Torres v. Gonzalez
| Citation | 898 F.Supp.2d 433 |
| Decision Date | 30 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 09–1886 (DRD). |
| Parties | Grace RODRIGUEZ TORRES, et al., Plaintiff(s), v. Jaime MUNIZ GONZALEZ; Jose Madera Casiano; Puerto Rico Police Department; Pedro Toledo; Jose Figueroa Sancha; John Doe; Nancy Doe; Insurance Company A; Benjamin Rodriguez; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Frank D. Inserni–Milam, Frank D. Inserni Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff(s).
Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendant(s).
Pending before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, Docket No. 99, and the Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 100. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' request is granted, and the instant case is dismissed with prejudice.
On September 3, 2009, plaintiffs Grace Rodriguez Torres (“Rodriguez” or “plaintiff”), and her three daughters, Greisa and Carolina Chacon, and Alondra Lasalle, filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1), and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5141, 5142; Puerto Rico Law No. 17, 29 L.P.R.A. § 155, et seq., Law No. 69, and 29 L.P.R.A. § 146.
The facts that triggered the instant action stem from an alleged sexual harassment situation between defendant Captain Jaime Muñiz Gonzalez (“Mu ñiz”) and plaintiff, which started when Ms. Rodriguez was interviewed for a job with the Puerto Rico Police Department (“PRPD”), on or about in the year 1990. See Docket No. 143–2. Notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Rodriguez admits that she felt uncomfortable and harassed at the interview, plaintiff joined the PRPD on or about December 16, 1990. Ms. Rodriguez reencountered with Muñiz on or about May 2, 1997, when plaintiff was transferred to the Mayagüez District. See Docket No. 143–2. Plaintiff alleges that the sexual harassment started again, and continued until on or about February 25, 2008, when Ms. Rodriguez was transferred to A ñasco, Puerto Rico. See Docket No. 99, page 7. The transfer to Añasco was triggered by an alleged incident occurred on or about August–September of 2007, when Muñiz took her to a water tank during the night, and had personal and physical contact with Ms. Rodriguez. See Docket No. 99, page 7.
Plaintiff Rodriguez alleges that, on March 3, 2008, she went to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and was interviewed by Mr. Carlos Gonzalez, who gave her a document to fill out. Plaintiff tendered a copy of her claim. Plaintiff further alleges that she signed up at the EEOC's reception area on March 3, 2008. See Docket No. 143–1. However, according to plaintiff, she was never contacted by the EEOC thereafter. Id. Ms. Rodriguez alleges that, on April 1, 2009, she returned to the EEOC and spoke with Mr. Carlos Gonzalez, who explained to her that at the March 3, 2008 interview, he only counseled her, but plaintiff did not file a claim. Mr. Gonzalez further explained to plaintiff that all documents were kept for 90 days, and destroyed thereafter. See Docket No. 136–2. Mr. Gonzalez further suggested that I contact my attorney Inserni. See Docket No. 136–2. As of this date, the alleged claim filed by plaintiff with the EEOC on March 3, 2008, has not been found. Eventually, plaintiff filed her EEOC claim on April 8, 2009. See Docket No. 99, page 7. Thus, more than one year elapsed after plaintiff was transferred to Añasco Police Station, on February 25, 2008, and the filing of her EEOC claim on April 8, 2009. The record shows that after plaintiff was transferred on February 25, 2008, there are no new allegations of discrimination of sexual harassment on the employment.
On or about March 5, 2008, plaintiff filed an administrative claim of sexual harassment with the PRPD. See Docket No. 99, page 8. Plaintiff alleges that she personally delivered her complaint in an e-mail format to the PRPD's Domestic Violence Unit in the General Headquarters. Id. “This grievance was investigated and plaintiff Grace Rodriguez rendered a sworn statement at the Police Department on April 29, 2008 as part of the investigation.” Id.
