Tittle v. Corso

Decision Date09 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. A02A0828.,A02A0828.
Citation256 Ga. App. 859,569 S.E.2d 873
PartiesTITTLE et al. v. CORSO et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Larry E. Stewart, for appellants.

Kristina H. Blum, for appellees.

PHIPPS, Judge.

Russell Tittle and his wife sued Gwinnett County Deputy Sheriff Paul Corso and the Gwinnett County Sheriff's Department, alleging a variety of torts. The trial court granted Corso's motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was entitled to official immunity from suit. The court also denied the Tittles' motion to substitute the sheriff, in his official capacity, for the sheriff's department. The Tittles appeal both rulings. We affirm because there is no evidence that Corso acted with actual malice and the sheriff was entitled to sovereign immunity.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.2

Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that at about 1:00 a.m. on October 6, 1999, Corso was watching television at home, having just finished his shift with the sheriff's department. He heard six to eight "loud popping noises" outside that he believed were gunshots. He looked out the window and saw a car with its emergency lights on, and he heard a broadcast over the police radio that shots had been fired and officers should "check the neighborhood." Corso decided to respond to the call because "[i]t was so close to my house I was worried about it."

Meanwhile, Tittle was driving his wife and two children home. The car began to backfire repeatedly, and Tittle switched to "back roads" because he was afraid that "[s]omebody's going to think we're out here shooting or something." A short while later, the muffler exploded and caught fire, and the car shut off entirely. Tittle exited the car and began "kicking the muffler around" with half of his body under the car.

Corso pulled up in his patrol car, stopped near Tittle, and shone the patrol car's spotlight and headlights onto Tittle. Corso approached Tittle with his gun drawn and told him to stand, put his hands in the air, and walk backward toward him. Tittle complied. Corso then ordered him to lie facedown, placed a gun against his neck, and introduced himself. Corso searched him for weapons and found none. Corso testified that he had Tittle lie down because he had no handcuffs with him, and Tittle admitted that Corso did not hurt him.

While Tittle was lying down, his wife got out of the car and asked what was going on. Corso told her to get back in the car and that he would "explain it in a minute." Then Corso had Tittle sit down cross-legged while he went to his patrol car to use the radio. Tittle tried to explain that he was having muffler trouble, but Corso told him, "Shut up. I'm in control." According to Tittle, however, Corso "dispatched and told them that I was having car trouble." Corso also requested backup.

Next, Corso helped Tittle to his feet and walked him over to the patrol car. Tittle testified that Corso did this not in a hurtful manner, but "just like any officer would." Although Tittle testified that he was "scared," he again denied that Corso hurt him. According to Tittle, Corso then "slammed me down on the hood and [said], `If you fucking move, I'll put my dog on you, and he'll eat you up.'" Corso also told Tittle that "if I fucking moved, he'd blow my head off" and that more officers would arrive and would "treat you worse than I did."

Corso left Tittle leaning over the hood of the patrol car, walked over to Tittle's car, and asked his wife if there were any guns in the car. She said no, and Corso asked her to get out of the car. He then promised not to hurt the children, one of whom was sleeping, and leaned into the car and asked if there was a gun inside. The child who was awake "shook his head no."

The backup officers arrived and ascertained that Tittle's license check was clean and that no weapons were present. After offering the Tittles assistance, the officers permitted them to leave in their car.

Corso denies putting a gun to Tittle's head or slamming him against the hood of his patrol car. He also maintains that Tittle did not initially tell him about the broken muffler. He further asserts that he never threatened to blow Tittle's head off and that he did not use the expletive "fucking" during his confrontation with the Tittles.

Tittle sued Corso, alleging false imprisonment, aggravated assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. Tittle's wife also sued Corso, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and trespass. Finally, the Tittles sued the Gwinnett County Sheriff's Department under a theory of respondeat superior. The trial court denied the Tittles' motion to substitute the sheriff, in his official capacity, as Corso's employer, ruling that the sheriff would be entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity, which had not been waived by the county. The trial court also granted Corso's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that he was entitled to official immunity.

1. The Tittles argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Corso because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether his actions demonstrated actual malice. We cannot agree.

Corso was acting within the scope of his authority and performing an official discretionary function in investigating a "shots fired" call.3 Thus, he is entitled to official immunity from the Tittles' claims, absent a showing that he acted with actual malice or intent to cause injury.4 The Tittles do not contend that Corso intended to injure them. They argue instead that his actions demonstrated actual malice. Actual malice, in the context of official immunity, means a deliberate intention to commit a wrongful or illegal act.5

The Tittles concede that Corso's actions up to the point of radioing for backup do not show any actual malice. They argue, however, that Corso's subsequent use of unnecessary profanity and force do show actual malice because, at that point, Corso knew that Tittle was unarmed and merely had a problem with his muffler. Although we in no way condone Corso's behavior, as described by the Tittles, we must conclude that, as a matter of law, it does not rise to the level of actual malice.

Tittle testified that after making the radio call, Corso helped him to his feet "just like any officer would" and escorted him to the patrol car. Although Corso still held his gun in his left hand, the Tittles did not testify—contrary to assertions in their brief—that Corso again placed the gun against Tittle's neck. Tittle did testify that Corso threatened to shoot him or unleash his dog on him if he moved. In addition, Tittle testified that Corso "slammed" him against the patrol car. Thus, the actions alleged to constitute actual malice include the use of profanity, threats, and "slamming."

