Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, C.A. No. 02-2513 (R.I. Super 1/30/2004)

• Decision Date: 30 January 2004
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 02-2513
• Parties: TOWN OF BURRILLVILLE, Appellant v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

Page 1

TOWN OF BURRILLVILLE, Appellant v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.

C.A. No. 02-2513

Superior Court of Rhode Island.

Filed: January 30, 2004

DECISION

DARIGAN, J.

Before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, which found that the Town of Burrillville violated G.L. § 28-7-13(6) by refusing to bargain with the Local 369, International Brotherhood of Police Officers over the implementation of a General Order issued by the Chief of Police dictating procedures to be followed when a police officer is injured while on duty. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. § 45-35-15.

Facts/Travel

A review of the record reveals the following facts. The appellant, the Town of Burrillville (Town), is an employer as defined in the Rhode Island Labor Relations Act. See G.L. § 28-7-3. The appellee, the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board, is an administrative agency. The Local 369, International Brotherhood of Police Officers Union (Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of the Rhode Island Labor Relations Act and is the bargaining representative for the members of the Burrillville Police Department. The Town and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which was in force during the relevant time period.

On or about March 10, 1999, the Chief of the Police Department, Colonel Bernard Gannon (Colonel Gannon), summoned Officer McBrier and Officer Macomber to his office to review a proposed policy outlining procedures with which the members of the Police Department would be required to comply in order to receive injured-on-duty benefits. Shortly after the meeting, Colonel Gannon implemented the policy as General Order 99-1. The parties did not engage in bargaining prior to Colonel Gannon's implementation of General Order 99-1 (General Order).

The General Order establishes policies and procedures to be followed by a police officer who is injured in the line of duty (hereinafter injured-on-duty) for the Burrillville Police Department (Department).¹ The General Order requires, inter alia, that an officer injured-on-duty submit the following: a form reporting the injury; a form setting forth statements by any witnesses; a form authorizing the officer's medical care providers to release medical information regarding the work related injury to the Police Department; a form to be filled out by the police officer's immediate supervisor; and a statement of diagnosis from the officer's treating physician indicating the diagnosis and whether or when the officer will be able to perform his or her regular duties.

In addition to requiring the submission of the forms identified above, the General Order dictates that an officer who does not return to work after his or her initial medically excused absence must submit another statement from a medical doctor in order to continue to be carried on injured-on-duty status.² The officer is required to notify his or her physician of the Town's requirement that the physician produce a statement of information concerning whether the officer's injury was a work related injury, the prognosis, notes on the officer's rehabilitation, and length of time the officer will be unable to perform his or her duties. Pursuant to Section 5, an officer who fails to produce the second Physician's statement within 14 days of the injury will not be reimbursed for sick leave utilized prior to the submission of the additional documentation. After the Department receives the additional medical documentation to substantiate the continuance of the injured-on-duty claim, the officer will be carried on injured-on-duty status from that date forward.

Section 10 of the General Order specifies procedures to be followed when the Town requires an injured officer to be examined by a Town physician. In pertinent part, this section mandates that an officer who "fails to appear for two (2) scheduled appointments with the Town physician. . .will be suspended for two (2) days without pay." Finally, Section 11 of the General Order requires that when an officer whose status is "injured-on-duty" leaves the state for more than 24 hours, he or she must notify the Department and "[i]n such case, the officer's [injured-on-duty] status shall be changed and the officer shall be required to use furlough time."

Subsequent to the implementation of the General Order, on or about August 24, 1999, the Union filed a charge with the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (Board), alleging that the Town violated the Labor Relations Act by issuing the General Order without engaging in bargaining with the Union. The parties met at an informal conference on September 24, 1999; however, they failed to resolve the matter. Thereafter, on August 25, 2000, the Board issued a complaint against the Town based on the Union's Unfair Labor Practice Charge. The complaint was heard before the Board in a formal hearing on January 21, 2001. At the hearing, Colonel Gannon, Officer McBrier, and Officer Macomber testified to the Department's previous practice for reporting injuries sustained in the line of duty, the content of the General Order, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.

On April 29, 2002, the Board issued its written decision holding that (1) the General Order addresses mandatory subjects for bargaining because its provisions impact receipt of injured-on-duty benefits and discipline, (2) inclusion of a management-rights clause in the Collective Bargaining agreement did not constitute a waiver of the right to bargain over the content of the General Order, (3) the Union did not waive its right to bargain over the issuance of the General Order, and (4) the Union proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the Town committed a violation of G.L. § 28-7-13(6).

The Town filed a timely appeal of the Board's decision in which it argues that it had no duty to bargain because the content of the General Order is not a mandatory subject for bargaining; the General Order did not constitute a material change in the Police Department's procedures; and the Union waived its right to bargain by accepting a management-rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement and by failing to specifically request bargaining.

Standard of Review

General Laws § 42-35-15(g) guides this Court in its review of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board's decision and provides:

"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

This section of the Administrative Procedures Act precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact. Kachanis v. Bd. of Review, Dep't. of Employment and Training, 638 A.2d 553, 555 (R.I. 1994); Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988); Carmody v. R.I. Conflict of Interest Commission, 509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986). Accordingly, this Court "must uphold the agency's conclusions when they are supported by any legally competent evidence in the record." Rocha v. State Public Utilities Comm., 694 A.2d 722, 725 (R.I. 1997); Interstate Navigation Co. d/b/a The Block Island Ferry v. Div. of Public Utilities & Carriers of R.I., 824 A.2d 1282, 1288 (R.I. 2003). This is true even in cases where the Court, after reviewing the certified record and evidence, might be inclined to view the evidence differently than the agency. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992).

This Court will "reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record." Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981) (even if the court were to conclude that one witness's testimony was improper, it would reverse the agency's conclusions only if said testimony were the sole basis of the agency's finding); Bunch v. Bd. of Review, Rhode Island Dep't. Employment and Training, 690 A.2d 335, 337 (R.I. 1997). "Legally competent evidence is `relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.' [Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Dep't. of Labor and Training, Board of Review, 749 A.2d 1121, 1124 (R.I. 2000)] (quoting Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998))." Arnold v. R.I. Dep't. of Labor, 822 A.2d 164, 167 (R.I. 2003); Ryan Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 257 F.3d 1, 7 (1st. Cir. 2001). Questions of law are "not binding upon a reviewing court and may be freely reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607; 376 A.2d 1, 7 (1977); Hometown Properties v. Rhode Island Dep't. of Envtl. Management, 592 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1991). The Court may modify a decision of the board if, inter alia, the findings are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of the whole record" or otherwise affected by legal error. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 (g) (5).

Collective Bargaining

"Our Legislature has...