Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Town of Watertown, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 14 March 1989
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 13424,13424
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WATERTOWN POLICE UNION LOCAL 541, AFSCME,v. TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al.

Page 406

555 A.2d 406

210 Conn. 333

WATERTOWN POLICE UNION LOCAL 541, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al.

No. 13424.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 8, 1988.

Decided March 14, 1989.

Joseph Lander, with whom, on the brief, was Frank J. Raccio, for appellant (plaintiff).

James R. Smith, Middlebury, for appellee (named defendant).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, the Watertown Police Union Local 541, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying its application, brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a), ¹ to vacate an arbitration award. On appeal the plaintiff claims that the arbitration board exceeded its authority because the award it rendered was in contravention of public policy and the trial court, therefore, erred in refusing to vacate it. We find no error.

The following facts, disclosed by the record, are relevant. The named defendant, the town of Watertown (town), and the plaintiff entered into a labor contract on October 31, 1984, in which they designated the codefendant, the Connecticut board of mediation and arbitration (board), as the arbitrator empowered to resolve disputes between them. The contract also addressed the standards by which the town could discharge union members. Pertinent to our discussion are article VI, § 8 of the contract which applied specifically to probationary employees and stated that such employees "may be terminated by the Town in its sole discretion for any reason whatsoever," and article XIII, § 1 which was a general provision providing that "[n]o employee covered by this Agreement shall be discharged ... except for just cause, and the Town shall be required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that just cause exists in those instances."

In February, 1985, the town discharged Michael Thompson, a probationary police officer. The plaintiff, claiming the discharge was not justified, grieved the town's action to arbitration. After an arbitration hearing on March 5, 1986, the board, in a written decision, cited the following findings of fact concerning Thompson's discharge: ² On January 5, 1985 Thompson was assigned to a patrol car with a part-time police officer. Because he was still in training at the police academy and the town did not want him involved in court appearances which would interfere with his training, Thompson's supervisor, Sergeant James Sheehan, ordered him "not to make any motor vehicle stops." Contrary to this order, Thompson did make a motor vehicle stop during his tour of duty that night. In addition, when Thompson made the stop, he failed to radio a "signal seventeen" into police headquarters which is a required procedure designed to protect officers by keeping the police department apprised of their whereabouts. Shortly thereafter, Thompson was discharged by the town under the provisions of article VI, § 8 of the contract pertaining to probationary employees. The reasons cited by the town for discharging Thompson were both his failure to follow the orders of a superior and his violation of a routine police procedure.

The plaintiff grieved Thompson's discharge arguing that article VI, § 8 of the contract must be read in conjunction with article XIII, § 1, thereby requiring the town to show just cause for the discharge of a probationary employee. Based on its reading of the contract, the plaintiff claimed that the town had failed to meet its burden of showing just cause for dismissing Thompson and that his discharge was, therefore, in violation of the contract.

Because the parties disagreed as to the relevant contract provision to be applied, they were unable to reach an agreement on the issue to be submitted to the board. The board decided to reject the plaintiff's interpretation of the contract, stating that Thompson, a probationary employee, was not entitled to the protection of the "just cause" standard. It then adopted the town's formulation of the issue and framed the submission as follows: "[W]hether the discharge of Michael Thompson was consistent or in violation of Article VI, Section 8 [of the labor contract]." Citing Thompson's failure to follow the orders of his superior, the board rendered an award in favor of the town stating that "there was a reason for [his] termination and that [because he was a probationary employee] the Town did, under Article VI, Section 8 have the right in its sole discretion to terminate [him]."

The plaintiff subsequently applied to the Superior Court to vacate the board's award. In support of its application to vacate, the plaintiff argued that the board had exceeded or imperfectly executed its powers in violation of § 52-418(a)(4) both in framing the issue, because it "prejudged the merits of the dispute and precluded, ab initio any possibility of relief to be awarded to the plaintiff," and in rendering an award that sanctioned the disciplining of an officer who did not follow an order of his superior that is against public policy.

On March 24, 1987, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it rejected both of the plaintiff's claims. ³ The court concluded that the board's adoption of the town's version of the issue, disregarding the "just cause" provision set out in article XIII, § 1 of the contract, was proper because any other formulation of the issue "would render Article VI, Section 8, surplusage." In rejecting the plaintiff's second claim that the board's decision countenanced an order contrary to public policy, the trial court distinguished the facts in this case from those of cases in which awards had been vacated as against public policy because they licensed serious violations of the law, and held that "as a pragmatic matter police departments do, and probably have to, adopt policies of selective enforcement when it comes to relatively minor failures to conform to motor vehicle laws, and I simply cannot buy the view that such a restraint on Thompson rises to the level of a violation of public policy."

On May 4, 1987, the plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Appellate Court. The plaintiff's claim on appeal is that the board exceeded its powers in violation of § 52-418(a)(4) in that its award sanctioned the order of Sheehan "not to make any motor vehicle stops," and that this order is contrary to public policy. On April 28, 1988, we transferred the case to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Because Sheehan's order does not violate established public policy, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the board's award.

"We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes." Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266, 270, 487 A.2d 553 (1985); Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 173 Conn. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 323 (1977); International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 653, 201 A.2d 656 (1964); Board of Education v. Local 818, 5 Conn.App. 636, 639, 502 A.2d 426 (1985). "A challenge of the arbitrator's authority is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission." Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 584, 440 A.2d 774 (1981); see also American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 186, 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME, supra, 195 Conn. at 271, 487 A.2d 553; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102, 106, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981); Board of Education v. Local 818, supra. An award, therefore, will normally be vacated only if it fails to conform to the submission, and the party challenging it has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to show that it does not conform to the submission. Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, supra, 183 Conn. at 585, 440 A.2d 774. " 'Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved. Meyers v. Lakeridge Development Co., 173 Conn. 133, 135, 376 A.2d 1105 [1977].' " Id., 183 Conn. at 584, 440 A.2d 774, quoting Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 404, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979); Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, supra, 191 Conn. at 340-41, 464 A.2d 785.

In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator's authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists under § 52-418(a)(4) when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 416-17, 544 A.2d 186 (1988); Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 590-91, 519 A.2d 1 (1986); Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); Stamford v. Stamford Police Assn., 14 Conn.App. 257, 259, 540 A.2d 400 (1988); State v. Connecticut Council 4, CEU, AFSCME, 7 Conn.App. 286, 290, 508 A.2d 806 (1986); International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Windsor, 40 Conn.Sup. 145, 483 A.2d 626 (1984); Avco Corporation v. Preteska, 22 Conn.Sup. 475, 174 A.2d 684 (1961). This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award "approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a...