Tiryakian v. Tiryakian

• Decision Date: 16 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 8814DC129,8814DC129
• Citation: 91 N.C.App. 128,370 S.E.2d 852
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edwyn A. TIRYAKIAN v. Karen E. TIRYAKIAN.

Page 852

370 S.E.2d 852

91 N.C.App. 128

Edwyn A. TIRYAKIAN v. Karen E. TIRYAKIAN.

No. 8814DC129.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Aug. 16, 1988.

Maxwell, Martin, Freeman, and Beason, P.A. by John C. Martin and Robert A. Beason, Durham, for plaintiff-appellant.

R. Roy Mitchell, Jr., Durham, for defendant-appellee.

BECTON, Judge.

Plaintiff, Edwyn A. Tiryakian, hereinafter the husband, brought this action seeking an absolute divorce. Defendant, Karen E. Tiryakian, hereinafter the wife, filed an "Answer and Cross Action" seeking, among other things, equitable distribution pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat.Sec. 50-20. An absolute divorce, based on a one-year separation, was entered on 10 February 1987, and a hearing upon the wife's claim for equitable distribution was held in August 1987. Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order which, among other things: (1) voided an antenuptial agreement signed by the wife on the afternoon before the wedding, (2) created a resulting trust in favor of the wife in the amount of $10,000, and (3) designated as marital certain personal property acquired prior to and during the course of the marriage. The husband appeals. We affirm the trial court's ruling regarding the antenuptial agreement and the resulting trust. We reverse and remand for further findings of fact regarding the designation as marital of certain items of personal property.

I

Husband and wife were married on 15 September 1984. During the marriage, the husband was employed as a securities analyst with a brokerage firm in Durham where he earned $15,000 per year. He also received an annual gift of $10,000 from his grandmother. The wife is a high school graduate who worked as a travel agent during the course of the marriage. Her annual income was approximately $13,000.

Two months prior to their wedding, the husband's grandmother, Mrs. Keghinee Tiryakian, expressed an interest in providing the couple with a marital home. The parties selected a condominium in Durham priced at $72,000. In order to pay for the property, the grandmother gave several checks to different people. She gave one check for $10,000 to the wife in her maiden name, Karen E. Whitfield, and a second one for $10,000 to the husband's mother. She gave three more checks to the husband, altogether totaling $60,000. None of the checks contained any notations.

On 11 July 1984, the wife wrote the husband a check for $10,000 which contained the notation "for the condo." Six days later, the husband purchased the condominium which was deeded solely in his name. The wife was not present at the closing. The parties used the remaining funds to purchase household furniture and appliances.

During July of that same year, the parties also purchased a 1984 Datsun Maxima for $12,000. The husband used $7,000 of his own funds for the down payment, and the parties agreed to make equal contributions towards the finance payments. The car was titled in both names. In October of 1984, the wife took over the car payments and continued to make them after the date of separation.

On 14 September 1984, one day before their wedding, the husband called the wife and asked her to meet him at his attorney's office to execute a legal document. The wife met the husband in the parking lot, and he gave her an antenuptial agreement with several copies. There is conflicting evidence as to what was disclosed at this point. The husband testified that he and the wife had discussed the terms of the agreement earlier and the wife was well aware of its contents. The wife testified that, although the husband had once raised the issue of an antenuptial agreement, they had not discussed any specifics and she had expressed no interest in entering into one. She also testified that on the day in question, the husband told her, and she believed, that the document was to protect his interest in his grandmother's estate.

The wife never read the agreement, nor did she consult with an attorney about its contents. Instead, she rushed to her bank, had her signature notarized, and returned the documents within forty minutes. That evening, as the couple left their rehearsal dinner, the husband presented the wife with one of the copies which she had failed to sign. No further disclosures were made, the wife did not attempt to read the document; and she signed it immediately. The parties were married the next day.

During their marriage, the parties purchased a 1985 BMW 318i and other household items. At the time of separation, their joint checking and savings accounts had a balance of approximately $700.

