Tibrewal v. City of Worcester

• Decision Date: 18 August 2011
• Docket Number: 10-P-1885
• Parties: ADITYA TIBREWAL & another[FN1] v. CITY OF WORCESTER & another.[FN2]
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

ADITYA TIBREWAL & another¹ v. CITY OF WORCESTER & another.²

10-P-1885

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Entered: August 18, 2011.

NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiffs own two contiguous parcels of real property located within the Montvale Local Historic District (MLHD) in Worcester. One parcel contains a residential dwelling and the second parcel contains a largely abandoned tennis court. At the time the plaintiffs acquired the properties in July, 2009, the MLHD included only one of the plaintiffs' parcels.³ However, on December 22, 2009, the Worcester city council voted to enlarge the historic district to encompass additional properties, including the plaintiffs' tennis court parcel. On January 13, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court against the city of Worcester and the Worcester historical commission (commission) alleging that the inclusion of the tennis court parcel in the MLHD violated (1) the Historic Districts Act, G. L. c. 40C; (2) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (3) the principle set forth in Mullin v. Planning Board of Brewster, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 139 (1983).⁴ On cross motions for summary judgment, the judge allowed the defendants' motion, ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award the relief requested by the plaintiffs. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Background. The following undisputed facts are contained in the summary judgment record. In December, 2007, the commission issued a report proposing to expand the MLHD to cover several additional properties, including the tennis court parcel now owned by the plaintiffs. The commission submitted the report to the Worcester city council on March 6, 2008. The council, in turn, referred the report to its committee on economic development, which was comprised of three members of the city council. On December 15, 2009, the committee held a public hearing on the proposed expansion of the MLHD. On December 22, 2009, the full city council voted to adopt the recommendations of the commission.

Discussion. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to seek relief under the Historic Districts Act (Act) as an aggrieved party pursuant to G. L. c. 40C, §§ 12A and 13. They also assert that their constitutional claims were erroneously dismissed because the city advances no legitimate government interest in designating the tennis court parcel as part of the MLHD. Finally, they argue that the city council's vote to enlarge the historic district was a quasi-judicial act, not a legislative act.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007), and determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). In making this determination, '[w]e may consider any ground supporting the . . . judge's ruling.' Foster v. Group Health Inc., 444 Mass. 668, 672 (2005). We may affirm the motion judge's ruling on any ground, even if it differs from the reason relied upon by the judge. Hawthorne's, Inc. v. Warrenton Realty, Inc., 414 Mass. 200, 210 n.6 (1993).

1. Historic Districts Act. Under G. L. c. 40C, § 12A, as appearing in St. 1983, c. 429, § 3, '[a]ny person aggrieved by a determination of the commission . . . may, within twenty days after the filing of the notice of such determination . . . appeal to the superior court.' Contrary to the plaintiffs' characterization, § 12A does not allow an appeal of 'any' determination by the commission. Rather, § 12A refers simply to a determination of the commission either to approve or disapprove applications from individual property owners to obtain approval to modify a property within a historic district. See, e.g., Dennis Hous. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Dennis, 439 Mass. 71, 74-75 (2003); Collins v. Historic Dist. Commn. of Carver, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 388, 390- 391 (2008) (appeal proper under § 12A where historic district commission denied application by owner to build on property).

The designation of a historic district is not a 'determination' of the commission within the meaning of § 12A. Indeed, the Act provides in § 3 that only a city or town may establish a historic district. G. L. c. 40C, § 3. Although the commission may make recommendations to the city council, as it did here, the commission itself has no power to designate a historic district. Ibid. Once a historic district is established, the commission is then empowered to review and make determinations as to the appropriateness of any alteration or construction of any building or structure that affects exterior features.⁵ Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Springfield Library & Museums Assn., Inc., 447 Mass. 408, 410 (2006) (Springfield Preservation Trust II), citing G. L. c. 40C, §§ 6, 10(a)-(c). Section 12A provides an avenue of appeal for a property owner who is affected by such a determination of the commission. See Collins, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 390.

In the present case, the plaintiffs are not appealing a 'determination' of the commission. They did not apply to the commission for a certificate of appropriateness or an exception. See G. L. c. 40C, § 6. Contrast Collins, supra. As is clear from the plaintiffs' complaint, they are challenging the designation of the MLHD -- an act that is solely the prerogative of the city council. See G. L. c. 40C, § 3. See also Springfield Preservation Trust II, supra at 419 (pursuant to § 3, 'the Act gives municipalities unfettered discretion whether to establish a historic district and, if so, what lands, buildings, and structures to include in that district'). The plaintiffs have thus failed to establish that the injury they allege, namely inclusion of their property in a historic district, falls within the zone of interests protected by G. L. c. 40C, § 12A. See Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 323 (1998).

The plaintiffs also point to G. L. c. 40C, § 13, as a basis for their challenge. Section 13 states, in part, '[t]he superior court . . . shall have jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this chapter and any ordinance or by-law enacted hereunder and the determinations, rulings and regulations issued pursuant thereto and may, upon the petition of the mayor or of the board of selectmen or of the commission, restrain by injunction violations thereof' (emphasis added). G. L. c. 40C, § 13, inserted by St. 1971, c. 359, § 1. The Supreme Judicial Court has construed § 13 as 'limiting the eligible plaintiffs to those listed.' Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Springfield Historical Commn., 380 Mass. 159, 161 (1980) (Springfield Preservation Trust I).⁶ Accordingly, under § 13, only the mayor or the board of selectmen or the commission may bring an action to enforce the provisions of the Act. Here, the plaintiffs may not bring a challenge under G. L. c. 40C, § 13, because they are not one of the named entities permitted to enforce the statute.

2. Constitutional claims. 'The exercise of broad legislative powers granted to municipalities under the Home Rule Amendment (art. 89 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution) is limited by whether the enactment violated State law or any other constitutional protections.' Andrews v. Amherst, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 368 (2007), citing Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 440 Mass. 45, 53-55 (2003). A zoning by-law or ordinance is valid under the United States Constitution 'unless its application bears no 'reasonable relation to the State's legitimate purpose."⁷ Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 444 Mass. 754, 760 (2005), quoting from Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978). See Andrews, supra at 369 ('the challenger [to a zoning by-law] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare'), quoting from Van Renselaar v. Springfield, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 108 (2003).

Irrespective of the judge's determinations as to standing,⁸ the judge correctly concluded that the plaintiffs have not met their heavy burden of showing that the city council's vote to enlarge the MLHD violated State law or was otherwise unconstitutional. As the judge noted, the purpose of the Historic Districts Act 'is to promote the educational, cultural, economic and general welfare of the public through the preservation and protection of the distinctive characteristics of buildings and places significant in the history of the Commonwealth and its cities and towns or their architecture . . . .' G. L. c. 40C, § 2, inserted by St. 1971, c. 359, § 1. The commission's report establishes that the purpose of the MLHD is to 'preserve[] one of the City's historic residential neighborhoods' and that '[a]n integral part of preserving this district's historical value is the ongoing preservation of its residential character.' The commission indicated that the tennis court parcel and others were included 'to ensure that future development including accessory structures and accessory parking...