Defendants allege that “[p]laintiff's claim before the EEOC was filed a year after she rendered her sworn statement at the Police Department.” Id. Hence, plaintiff's EEOC claim is time-barred, as it was filed after the “statute of limitations of 180 days had expired.” See Docket No. 99, page 7. Defendants further argue that, “[e]ven affording plaintiff the more generous statute of limitations of 300 days, there are more than 365 days between the date that plaintiff ceased to have personal contact with Muñiz, to wit, February 25, 2008, and the date when she filed her claim at the EEOC on April 8, 2009.” See Docket No. 99, page 7. In sum, “any claim beyond the filing period is barred by Title VII applicable statute of limitations and any claim of sexual harassment that plaintiff brought in her complaint is time-barred.” See Docket No. 99, pages 7–8.
As of this date, plaintiff Rodriguez is still working with the PRPD. In addition, the record shows that the defendants' motion for summary judgment stands unopposed at the time of this writing.1
It is settled that a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not have a specific statute of limitations. In Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 7, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1982), the Court adopted the one year statute of limitations applicable to Puerto Rico tort actions, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141, as applicable to an action brought under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991. See also
“Civil rights actions brought forth pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do not have a specific statute of limitations.” Sanchez Ramos v. Puerto Rico Police Department, et al., 392 F.Supp.2d 167, 180 (D.P.R.2005). Hence the “states have been encouraged to, and must apply, the state's statute of limitations which is most appropriate to the particular § 1983 claim.” Sanchez Ramos, 392 F.Supp.2d at 180. In the case of Puerto Rico, the most analogous statute of limitations to a § 1983 claim is the one year personal injury action statute of limitations. Id. citing Ruiz–Sulsona v. University of Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir.2003); Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir.1990); Rivera Sanchez v. Autoridad de Energia El ectrica, 360 F.Supp.2d 302, 307 (D.P.R.2005). Hence, the statute of limitations applicable to an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991 is one year from the date that the employee is notified in writing of his/her discharge or from the alleged § 1983 violation. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. at 7, 102 S.Ct. 28. However, “[p]laintiff should keep in mind that ‘the pendency of an administrative proceeding does not maintain the section 1983 claim in a state of suspended animation.’ ” 2Sanchez Ramos, 392 F.Supp.2d at 181 (citations omitted). “[T]he filing of an administrative complaint with the Department of Labor, EEOC Local Office, fails to toll in any way the running of the statute of limitations for claims pursuant as to a civil rights complaint under § 1983 against the natural persons individual co-defendants.” (Citations omitted). Id.
In the instant case, plaintiff is still working with the PRPD. The record further shows that plaintiff Rodriguez grievances ceased after she was transferred to Añasco on February 25, 2008, and the instant complaint was filed on September 3, 2009. Hence, any action that plaintiff may have under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is time-barred, as the complaint was filed more than 365 days after February 25, 2008, that is, after the statute of limitations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991 had expired. The filing of the administrative complaint with the EEOC only tolled the one year period of the statute of limitations as to the employer, but not as to the natural persons sued in their individual capacities. See Sanchez Ramos, 392 F.Supp.2d at 182, citing Leon–Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 964 F.Supp. 585 (D.P.R.1997); Galib Frangie v. El Vocero, 138 D.P.R. 560 (1995); Cintron v. E.L.A., 127 D.P.R. 582 (1990). Hence, this action is time-barred as to defendants Mufiiz, Jose Madera Casiano, Pedro Toledo, Jose Figueroa Sancha and Benjamin Rodriguez in their individual capacities. 3
The Court notes that the instant case is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an underlying cause of action of sexual harassment under Title VII. But the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has stated clearly, following most if not all of the circuits, that there is no cause of action under Title VII, and most if not all, discrimination statutes against personal individuals. See Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.2009). Further, the federal courts have stated that a Title VII claim is the exclusive remedy for a Title VII claim, precluding a § 1983 claim. Others have stated that if a § 1983 claim is permitted, the underlying law must be used and cannot be circumvented. See Henley v. Brown, et al., 686 F.3d 634, 642 (8th Cir.2012) (). Hence, the principles of law of Title VII must be used. See Wright v. Rolette County, 417 F.3d 879, 884–885 (8th Cir.2005).
In Wright, 417 F.3d at 884–885, the Court held:
Sexual harassment...
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...this remains an open question of law. Section 1983 does not supply a statute of limitations for itself. See Rodríguez Torres v. Muniz Gonzalez, 898 F.Supp.2d 433, 436 (D.P.R.2012). However, the Supreme Court held that courts must generally borrow the forum state's limitations period governi......
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