Town of Milford v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 03 April 2001
• Citation: 752 NE 2d 732,434 Mass. 754
• Parties: TOWN OF MILFORD & another v. JAMES S. BOYD, JR., & another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

434 Mass. 754

752 NE 2d 732

TOWN OF MILFORD & another¹ v. JAMES S. BOYD, JR., & another.²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 3, 2001.

August 13, 2001.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

Gerald M. Moody for the plaintiffs.

Thomas O. Moriarty (Richard E. Brooks with him) for the defendants.

Merita A. Hopkins, Michael A. Wirtz, Jennifer Dopazo, & Thomas J. Urbelis, for city of Boston & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

SPINA, J.

The town of Milford (town) appeals from the decision of a judge in the Land Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant managers of the Courtyard at Milford Condominium Association (association). On appeal, the town claims that the judge erred in (1) concluding that G. L. c. 60, § 77, requires the town to pay condominium common area charges assessed after it took record title to certain units for unpaid property taxes, and (2) determining that a decree of foreclosure under G. L. c. 60, § 69, does not extinguish the town's liability for these charges for the period between the date of the tax taking and the decree of foreclosure.³ We transferred the case here on our own motion. We affirm the judgment.⁴

1. Facts. The Courtyard at Milford Condominium is a commercial condominium complex developed by Caruso Builders, Inc. (Caruso), and located in the town of Milford. In 1993 and 1994, the tax collector for the town placed eleven units in the complex owned by Caruso in tax title pursuant to G. L. c. 60, §§ 53 and 54, for failure to pay real estate taxes. The instruments by which the town took record title were recorded on April 28, 1993, and May 6, 1994. Thereafter, the town commenced proceedings in the Land Court to foreclose and enforce the town's liens for taxes against the eleven units.

On June 24, 1998, counsel for the association notified the town that the association claimed $219,254.49 in unpaid common expenses due from and after the date of tax taking for each unit. These expenses were based on expenditures incurred for, among other purposes, liability and casualty insurance covering the common areas of the condominium; maintenance of the condominium parking areas, including snow removal; and landscaping, trash removal, and other general maintenance of the common areas. In response, the town contested liability for common charges incurred during the period after it took record title and before the judgments of foreclosure.⁵

The association commenced an action in the Superior Court against the town seeking to establish and enforce a lien for the unpaid common expenses for the periods prior to judgment of foreclosure. The town responded by seeking a declaration in the Land Court that the judgments of foreclosure extinguished any liens or claims for condominium fees or common charges accrued prior to the date of such judgments. The Superior Court action was stayed pending resolution of the Land Court proceeding.

The town and the association filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Land Court judge concluded that (1) the town is liable for common area expenses for a unit it has taken for unpaid taxes, commencing in each instance on the date on which such unit was taken; and (2) any decree of foreclosure entered in the town's behalf will extinguish the condominium's lien⁶ for all unpaid common expenses that accrued prior to the date of the decree, thereby removing that cloud on the title to the unit, but will not extinguish the town's liability for the common expenses that accrued between the date of the tax taking of a unit and the date of the decree of tax foreclosure.

2. Discussion. A town's liability for condominium common area charges, from and after the date of the tax taking, is controlled by G. L. c. 60, § 77.⁷ We have not previously had occasion to construe this statute, and begin our analysis with the familiar rule that, "[w]here the language of a statute is clear, courts must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and the courts need not look beyond the words of the statute itself." Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston, 430 Mass. 637, 640 (2000), and cases cited.

General Laws c. 60, § 77, provides, in pertinent part:

"Before foreclosure so much of the provisions of any covenant or agreement running with the land as calls for the payment of money by the owner thereof shall not be enforceable against a town which is the owner of record of such land under a tax title or taking, except as hereinafter provided. After foreclosure the town while it is the owner of record of such land may apply to the commissioner for an extension of the time during which such provisions shall not be enforceable against it. The commissioner shall have the power in his discretion to grant such an extension for a period not exceeding one year from the date of the foreclosure, and thereafter, from time to time, upon similar applications, may in his discretion grant similar additional extensions. Any such extension shall be in writing, may be recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds, and if so recorded within thirty days from its date, shall be conclusive in favor of the town. In no event, however, shall such provisions calling for the payment of money be so suspended and inoperative during any period in which such town directly or indirectly in any capacity accepts or receives the benefit of such covenant or agreement or of any right or privilege created or affected thereby."

The Land Court judge construed the last sentence as an exception referenced by the first sentence, and concluded that "prior to entry of a decree of foreclosure, a town is responsible for payment of money under a covenant running with the land only if the town `directly or indirectly' has accepted or received `the benefit of such covenant or agreement or of any right or privilege created or affected thereby.'" We agree.

The town's exemption from liability for the payment of money called for under covenants running with the land during the period prior to foreclosure is expressly modified by the language "except as hereinafter provided." To conclude that the last sentence does not provide an exception to the first sentence would render the modifying clause nugatory. In interpreting a statute, however, none of its words is to be regarded as superfluous. See Commonwealth v. Super, 431 Mass. 492, 498 (2000), and cases cited. Rather, a statute should be construed to avoid rendering its words meaningless. See Commonwealth v. Wade, 372 Mass. 91, 95 (1977). See also Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374 (2000). Because the language of the statute is clear, we must "enforce it according to its terms." D'Avella v. McGonigle, 429 Mass. 820, 823 (1999), quoting Boston Neighborhood Taxi Ass'n v. Department of Pub. Utils., 410 Mass. 686, 690 (1991).

Indeed, the town does not contend that the Land Court erred in its construction of the statute.⁸ Rather, the town's principal argument on appeal is that the Land Court erred in determining that the town benefited from the covenant to pay condominium common area charges. It contends that, under the Land Court's interpretation, a town would always be deemed to have benefited from the payment of condominium common area charges, and therefore a town would be automatically obligated to pay condominium expenses for a minimum of six months every time it took tax title. See G. L. c. 60, § 65 (municipality must wait six months from time of tax taking before filing petition to foreclose).

The town may have accurately predicted the consequences of the Land Court's interpretation, but we see nothing incongruous about those consequences. Rather, they are consistent with the statutory language and over-all statutory scheme. Furthermore, such consequences do not relieve the judge of the obligation to determine if an association has met its burden of proving that a town has benefited as a matter of fact. Although it may be difficult to imagine a situation in which the payment of a common area charge would not benefit a town, we do not foreclose such a possibility.

Here, the Land Court judge specifically found as fact that the town did benefit from the association's continued care and maintenance of the common areas. Common areas of a condominium unit are inextricably connected to the condominium units themselves. The units literally could not exist without them. As the Land Court judge...