Town of Williston v. Pine Ridge School, Inc., 138-73
| Decision Date | 04 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 138-73,138-73 |
| Citation | 321 A.2d 24,132 Vt. 439 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | TOWN OF WILLISTON v. PINE RIDGE SCHOOL, INC. |
William E. Mikell, Burlington, for plaintiff.
James H. Wick, of Dinse, Allen & Erdmann, Burlington, for defendant.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, KEYSER, DALEY and LARROW, JJ.
The exemptability under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) of the real property owned by a Vermont non-profit educational institution is the issue presented by this appeal. This section provides that among the property which is exempt from this State's property tax is:
(4) Real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or charitable uses; . . . and lands owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools . . ..
The primary purpose of the Pine Ridge School is the remediation of specific, severe learning disabilities, such as dyslexia. The lot of a student with one of these learning disabilities is similar to that of a blind student in that he can acquire the same knowledge or education as an unhandicapped child if he attends a school which has the necessary expertise, trained personnel, and special programs. He cannot do so if he attends a school such as Williston High School, which lacks the capability to furnish him the special attention he needs.
The cost of tuition, room, and board at Pine Ridge for the nine-month school year is $7,000. The school does not receive public funds directly; that is, by virtue of the fact that it exists. However, it does receive state and federal funds in the form of tuition payments by virtue of the fact that students who qualify under state and federal standards for such funds attend. The treasurer of the school testified that approximately forty per cent of its gross revenues was received from various public sources.
The Town of Williston assessed the real property of the defendant for the years 1971 and 1972. None of these taxes have been paid. The Town brought suit seeking to recover the taxes for these two years and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the defendant's property is not exempt.
The trial court concluded that the school was exempt under § 3802(4), both because the property was owned and operated as a 'public school' and because the principal use of the property constituted a 'public use.' It also denied recovery of the taxes previously assessed.
The Town argued below, and argues here, that even if the school is exempt it cannot contest the 1971 and 1972 tax assessments because it did not comply with 32 V.S.A. §§ 5291, 5292. Section 5292(a) provides:
A taxpayer shall not contest the validity of any tax assessed against his person, personal property or real estate nor the validity of the action of the listers or selectmen in assessing such tax nor the validity of any grand list unless the taxpayer filed his objections to the validity thereof, in the office of the town clerk wherein the tax is assessed, within a period of two months from November 15 of each year in which the tax is assessed.
The record does not show compliance with this section by the school; nevertheless, the trial court determined that, in light of other correspondence between various representatives of the two parties, not necessary to detail here, the Town was at all times aware of the school's claim that it was exempt. Therefore, the lower court concluded that the Town was not entitled to a judgment by virtue of the school's failure to technically comply with the statute.
The Town has appealed from all three of the lower court's conclusions to this Court. Both parties have devoted the major portions of their briefs and argument to the issue of whether the property is exempt from taxation under the public use clause of 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4). They have locked horns over the significance of the facts, set forth at the beginning of this opinion, describing the nature, enrollment, and expense of the defendant school.
However, the declaratory judgment issue in this case is directly controlled by Stowe Preparatory School, Inc. v. Town of Stowe, 124 Vt. 392, 205 A.2d 544 (1964). In that case, a non-profit educational institution, offering a college preparatory program and charging $2,200 for tuition, was held to be exempt from taxation under the public school clause of 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4). Id. 124 Vt. at 396, 205 A.2d 544. The Pine Ridge School, like the Stowe Preparatory School, is attended by students of elementary or high school age. These students can receive a high school diploma from Pine Ridge. The curriculum is the same as the curriculum at the schools they would attend if they were not handicapped.
The plaintiff questions the applicability of the Stowe case, arguing that the issue there was only whether the school was a college, with exemption dependent upon a vote by the Town's eligible voters under 32 V.S.A. § 3831(a), and that this Court held that since it was not a college, it was a public school, without considering whether it was properly characterized as a public school.
