Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration

• Decision Date: 10 August 1976
• Citation: 370 Mass. 769,352 N.E.2d 914
• Parties: , 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2494, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,908 TOWN OF ARLINGTON v. BOARD OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION et al. 1 (and a companion case). 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 914

352 N.E.2d 914

370 Mass. 769, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2494,

80 Lab.Cas. P 53,908

TOWN OF ARLINGTON

v. BOARD OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION et al.

¹

(and a companion case).

²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 8, 1976.

Decided Aug. 10, 1976.

John F. Maher, Asst. Town Counsel, Arlington, for the town of Arlington.

Andrew J. McElaney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration.

Warren H. Pyle, Boston, for Local 1297, Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters and others.

Herbert P. Gleason, Corp. Counsel, and Paul T. Edgar, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, and D. M. Moschos, Sp. Asst. City Sol., for the city of Worcester, as amici curiae, joined in a brief.

Before REARDON, QUIRICO, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

These cases were consolidated and are here on a reservation and report by a judge of the Superior Court without decision. An application for direct appellate review was granted. The actions were brought by the town of Arlington (town) to set aside 'last and best offer' arbitration awards issued pursuant to St.1973, c. 1078, § 4 (the act), which established wages, vacation pay, sick leave, and other conditions of employment for police officers and firefighters in Arlington for the year July 1, 1974, to June 30, 1975. The town challenged the binding arbitration statute as unconstitutional and in conflict with other prevailing General Laws of the Commonwealth. The cities of Boston and Worcester have joined in the plaintiff's brief as amici curiae, and some eighty-five towns and cities of the Commonwealth appear to indorse the plaintiff's brief. This is the first challenge directed toward the act and presents the following basic questions:

1. Does the act, in providing for binding arbitration for policemen and firefighters, violate the Home Rule Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution in that it removes all decision-making power with regard to those services from the municipality?

2. Does the act constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a panel of private individuals in violation of art. 30 of our Declaration of Rights, and pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth?

3. Does the act contravene the 'one-man, one-vote' principle in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

4. Would the enforcement of an arbitration panel's award under the act conflict with the provisions of the General Laws and statutes regulating the conduct of municipal finance, and, if so, which should prevail?

The facts are briefly stated as follows. On February 7, 1975, in the case of the firefighters, and on June 13, 1975, in the case of the policemen, the town commenced these actions seeking declaratory relief from the enforcement of arbitrators' awards which had been made in each case. Local 1297, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, was the collective bargaining representative of the firefighters. The Arlington Ranking Officers Association was the collective bargaining representative of the ranking police officers of the town. Both associations were voluntary and unincorporated. Separate negotiations between them and the town failed to produce collective bargaining agreements, whereupon each employee organization petitioned the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (board) for mediation and fact finding. After this had been granted and no contracts emerged, the employee organizations each petitioned the board to investigate. Following investigation the board determined that the conditions for binding arbitration existed as to both organizations and ordered three-member arbitration panels to be established under the act. Each panel consisted of a member selected by the town, a member selected by the employee organization, and an impartial chairman chosen by the other two members from a list of arbitrators prepared by the board. Hearings were held in each case and each panel received written statements of the last and best offers of the town and the employee organizations on each of the disputed issues. In conformance with the statute, which requires the panel to select one of the two written statements, a majority of each panel selected the written statement submitted by the employee organizations. The town has refused to proceed in accordance with either one of the awards. The only claims pressed by the town relate to the questions stated above. The board and the associations argue that the act is a valid legislative enactment. ³

1. We consider first whether the act violates the Home Rule Amendment (art. 89, amending art. 2 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth). There can be no question that prior to the adoption of that amendment the cities and towns of the Commonwealth were subject to the complete control of the General Court. We made reference to that fact in Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 355--356, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973). We also stated in that case at 358, 294 N.E.2d at 408 that it was the intention of the amendment to grant to the cities and towns 'independent municipal powers which they did not previously inherently possess.' On the other hand, in Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 144 n. 4, 293 N.E.2d 268, 273 (1973), we made it plain that the Legislature still 'may restrict local legislative action or deny municipalities power to act at all . . ..' These cases and the text of art. 89 itself indicate that, while the scope of the authority granted to municipalities to act on municipal problems is very broad, the scope of the disability imposed on the Legislature by the amendment is quite narrow. Section 6 of the amendment, while providing the broad grant of governmental powers referred to above, limits the municipal exercise of those powers to acts which are 'not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight.' Section 8 then provides that '(t)he general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities and towns . . . by general laws which apply to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two . . ..'

There would appear to be no argument here that the act, which applies to all cities and towns, is anything other than a general law. See Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. 761, 767, 250 N.E.2d 428 (1969). It would seem to reflect the proper employment of § 8 of the Home Rule Amendment. Furthermore, it is no longer subject to debate that the General Court has the power to legislate in the area of municipal wages and benefits. We have so stated in Quinlan v. Cambridge, 320 Mass. 124, 126, 68 N.E.2d 11 (1946), and nothing in the Home Rule Amendment suggests that this power has been withdrawn or limited (other than by § 8 of the amendment which has been complied with in this case). Here the arbitrators' awards which are contested by the town relate solely to wages and benefits. We note that G.L. c. 150E, § 7, inserted by St.1973, c. 1078, § 2, provides in part, 'If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the employer and the exclusive representative contains a conflict between . . . any municipal personnel ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation,' the terms of the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail. We made it plain in Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dep't of Community Affairs, supra, and in Bloom v. Worcester, supra, that in case of inconsistency or conflict a local ordinance or by-law must give way as in these cases where a general law has been enacted by the General Court in accordance with § 8 of the Home Rule Amendment. We thus conclude, for instance, that the award of the majority of the arbitration panel which provided four weeks' vacation to firefighters after ten years of service supersedes that town by-law that granted four weeks' vacation after twelve years of service. In short, the opinions cited above lead only to the conclusion that the binding arbitration procedure provided by the act is not violative of art. 89. See Board of Health of North Adams v. Mayor of North Adams --- Mass. ---, ---, 334 N.E.2D 34 (1975)^A; Del Duca v. Town Adm'r of Methuen, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, ^b 329 N.E.2d 748 (1975).

2. The town asserts that the act is an unconstitutional delegation of power to a panel of private individuals specifically stated to be a violation of art. 5 of our Declaration of Rights. ⁴ However, it would appear that the doctrine of nondelegation derives rather from art. 30 of our Declaration of Rights and from pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of our Constitution. The question of delegation was carefully considered in Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. of Danvers, 363 Mass. 409, 420--423, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973). There we made reference to the inability of the General Court to delegate general power to make laws. See Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 600, 66 N.E. 607 (1903), and cases cited. However, we made it equally plain that the Legislature may delegate to a board or an individual officer the implementation of details of a legislative policy. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 348 Mass. 538, 544, 205 N.E.2d 346 (1965); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 527, 95 N.E.2d 666 (1950); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 341, 52 N.E.2d 566 (1943).

It is to be emphasized that the act defines an elaborate and detailed framework within which the arbitrators must act. Section 4 provides with specificity ten standards to guide the arbitrators in arriving at a decision. ⁵ Regulations have been promulgated by the board which govern procedures and the conduct relative to hearings. Arbitration must be preceded by negotiation, mediation and fact finding, and may be followed at the instance of either p...