II

The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) voiding the antenuptial agreement because the evidence showed that the wife signed it voluntarily and had knowledge of its contents and the husband's financial status; (2) creating a resulting trust in favor of the wife because the check from the grandmother to the wife was intended to benefit the husband; and (3) classifying as marital certain items of personal property purchased prior to and during the marriage because they were separate property acquired by the husband without donative intent to the wife.

III

The husband first argues that the trial court erred in ruling the antenuptial agreement void and unenforceable because the wife chose not to review the document and signed it voluntarily after the husband had disclosed its contents and his own financial status. Before addressing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the ruling, we review the standards which govern the enforceability of such agreements.

North Carolina has recently enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, N.C.Gen.Stat. Chapter 52B. However, the contract at bar pre-dates the effective date of that legislation. The relevant statutes allow persons about to be married to release their rights, as acquired by marriage, to the property of the other spouse, N.C.Gen.Stat.Sec. 52-10(a), and to provide for the distribution of marital property by written agreement, N.C.Gen.Stat. 50-20(d). Moreover, prior to the aforementioned statutes, our Courts held that premarital agreements were not against public policy. Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955).

Our research, however, reveals a scarcity of North Carolina case law specifically addressing the enforceability of an antenuptial agreement based on the circumstances surrounding its execution. It has been established that "[a] confidential relationship ... exists between a couple contemplating marriage." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 57 N.C.App. 680, 682, 292 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1982). In his treatise, North Carolina Family Law, Lee explains that persons about to marry "are not dealing at arm's length with each other. The usual consequences of a confidential relationship are present." 2 R.E. Lee, North Carolina Family Law, Sec. 181 at 432 (1980). Lee also quotes extensively from an article by Professor Horner Clark which recognizes an affirmative duty on the part of each perspective spouse to fully disclose his or her financial status. Id. at 433, quoting from Clark, "Antenuptial Contracts," 50 U.Colo.L.Rev. 141, 143-46 (1979). The article goes on to state that "[a] court's disapproval of [an] antenuptial agreement may also be influenced by the fact that it was drawn by the husband's lawyer and not thoroughly explained to the wife, or by the fact that she was not advised by counsel of her own." Id.

Similar provisions regarding the disclosure of financial status are echoed in North Carolina's newly adopted Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. The official comment directs us to other state statutes which determine enforceability based on full disclosure. See Ark.Stat.Sec. 55-309; Minn.Stat.Ann.Sec. 519.11.

In this case, the trial court found that the husband failed to make a full disclosure of his financial status, and that the wife was presented with an agreement drawn by the husband's attorney which she signed without knowledge of its contents and without seeking independent legal advice. The husband argues that there was no evidence that he failed to provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of his property. We disagree. In a non-jury trial, the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are conclusive on appeal, so long as they are supported by competent evidence. Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 120, 254 S.E.2d 160, 165 (1979). The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the wife's testimony that the husband failed to disclose either his financial status or the contents of the agreement. We therefore uphold the court's decision to void the antenuptial agreement. Considering the applicable statutory and case law, we hold that, absent any voluntary waiver, especially considering the confidential relationship between prospective spouses, the failure to fully disclose one's financial status is grounds for invalidating an antenuptial agreement.

IV

The husband further argues that, because the money given to the wife by the husband's grandmother prior to the marriage was meant to benefit the husband, the trial court erred in establishing a $10,000 resulting trust in the wife's favor. The argument is without merit.

It is well established that when one person provides purchase money to pay for real property and the title is taken in the name of another, "a resulting trust commensurate with his interest arises in favor of the one furnishing the consideration." Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 46, 286 S.E.2d 779, 784 (1982). Such a trust is not dependent upon any agreement between the parties. Id; Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 292, 199 S.E. 83, 86 (1938). Rather, it functions to effectuate the intention, at the time of transfer, of the party furnishing the purchase money and "such intention is to be determined from all the attendant facts and circumstances." Mims 305 N.C. at 57, 286 S.E.2d at 790; Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 674, 97 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1957).

The husband argues, in...