Town of Amherst v. Niagara Frontier Port Authority

• Decision Date: 01 July 1963
• Citation: 19 A.D.2d 107,241 N.Y.S.2d 247
• Parties: TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Appellants, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 247

241 N.Y.S.2d 247

19 A.D.2d 107

TOWN OF AMHERST and Town of Cheektowaga, Appellants, v. NIAGARA FRONTIER PORT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 1, 1963.

Raichle, Moore, Banning & Weiss, Buffalo, for appellants; Frank G. Raichle, Buffalo, of counsel.

Ohlin, Damon, Morey, Sawyer & Moot, Buffalo, for respondent; Richard E. Moot, Buffalo, of counsel.

Before WILLIAMS, P. J., and BASTOW, McCLUSKY and HENRY, JJ.

BASTOW, Justice.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the proposed extension of a runway at the Buffalo airport for use by 'jet' planes is a public nuisance and that such proposed action should be permanently enjoined. Defendant appeared specially and moved (1) to strike the complaint upon the ground that it is a legal entity not subject to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court (Civil Practice Act, § 237-a) and (2) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject of the action. (Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 106, subd. 1)

Special Term granted both motions. In an opinion (38 Misc.2d 906, 908, 909, 238 N.Y.S.2d 710, 712, 713) it concluded that defendant 'was created by the State; it is part of the State, an arm or agency of the State' and that no '[c]ourt has jurisdiction to pass upon the grievances of those bringing this suit for an injunction.' In reaching these conclusions reliance was placed, among other authorities, upon Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 135 N.E.2d 572; Benz v. New York State Thruway Auth., 9 N.Y.2d 486, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47, 174 N.E.2d 727; Mathewson v. New York State Thruway Auth., 9 N.Y.2d 788, 215 N.Y.S.2d 86, 174 N.E.2d 754 and Psaty v. Duryea, 306 N.Y. 413, 118 N.E.2d 584.

In our opinion those and similar decisions are distinguishable and not here controlling. The reasons that lead us to this conclusion require a brief statement of the creation of defendant, its powers, functions and duties. It was created by chapter 870 of the Laws of 1955 (Public Authorities Law, §§ 1300-1333). While created as a public benefit corporation (Ibid. § 1303, subd. 1), it serves a limited geographical area consisting of the city of Buffalo and such of two other named cities and five named towns in Erie County as might elect to become participating municipalities with Buffalo (Ibid. § 1302). It is empowered, among other things, to acquire, maintain and operate the following projects: airport, port improvement and parking meter. (Ibid. § 1304, subd. 5) Each of these projects is limited geographically. The airport is the Buffalo Municipal Airport 'owned and operated by the city of Buffalo' in the plaintiff towns. The port improvement is limited to ports in the district and authority over parking meters is limited to streets in the participating municipalities (Ibid. § 1301, subds. 10, 11 and 12).

While, as Special Term points out, section 1315 of the law makes a legislative determination that defendant is carrying out its corporate purposes 'for the benefit of the people of the state' and is 'regarded as performing a governmental function' it is significant that such determination was made in that section for the apparent purpose of exempting defendant from the payment of all taxes. (Cf. N.Y.Const. Art. III, § 18; People ex rel. Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority v. Davis, 277 N.Y. 292, 14 N.E.2d 74.) Equally, if not more significant, are the provisions that defendant's corporate life is 40 years plus and when it ceases to exist the several projects become the property of one or more of the participating municipalities. The airport specifically reverts to the city of Buffalo (Public Authorities Law § 1303, subds. 5 and 7).

The act contains the familiar grant of power to defendant 'to sue and be sued' (Ibid. § 1304, subd. 1). Jurisdiction of tort actions by implication is placed in courts of general jurisdiction. Section 1322 requires service of notice of claim in a tort case as provided in section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and there is a short period of limitation for commencement of action thereafter.

