Town of Amherst v. Niagara Frontier Port Authority

• Decision Date: 06 September 1963
• Parties: TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Plaintiffs, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 831

242 N.Y.S.2d 831

40 Misc.2d 116

TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Plaintiffs, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Erie County.

Sept. 6, 1963.

Raichle, Moore, Banning & Weiss, Buffalo, for plaintiffs.

Ohlin, Damon, Morey, Sawyer & Moot, Buffalo, for defendant.

REID S. MOULE, Justice.

This is a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal insufficiency.

By this action, plaintiffs, Towns of Amherst and Cheektowaga, seek an adjudication that the proposed runway extension to the Greater Buffalo International Airport for use by jet aircraft would, if so used, constitute a public nuisance and should therefore be enjoined.

By an earlier motion, the defendant Authority sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that, as an agency of the State, it is immune from suits in equity. The Appellate Division held that this Court has jurisdiction over both the person of the Authority and the subject matter of the action (19 A.D.2d 107, 241 N.Y.S.2d 247, revg. 38 Misc.2d 906, 238 N.Y.S.2d 710).

In considering the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we start with the decision of the Appellate Division, which obviating the problem of sovereign immunity, held that the Authority is to be treated for jurisdictional purposes as a municipal corporation rather than as an arm or agency of the State itself. In passing upon the jurisdictional question, the Appellate Division pointed out that municipal corporations have in many instances been subject to suits to enjoin the maintenance of a nuisance. However, it expressly withheld its views as to whether or not the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

If this were a suit by private property owners to enjoin the creation or maintenance of a private nuisance, the complaint, in view of the decision of the Appellate Division, might well be held sufficient on its face. For although it is often stated that an activity carried on pursuant to legislative authority cannot, at least short of constitutional objections, constitute a nuisance, the scope of this doctrine has been severely limited in New York by the requirement of an express or clear sanction of the very conduct constituting the nuisance. Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937); Hill v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of City of New York, 139 N.Y. 495, 34 N.E. 1090 (1893); Cogswell v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 103 N.Y. 10, 8 N.E. 537 (1886). Certainly this standard of explicitness has not been met in the present case.

It might well be suggested that, if anything, a public nuisance is of more serious consequence than a private nuisance and therefore more unhesitatingly to be enjoined. I do not believe, however, that the question can be viewed quite this simply. For there are at stake important considerations of competence and separation of powers, that is, considerations of the proper functions of the plaintiff Towns, of the Authority, and of the Court, especially as these are related to each other.

The courts have always been the appropriate forum in which to seek protection of private rights from encroachment by governmental action. Serious questions of due process of law arise when a governmental body attempts to maintain a private nuisance, that is, an unreasonable interference with the use by an individual of his own property, without compensation. As already noted, the courts do not construe legislation as having authorized such interference unless the intent is clearly expressed and they do not hesitate to redress such a wrong.

It is one thing, however, for a court to protect private property rights threatened by governmental action and it is quite another for the court in the name of the rights of the public to overrule a determination of a public body, entrusted by the public or its representatives with the making of just such determinations, and this at the suit of another governmental body also representing and acting in behalf of the public welfare.

What we have in the present case is not a conflict between public and private interests but a conflict between two representatives to the public as to what is in the best interests of the public. I believe that the Court must leave the determination of what course of action will best meet the public interest with the body authorized in the first instance to make this determination; I do not believe the Court is free to substitute the judgment of the plaintiff Towns or its own for such a determination.

The conduct sought to be declared a public nuisance and enjoined is the construction and operation of a public improvement by the Authority, a governmental body, created by the Legislature with the function, among others, of maintaining, improving and operating the airport in question. Its relationship to the municipalities most directly interested in the airport, including the City of Buffalo and the plaintiff Towns, is a close one. A high degree of cooperation among these entities was contemplated. With the consent and participation of these municipalities, the Authority was to consolidate and supersede certain of their former functions and areas of jurisdiction. See Public Authorities Law, Article 6, Title 1, especially Sections 1307-1312, Sections 1316, 1326 and 1328.

The Towns of Amherst and Cheektowaga had...