Although profanity may be distasteful and insulting, we cannot conclude that it shows actual malice, particularly in the absence of any epithets or other words indicating any personal bias. As we noted in Woodward v. Gray,6 evidence demonstrating "frustration, irritation, and possibly even anger" is not sufficient to penetrate official immunity.

Nor are Corso's alleged threats sufficient to establish actual malice. Corso said that he would injure Tittle if he moved. Thus, the threats were intended, on their face, to prevent Tittle from presenting a danger while Corso investigated his car, which might have contained weapons or other dangers. While it is true that Corso knew by then that Tittle was unarmed, we find no actual malice in Corso's expressed desire that Tittle remain immobile while Corso's attention was directed elsewhere. We are not prepared to say that an unarmed man cannot be dangerous, particularly to a lone officer in the middle of the night. The Tittles point out that the better course would have been for Corso to retrieve his handcuffs from the patrol car and restrain Tittle or place him inside the patrol car. But our task is not to decide, with the benefit of hindsight, what Corso should have done. We are concerned only with whether his behavior showed a deliberate intention to commit a wrongful act. Under the circumstances alleged by the Tittles, we find that Corso's threats evidence no such intention.

Finally, Corso's placement of Tittle against the hood of the police car does not show actual malice. "[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it."7 Even accepting Tittle's characterization of Corso's action as "slamming," that act—without more—does not show that Corso's use of physical force was so excessive or unnecessary as to demonstrate a deliberate intent to do wrong.

We reiterate that we do not condone Corso's alleged behavior. Tittle's testimony that Corso "scared" him is understandable. But we cannot conclude that Corso's profanity, threats, and "slamming" showed a deliberate intent to commit a wrongful act, as opposed to an effort to restrain Tittle while Corso continued to investigate and secure the scene. The trial court properly granted Corso's motion for summary judgment on the basis of official immunity.8

2. The Tittles also argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to add the sheriff, in his official capacity, as a defendant. Having been sued in his official capacity, the sheriff can claim the defense of sovereign immunity to the extent there was no waiver.9 The Tittles contend sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-51(b), which provides,

Whenever a municipal
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
47 cases
  • Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 29 Junio 2023
    ...with standing -those sources are inapplicable here. OCGA § 36-33-4 applies to municipal corporations (not counties), and the portion of Tittle that Humphries relies on deals with immunity as applied to individuals, not sovereign immunity as applied to counties, see Humphries, 256 Ga.App. at......
  • Harris-Billups v. Anderson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 10 Marzo 2021
    ...54, 60 (2007). Instead, actual malice constitutes "a deliberate intention to commit a wrongful or illegal act." Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga. App. 859, 862, 569 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2002). This "may be accomplished with or without ill will and whether or not injury was intended." Adams, 271 Ga. at 4......
  • Reed v. City of Lavonia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • 19 Mayo 2005
    ...that he acted within the scope of his authority and without actual malice or an intent to cause the injury. See Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga.App. 859, 861-62, 569 S.E.2d 873 (2002). It is undisputed in this case that Officers Masionet and Carlisle both acted within the scope of their authority a......
  • S.W. ex rel. S.W. v. Clayton Cnty. Pub. Sch.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 12 Mayo 2016
    ...malice, in the context of official immunity, means a deliberate intention to commit a wrongful or illegal act." Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga.App. 859, 862, 569 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2002). It does not, however, include "implied malice," that is, "the reckless disregard for the rights or safety of oth......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 55-1, September 2003
    • Invalid date
    ...the claims against [defendant] in her individual capacity on the basis of official immunity was proper." Id., 578 S.E.2d at 148-49. 326. 256 Ga. App. 859, 569 S.E.2d 873 (2002). 327. Id. at 861, 569 S.E.2d at 876. Defendant, an off-duty deputy sheriff, heard loud noises at night near his ho......
  • "official Immunity" in Local Government Law: a Quantifiable Confrontation
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 22-3, March 2006
    • Invalid date
    ...cell Ministerial Wrongness No Malice Wrongness Negligence for Jury Negligence for Jury Negligence for Jury Negligence for Jury 164. 569 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiff sued defendant deputy sheriff for his conduct in an investigation of plaintiff on the road at night. Id. at 875-7......
  • Local Government Law
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 68-1, September 2016
    • Invalid date
    ...783 S.E.2d at 700.123. 333 Ga. App. 431, 773 S.E.2d 485 (2015).124. Id. at 436, 773 S.E.2d at 489.125. Id. (quoting Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga. App. 859, 862, 569 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2002)).126. 334 Ga. App. 684, 780 S.E.2d 60 (2015).127. Id. at 688, 780 S.E.2d at 63.128. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-30.3(a)(......
  • Local Government Law - James E. Elliott Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-1, September 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...App. 83, 86, 589 S.E.2d 584, 587 (2003)). 31. Id. at 706, 665 S.E.2d at 406. 32. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga. App. 859, 862, 569 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2002)). 33. Id. 34. Id. at 707, 665 S.E.2d at 406. 35. 285 Ga. 262, 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009). 36. Id. at 262, 674 ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT