cordello of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., Warren Holmes, Individually and in his Capacity as President of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc. and David Humbert, Individually and in his Capacity as Fire Chief of North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Plaintiff, a former member of defendant North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc. (Fire Company), commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that defendants discriminated against him and violated his privacy and civil rights when they expelled him from membership in the Fire Company. Plaintiff also commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Fire Company's determination to expel him, and we confirmed that determination and dismissed the petition (Matter of Thygesen v. North Bailey Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 1416, 954 N.Y.S.2d 314). In the instant action, North Bailey Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., Warren Holmes and David Humbert (defendants) moved to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 alleging, inter alia, that plaintiff had never served a notice of claim as required by General Municipal Law § 50–e and that plaintiff was not an employee of the Fire Company. Supreme Court granted the motion in part, dismissing the first, third, fifth and sixth causes of action against defendants. Plaintiff now appeals.

Plaintiff contends that General Municipal Law § 50–e does not apply to the instant action because the Town of Amherst (Town) is not a named defendant, and the Fire Company is a not-for-profit corporation ( seeN–PCL 1402[e][1] ), not a municipality or a fire district. We reject that contention. Pursuant to Town Law § 170, a town is authorized to establish a fire district, fire alarm district or fire protection district for the benefit of the town residents ( see Cuddy v. Town of Amsterdam, 62 A.D.2d 119, 120, 403 N.Y.S.2d 590;see also Miller v. Savage, 237 A.D.2d 695, 696, 654 N.Y.S.2d 215). A fire district is a separate legal entity whose members are employees of the fire district, not of any political subdivision ( see § 174 [7]; Nelson v. Garcia, 152 A.D.2d 22, 25, 548 N.Y.S.2d 963). In contrast, “a fire protection district is simply a geographic area, with no independent corporate status, for which the town board is responsible for providing for the furnishing of fire protection” (1981 Ops. St. Comp. No. 81–1; see § 184; Miller, 237 A.D.2d at 696, 654 N.Y.S.2d 215;Nelson, 152 A.D.2d at 24–25, 548 N.Y.S.2d 963). Members of the fire departments or companies established within a fire protection district “are deemed officers, employees, or appointees of the town[,] and the town is liable for any negligence on the part of such members” ( Nelson, 152 A.D.2d at 24, 548 N.Y.S.2d 963;seeGeneral Municipal Law §§ 50–a [1]; 50–b [1]; 205–b; Town Law § 184 [1]; N–PCL 1402[e][1]; Miller, 237 A.D.2d at 696, 654 N.Y.S.2d 215;Miller v. Morania Oil of Long Is., O.C.P., 194 A.D.2d 770, 771, 599 N.Y.S.2d 303).

It is undisputed that, in 1958, the Town established the North Bailey Fire Co., Inc., Fire Protection District No. 18 (Fire Protection District). The Town, acting on behalf of the Fire Protection District, contracted with the Fire Company for fire protection services within the Fire Protection District. Where an action is commenced against an officer, appointee or employee of a public corporation such as the Town of Amherst, “service of the notice of claim upon the public corporation shall be required ... if the corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify such person under this chapter or any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law § 50–e [1][b] ), and that is the case here.

Having determined that General Municipal Law § 50–e is implicated by this action, we now address its application to the four causes of action dismissed by the court. We conclude that the court erred in granting those parts of the motion with respect to the first and third causes of action, alleging violations of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 et seq.), and properly granted those parts of the motion with respect to the fifth and sixth causes of action, alleging defamation. We therefore modify the order accordingly.

It is well settled that the notice of claim requirements of General Municipal Law § 50–e do not apply to discrimination causes of action under the Human Rights Law inasmuch as those causes of action are not “founded upon tort” (General Municipal Law § 50–e [1][a]; see Mills v. County of Monroe, 89 A.D.2d 776, 776, 453 N.Y.S.2d 486,affd.59 N.Y.2d 307, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709, 451 N.E.2d 456,cert. denied464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 551, 78 L.Ed.2d 725;Margerum v. City of Buffalo, 63 A.D.3d 1574, 1580, 880 N.Y.S.2d 820;Grasso v. Schenectady County Pub. Lib., 30 A.D.3d 814, 816, 817 N.Y.S.2d 186;Picciano v. Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 290 A.D.2d 164, 170, 736 N.Y.S.2d 55;Sebastian v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 221 A.D.2d 294, 294–295, 634 N.Y.S.2d 114). Thus, based on the limited issues raised by the parties ( cf.County Law § 52; Town Law § 67[1], [2]; Scopelliti v. Town of New Castle, 210 A.D.2d 308, 309, 620 N.Y.S.2d 405), we conclude that defendants were not entitled to dismissal of the first and third causes of action based on plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of claim.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to the fifth and sixth causes of action, however, which are “founded upon tort” (General Municipal Law § 50–e [1] ). The fifth cause of action alleges the tort of defamation against defendants Warren Holmes and David Humbert, and the sixth cause of action alleges the tort of defamation against Humbert. Both Holmes and Humbert were sued individually and in their capacity as members of the Fire Company. Inasmuch as the Town would be obligated to indemnify both men ( see Miller, 237 A.D.2d at 696, 654 N.Y.S.2d 215;Nelson, 152 A.D.2d at 24, 548 N.Y.S.2d 963), the Town was entitled to a notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e (1), and plaintiff's failure to serve that notice of claim is fatal to the fifth and sixth causes of action.

Defendants also sought dismissal of the first and third causes of action against them, alleging violations of the Human Rights Law, on the ground that plaintiff could not be deemed an employee covered by that statute. “It is well settled that the federal standards under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are applied to determine whether recovery is warranted under the Human Rights Law” ( VanDeWater v. Canandaigua Natl. Bank, 70 A.D.3d 1434, 1435, 893 N.Y.S.2d 916, citing Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305 n. 3, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998). The question before us on this appeal is whether plaintiff may invoke the protections of the Human Rights Law, i.e., whether he was an “employee” of defendants. “ ‘[T]he question of whether someone is or is not an employee under Title VII usually turns on whether he or she has received direct or indirect remuneration from the alleged employer’ ” ( York v. Association of Bar of City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 125–126,cert. denied537 U.S. 1089, 123 S.Ct. 702, 154 L.Ed.2d 633,reh. denied...