Tracey v. Osborne

• Decision Date: 26 January 1917
• Citation: 114 N.E. 959,226 Mass. 25
• Parties: TRACEY et al. v. OSBORNE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

226 Mass. 25

114 N.E. 959

TRACEY et al.

v.OSBORNE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 26, 1917.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Suit in equity for an injunction by Michael J. Tracey and another against Robert M. Osborne and others. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Decree affirmed.

Philip A. Kiely, of Lynn, for appellants.

Fredk. W. Mansfield, of Boston, for appellees.

RUGG, C. J.

The plaintiffs are members and representatives of a labor union called the United Shoe Workers of America. The defendants formerly members of the same union, are now members and representatives of another union called the Lasters' Protective Union of Lynn. Both these unions are voluntary unincorporated associations. This is a suit in equity whereby the plaintiffs seek to restrain the defendants from taking any action to cause or intended to cause any parties to break certain agreements, to which the plaintiffs are parties, to employ members of the plaintiff union, and particularly from calling any strike directed to that end.

The case was sent to a master, whose findings so far as now material are that for several years prior to 1915, there existed in the city of Lynn several local branches of the United Shoe Workers. Composed of three delegates from each of these branches was a suborganization known as Joint Council No. 1, designed to secure concentration of authority and efficiency of administration. It was authorized by the constitution of the union ‘to make agreements with manufacturers when prices and conditions are satisfactory to said Joint Council. Said agreement (sic) to be of a uniform nature and to be issued by the General Executive Board.’ In the early part of 1915, at the initiative of one Enwright, the publisher of a newspaper in Lynn, there was a movement for the purpose of formulating some agreement between manufacturers and workmen to promote industrial peace. As a result an agreement popularly known as the ‘Peace Pact’ was framed. These agreements, identical in form, each to be signed by a representative of the Joint Council No. 1 of the United Shoe Workers, and by some manufacturer who chose to adopt it, were to continue in force one year with stipulation for further extension and provided for the adjustment of any differences that might arise between the contracting parties and that there should be no strikes or lockouts or cessation of work pending a decision as to differences, and that all work of the employer in certain designated rooms and departments should be done by members of the United Shoe Workers, and that, so long as there was a sufficient number of these to do the work, no other help be employed. Other clauses regulated different aspects of the relations between the employer and the members of the plaintiff union.

The master found that the agreements were prepared and executed in the manner and by the agencies provided by the constitution of the United Shoe Workers. There are no subsidiary findings inconsistent with this general conclusion and, since the evidence is not reported, it must stand. The form of the agreement was indorsed unanimously by the resident committee of the general executive board and copies of it were printed by the general executive board and furnished to the Joint Council No. 1. This might have been found to be a substantial compliance with terms of the governing article of the constitution. The general executive board appears to have acted in some respects through what is termed a resident committee. Its powers by custom or otherwise are not set out in the master's report. In the absence of specific findings it may be presumed in favor of the general finding that the powers here exercised may be delegated by the general executive board. So far as the agreement was modified, after approval by the general executive board, if indeed in any instance there was a material change, it does not appear to affect any of the manufacturers referred to in the report as having signed the contract.

The contract in its general outlines is similar to that held legal in Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717, L. R. A. 1915A, 1217, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 810. In this aspect the case at bar is governed by that decision. It is putting in the form of an agreement a stipulation that one named labor union shall have, so long...