Thus, in general outline the defendant Authority resembles the Authority considered in Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority, 255 App.Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103. That defendant had been given broad powers to carry out the health policy of the State. Plaintiff was injured and brought action in Supreme Court. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that defendant was an agency of the State and that the claim should be prosecuted in the Court of Claims. In holding to the contrary the court said (255 App.Div. p. 429, 8 N.Y.S.2d p. 106): 'We regard the Saratoga Springs Authority as an agency exercising governmental powers, and the performance of its functions is not so closely allied or held in such intimate relation to the health activities carried on by the State itself, as to make its work a part of the health work carried on directly by the State. The State did not 'employ' the Authority to that end. Paige v. State of New York, supra [269 N.Y. 352], page 356, 199 N.E. 617.) The State is not liable for the torts of the Authority; and if an actionable cause exists in favor of the plaintiff, it may be enforced only against the defendant or those persons whose negligence caused the injury. From this it follows that claimant's claim may not be prosecuted in the Court of Claims, and that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter.'

It is significant in considering the subsequent pattern of legislation relating to the New York State Thruway that Pantess was decided in 1938 and the following year section 1607 (then § 1306-a) was added to the Public Authorities Law conferring upon the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims sounding in tort against the Saratoga Authority (L.1939, ch. 871).

The New York State Thruway Authority was created by chapter 143 of the Laws of 1950, Public Authorities Law, § 350 et seq., with power to sue and be sued. Presumably from that time until 1954 courts of general jurisdiction were vested with jurisdiction of tort cases against the Authority. (Cf. Strang v. State of New York, 206 Misc. 734, 134 N.Y.S.2d 871.) In the latter year section 361-b was added to the Public Authorities Law (L.1954, ch. 517, § 9). The provisions thereof conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine all claims against the Authority for alleged torts or breaches of contract.

This enactment was passed upon in Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority, 1 N.Y.2d 374, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 135 N.E.2d 572. There a tort claimant, subsequent to the enactment of section 361-b brought an action in Supreme Court against the Authority. It was contended that the Legislature could not constitutionally divest Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over tort actions against such a corporation. The court held to the contrary. It concluded that the enactment was valid and in so doing stated that the Authority was an agent of the State.

Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47, 174 N.E.2d 727 (and Mathewson v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 788, 215 N.Y.S.2d 86, 174 N.E.2d 754, decided therewith) held that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of an equity action brought against the Thruway Authority. In reaching this conclusion the court pointed out the two statutory grants of jurisdiction to sue the Authority found in Sections 361-b and 368 of the Public Authorities Law. As we understand these decisions they are authority for the proposition that the Thruway Authority is not suable in an equity action because of the limited grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims of common law actions and the absence of any further or additional grant to that or any other court. Thus in Benz it was said (9 N.Y.2d p. 490, 215 N.Y.S.2d p. 49, 174 N.E.2d p. 728): 'There is no provision anywhere for equity suits against the Thruway Authority. It would indeed be remarkable if the Legislature which 'could have forbidden suits to be maintained against the Authority in any court or tribunal' produced a situation where suits at law could be prosecuted (per express enactment) in the Court of Claims only but (by legislative silence) equity suits would be allowed against the Thruway Authority in the Supreme Court. There is no sign that the lawmakers had any such strange intent.'

Thus, it would seem that Benz is distinguishable from the case before us. It is bottomed on a finding and a statute that differ. The finding is that the Thruway Authority is an arm or agency of the State. The two statutes differ because the Legislature, as to the Thruway Authority, by express enactment has given jurisdiction of suits at law to the Court of Claims but has remained silent as to equity cases. Such is not the case in the enactment under consideration. It grants the broad power 'to sue and be sued' and limits this general grant only as found in sections 1319 and 1322.

The defendant Authority is not an arm or agency of the State. It is an agency of local subdivisions of government (cities and towns) performing municipal functions--among other things, operating the Buffalo airport and maintaining parking meters. Running through most of the decisions in this area we find repeated references to the 'close relationship' between the defendant and the State. (See, for instance, Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 489, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48, 174 N.E.2d 727, 728; Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors Association, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Authority, 5 N.Y.2d 420, 424, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536, 158 N.E.2d 238, 240; Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority, 1 N.Y.2d 374, 376, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29, 135 N.E.2d 572, 573 and Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436, 441, 131 N.E.2d 721, 724.) But if, in the case before us there is to be a 'closeness'...