Tomlinson v. State, 92-03528
| Decision Date | 27 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-03528,92-03528 |
| Citation | 645 So.2d 1 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1179 Jack TOMLINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Tonja R. Vickers, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anne Y. Swing, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Appellant pled no contest and was sentenced for six counts of sexual offenses including lewd and lascivious assault on a child, sexual activity with a child, and sexual battery on a child.
Appellant challenges only the validity of one of the conditions of his probation. Condition six states: Appellant argues this condition is invalid because it is not related to his crimes and relates to conduct which is not criminal. He argues he was not even shown to have a substance abuse problem. Further, the condition was not announced in open court.
We find that the portion of condition six prohibiting appellant from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used is valid. This restriction is valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states as an accepted condition of probation that an offender may "not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities." This portion of condition six requires appellant not to associate with persons engaged in the illegal activity of unlawfully selling or using certain substances. This is a general condition that is valid and need not have been pronounced in open court, an argument that was not presented to us in Gregory v. State, 616 So.2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
The remaining portion of condition six prohibits appellant from using intoxicants to excess. This special condition must be stricken since the trial court failed to announce it in open court, preventing appellant from having the opportunity to object to its imposition. Dycus v. State, 629 So.2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
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Reyes v. State
...use of alcohol to excess, because they are not statutorily mandated and were not orally pronounced at sentencing. See Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Labar v. State, 584 So.2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Although Mr. Reyes contends that the trial court erred in requiring him ......
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Vasquez v. State
...precise definition of a standard condition of probation which need not be orally pronounced. Compare Zeigler; Nank; Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). It is certainly the type of special condition of which defendant should have been informed at the time of THE COURT'S COLLO......
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Nank v. State, 93-02215
...prohibiting a defendant from using intoxicants to excess is a special condition which must be pronounced at sentencing. Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Thus, this aspect of condition six must be stricken. Moreover, we find nothing in the record to support the imposition ......
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Burdo v. State, 94-2553
...an accepted condition of probation that an offender may 'not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities.' " Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Because this is a general condition that is valid, it need not have been pronounced in open court. Tomlinson v. State, 6......