Town of Amherst v. Niagara Frontier Port Authority

• Decision Date: 14 March 1963
• Citation: 238 N.Y.S.2d 710,38 Misc.2d 906
• Parties: TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Plaintiffs, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 710

238 N.Y.S.2d 710

38 Misc.2d 906

TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Plaintiffs, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Erie County.

March 14, 1963.

Raichle, Moore, Banning & Weiss, Buffalo (Frank G. Raichle, Buffalo, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Ohlin, Damon, Morey, Sawyer & Moot, Buffalo (Richard E. Moot, Buffalo, of counsel), appearing specially for defendant.

REID S. MOULE, Justice.

This is a suit by the Towns of Amherst and Cheektowaga to enjoin the defendant, The Niagara Frontier Port Authority, from proceeding with a proposed extension of runways at the Greater Buffalo International Airport so as to accommodate jet aircraft.

By notice of motion dated February 28, 1963, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over its person and over the subject matter of the suit.

The question to be decided is whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Authority and to enjoin the proposed extension of the runways. Briefly, the argument of the defendant is that it is an arm or agency of the State, performing a governmental function of the State, and that it shares in the sovereign immunity of the State from suits in equity.

The answer to this question rests on two other questions. First, whether the defendant is an arm or agency of the State clothed with sovereign immunity. Second, assuming that it is such whether the State has waived the immunity of the Authority to suits in equity.

The Niagara Frontier Port Authority was created by the Legislature in 1955. It is a 'body corporate and politic constituting a public benefit corporation.' (Public Authorities Law, § 1303(1).) The Legislature has declared that its creation and purposes are 'for the benefit of the people of the state', and that it is to be regarded as performing a 'governmental function'. (Public Authorities Law, § 1315(1).)

The Court of Appeals held in Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority 1 N.Y.2d 374, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 135 N.E.2d 572 (1956), and Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47, 174 N.E.2d 727 (1961), that the New York State Thruway Authority is an arm or agency of the State. True, the relationship between the Authority and the State may not be as close as that existing between the Thruway Authority and the State. Nevertheless, the relationship is a close one and I believe that I must give effect to the foregoing Legislative declarations of the nature of this Authority. I find that defendant is a State agency.

In Mathewson v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 788, 215 N.Y.S.2d 86, 174 N.E.2d 754 (1961), the people of the Village of Pelham Manor in Westchester County sought an injunction in Supreme Court enjoining the Thruway Authority from permitting use of the Thruway by trucks, buses and tractor-trailers through the Village during the hours between 8 o'clock in the evening and 8 o'clock in the morning. On the reasoning of Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, supra, the Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. It might well be argued that the policy underlying this decision is one of separation of powers of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the State government and reflects the notion that bodies created by the Legislature to perform certain executive and legislative functions should not be subject in the performance of these functions to interference by the Courts through the granting of coercive equity relief. (Cf. Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436, 440, 131 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1956); New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 203, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9, 176 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1961). This question need...