Toler v. MVA

• Decision Date: 24 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 21,21
• Citation: 373 Md. 214,817 A.2d 229
• Parties: Christopher Lee TOLER v. MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

817 A.2d 229

373 Md. 214

Christopher Lee TOLER v. MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.

No. 21, Sept. Term, 2002.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

February 24, 2003.

Richard I. Chaifets, on brief, Columbia, for petitioner.

Dore J. Lebowitz, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Glen Burnie, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

WILNER, Judge.

Maryland Code, § 16-401 of the Transportation Article, requires the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) to maintain a point system for the suspension and revocation of drivers' licenses. Petitioner, Christopher Lee Toler, accumulated eight points within a two-year period. After a hearing, an administrative law judge for MVA suspended his license for 30 days but authorized the issuance of a restricted license that allowed him to drive for work purposes during the period of suspension. Toler contends that the MVA and, on judicial review, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, misread the law and that he is entitled to accumulate a minimum of 16 points before his license can be suspended. He is correct.

BACKGROUND

We are concerned here with the interplay among three statutory parts of the point system— § 16-404(a), § 16-405(a), and § 16-405(b). Section 16-404 provides for graduated sanctions upon the accumulation of points by a licensee within a two-year period. If a licensee accumulates three points, MVA must send a warning letter. § 16-404(a)(1). If a licensee accumulates five points, MVA must require attendance at a conference, except that, if the licensee holds a Class A, B, or C license and can show that he or she is a "professional driver," the licensee may not be called in for a conference until there is an accumulation of eight points. § 14-404(a)(2).

Subject to § 16-405, § 16-404(a)(3) requires MVA to suspend the license of each individual who accumulates eight points and to revoke the license of an individual who accumulates twelve points. With certain exceptions not relevant here, an initial suspension shall be for at least two but not more than thirty days; subsequent suspensions shall be for at least fifteen but not more than ninety days. § 16-404(c)(1). Subsection (c)(4) makes clear that the section does not limit MVA's authority to issue a restricted license.¹

Section 16-405, the statute most in point in this case, provides both an exception and for some discretion on the part of MVA when a suspension or revocation arising from the accumulation of points may affect the licensee's employment. Subsection (a)—the discretionary provision—states, in relevant part, that "if the suspension or revocation of a license would affect adversely the employment or opportunity for employment of a licensee, the hearing officer may ... [d]ecline to order the suspension or revocation." Subsection (b) provides that, for purposes of § 16-404, "if a licensee is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his [or her] regular employment ... [s]uspension requires 16 points." Toler contends that he falls within subsection (b) and thus may not have his license suspended until he accumulates sixteen points.

Mr. Toler has had a long and continuous involvement with MVA, mostly because of speeding violations. He began collecting points shortly after receiving his license. In December, 1986, he received his first warning letter upon the accumulation of four points within a three-month period. After two speeding convictions in 1986, he was called to a conference in July, 1987, and given a reprimand. That seemed to have little effect as, in December, 1987, he was again convicted of speeding, which resulted in a second warning letter. A third warning letter was sent in November, 1989, following a speeding conviction in August of that year. Three days prior to the issuance of that letter, he was again convicted of speeding, leading to another conference and reprimand. By reason of three additional convictions in 1990—two for speeding and one for failure to drive in the designated lane—he managed to collect eight points and was threatened with suspension. For whatever reason, however, he received only another reprimand, his third. In 1991 and 1992, he piled on two more convictions, one for speeding and one for failure to obey a traffic signal. Toler either modified his behavior or managed to elude police detection for a few years, but in 1998, having accumulated four points for speeding convictions in 1996 and 1997, he received a fourth warning letter.

The suspension that generated this case came about as a result of his collecting eight points in 1999—five upon a conviction for exceeding the speed limit by 30 miles per hour and three following a conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. On May 1, 2001, he was informed that his license would be suspended, but, upon his request for a hearing, the suspension was held in abeyance. At the hearing, he informed the administrative law judge that he owned and operated a door and window manufacturing and installation company and that his primary role was in sales. He said that he ran "all the sales appointments for commercial sales and commercial divisions" and that he also trained and "r[a]n with" the residential sales representatives. He testified that every day he made sales calls and visited job sites and that he drove to those places, logging 100 to 200 miles a day. Toler testified that he brought in about two-thirds of the business and that if he was precluded from driving, "[i]t would be impossible for me to do what I need to do."

After taking into account that testimony and Toler's driving record, the ALJ suspended Toler's license for 30 days but directed MVA to issue him a restricted license that would permit him to drive for work purposes during the suspension period. The ALJ explained that, with the restricted license, Toler would be able to "do everything you have to do as far as work is concerned" but that "[w]hat you can't do is drive socially for that 30-day period." Following the announcement of that decision, Toler argued, for the first time, that he fell within § 16-405(b) and, for that reason, was ineligible for a suspension. The ALJ rejected that argument.

Toler applied for and received the restricted license but also sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision, arguing that (1) the ALJ abused his discretion in making the suspension for thirty days rather than two, and (2) because he fell within the ambit of § 16-405(b)(1) and had not yet collected sixteen points, he was not eligible for any suspension. The court rejected both arguments and affirmed. We granted certiorari to consider the second issue, in effect whether the special exception in § 16-405(b) that requires the accumulation of sixteen points for a suspension when a licensee "is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his [or her] regular employment" is limited to persons whose very job is the driving of a motor vehicle or also includes persons like Toler, who simply drive as an incident to their work.

DISCUSSION

In a direct sense, this case is moot. Toler's suspension has ended and his full driving privileges were restored. Nonetheless, if the suspension is valid, it could have a collateral consequence of some importance. If Toler's license is subsequently suspended, which, in light of his atrocious driving record, is more than a conjectural possibility, he will face a minimum period of suspension of fifteen days, rather than two days, and a maximum period of ninety days, rather than thirty days. See Md.Code, Transportation art., § 16-404(c)(1). Because of that collateral consequence, the issue he raises is not moot. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)

(collateral consequences of petitioner's conviction, including consideration of the conviction in subsequent sentencing, precluded mootness); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (expiration of criminal sentence did not prevent petitioner from challenging that sentence when certain collateral consequences, which were statutory and thus non-speculative, arose from his conviction); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (collateral consequences of increased penalties for subsequent convictions precluded mootness); Adkins v. State, 324 Md. 641, 598 A.2d 194 (1991) (summarizing the history of the collateral consequences doctrine and applying Sibron, Carafas, and Morgan to find that the petitioner's challenge to a probation violation finding was not rendered moot by the completion of his sentence; collateral consequences of a parole violation finding included increased penalties for subsequent convictions).

The issue is one of statutory construction, and, as we have said many times, when construing statutes "our goal is to ascertain and implement, to the extent possible, the legislative intent." Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). As we explained in Witte, "we look first to the words of the statute, on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant." Id. We added, however, that "if the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone," we may look to other indicia of that intent, including the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the "relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions." Id. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165. One aspect of examining these indicia is the presumption, which itself is a rule of construction, that the Legislature "intends its enactments `to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law,'" State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997) (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555 ...