However, the Stowe decision invites its readers to see the case of Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 9 A. 907 (1886). In that case the argument was advanced that the St. Johnsbury Academy could not be exempt from taxation because it was not free to the public, and the use of the phrase 'or other public schools' meant that only academies that were free of charge would be exempt. In rejecting this contention, this Court construed the word 'public' in the above-quoted phrase as follows:
The word 'public' in this statute, we hold, is not to be construed in the . . . sense (os being free of charge to the pupils), but in the sense in which academies are regarded as public institutions. It is not restrictive of what precedes, but is explained thereby; that is, public in the sense in which colleges and academies are public.
No colleges or academies in this state are yet free to the public like our public schools; neither are they public corporations; therefore if the legislature intended by the phrase, 'lands owned or leased by colleges, academies, or other public schools, only such colleges and academies as were free to the public without charge for tuition, or as were purely and technically public corporations like municipalities, the legislation was simply idle.
Willard v. Pike, supra, 59 Vt. at 216, 9 A. at 915.
The Pine Ridge School is a public school under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), as the lower court correctly concluded. The lower court's Finding No. 18 that the property was used for the operation of a private school is not an inconsistency constituting reversible error, since the word 'private' was used to distinguish the defendant from a school operated by a municipal corporation.
The plaintiff argues that the definition of 'public school' in Title 16 should control. 16 V.S.A. § 11 provides:
(a) For the purposes of this title, unless the context otherwise clearly requires:
(7) 'Public school' means elementary and high schools which are princicipally supported by public taxation or tuition payments derived from public funds.
For this Court to so rule would require it to overlook not only Willard v. Pike, supra, and the Stowe decision, but also The Experiment in International Living, Inc. v. Town of Brattleboro, 127 Vt. 41, 238 A.2d 782 (1968), and The New York Institute for the Education of the Blind v. Town of Wolcott, 128 Vt. 280, 262 A.2d 451 (1970). While in the Experiment case, 'public school' for the purposes of 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) was defined by quoting the pertinent part of 16 V.S.A. § 791(1), a forerunner of 16 V.S.A. § 11(a)(7), noticeably omitted from the 'pertinent part' was the requirement that the school 'receives its principal support from public funds.' Id. 127 Vt. at 51-52, 238 A.2d at 789. In the New York Institute case, this Court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff was not a public school under 16 V.S.A. § 791. Shortly thereafter it stated that because the property was exempt as a public use it was not necessary to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Vt. Coll. of Fine Arts v. City of Montpelier
...we have specifically noted that "[t]he various clauses of § 3802(4) are disjunctive, not conjunctive." Town of Williston v. Pine Ridge Sch., Inc., 132 Vt. 439, 444, 321 A.2d 24, 28 (1974). In New York Institute for the Education of the Blind v. Town of Wolcott, we considered this question i......
-
Keystone Montessori Sch. v. Vill. of River Forest
...not been entrusted by Illinois law with the power to assess property for property tax purposes. ¶ 72 In Town of Williston v. Pine Ridge School , 132 Vt. 439, 321 A.2d 24, 28 (1974), the Vermont Supreme Court found that a school did not waive or forfeit its property tax exemption by not time......
-
Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield
...the trend in other jurisdictions is away from requiring both use and ownership. Lincoln Street relies on Town of Williston v. Pine Ridge School, Inc., 132 Vt. 439, 321 A.2d 24 (1974), to support its argument that the first clause of § 3802(4) should be read independently of the rest of the ......
-
Brattleboro Child Development, Inc. v. Town of Brattleboro, 263-79
...an indefinite class. New York Institute for Education of Blind v. Town of Wolcott, supra. See also Town of Williston v. Pine Ridge School, Inc., 132 Vt. 439, 321 A.2d 24 (1974). These interpretations of 32 V.S.A. § 3802 reflect the underlying economic theory of property tax exemption expres......