Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Ayers

• Decision Date: 24 October 1905
• Citation: 75 N.E. 506,217 Ill. 390
• Parties: TRAVELERS' INS. CO. v. AYERS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

217 Ill. 390

75 N.E. 506

TRAVELERS' INS. CO.

v.AYERS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1905.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by Mary A. Ayers against the Travelers' Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Horton & Brown, for appellant.

James Jay Sheridan and Monroe Fulkerson, for appellee.

RICKS, J.

This was a suit brought on an accident insurance policy which was issued on March 15, 1890, to John C. Ayers, husband of appellee. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of appellee for $4,573.24, upon which judgment was entered, from which an appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and a further appeal is prosecuted to this court to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts in the case are undisputed, and the record discloses that the insured, john C. Ayers, was in Richmond, Ind., and on Wednesday of the week of November 10, 1900, was assigned to a room in the Arnold Hotel, and on Saturday, november 10th, about noon, was found dead, or breathing practically his last breath. The evidence discloses that at the time the insured was found there was a strong odor of gas in the room, and it appeared that prior to the Saturday morning the room had been lighted by natural gas, and on that morning the natural gas was changed to artificial gas, and in doing so it was necessary to turn off the gas in the basement while making the change, and after the change was made the evidence discloses that the gas was again turned on. The evidence also discloses that the deceased usually left the gas burning when he retired for the night. All premiums were paid at the time of the accident, and it is not contended that any of the conditions of the policy were not complied with by the insured. There can be no question but that the cause of his death was the inhaling of the gas, and the only question to be determined in this case is whether or not the provisions of the policy exempt the payment where the gas was involuntarily inhaled.

It is insisted by appellant that the provision of the policy, ‘This insurance shall not cover * * * death * * * resulting, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, * * * from any gas or vapor,’ covers death by asphyxiation from gas, voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious, and that the case is distinguished from the cases of Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass'n, 133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52,9 L. R. A. 371, 23 Am. St. Rep. 637,Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 160 Ill. 642, 43 N. E. 765,52 Am. St. Rep. 355,Metropolitan Accident Ass'n v. Froiland, 161 Ill. 30, 43 N. E. 766,52 Am. St. Rep. 359, and Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Waterman, 161 Ill. 632, 44 N. E. 283,32 L. R. A. 654, which follow the case of Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347, 3 L. R. A. 443, 8 Am. St. Rep. 758, wherein it is held that a clause in an accident insurance policy exempting the company from liability where the insured met his death from inhaling gas does not excuse the payment where such a death was due to gas breathed into the lungs in an unconscious and involuntary manner, and in discussing the question the court said: ‘But, in expressing its intenton not to be liable for death from ‘inhaling of gas,’ the company can only be understood to mean a voluntary and intelligent act by the insured, and not an involuntary and unconscious act. Read in that sense and in the light of the context, these words must be interpreted as having reference to medical or surgical treatment, in which, ex vi termini, would be included the dentist's work, or to a suicidal purpose. Of course, the deceased must have, in a certain sense, inhaled gas; but, in view of the finding that the death was caused by accidental means, the proper meaning of the word compels, as does the logic of the thing, the conclusion that there was not that voluntary or conscious act necessarily involved in the process of inhaling. An accident is the happening of an event without the aid and the design of the person, and which is unforeseen. The finding itself defines the cause of death as the breathing of the atmosphere of the room full of illuminating gas. To inhale gas requires an act of volition on the person's part before the danger is incurred. Poison may be taken by mistake, or poisonous substances may be inadvertently touched; but, whatever the motive of the insured, his act precedes either fact.' In the case of Metropolitan Accident Ass'n v. Froiland, supra, the contract contained the provision, ‘I agree that this insurance should not be held to extend * * * to poison in any way taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled.’ In discussing this case the court says (page 36 of 161 Ill.,page 768 of 43 N. E. ): ‘But it is insisted that the qualifying words ‘in any way’ have relation to the motive of the insured in taking the poison, and embracehis involuntary, as well as his voluntary, action in that regard. We are of the opinion that the words ‘in any way’ relate to the mode or manner in which the poison is taken, and not to the motive of the insured in taking it. Very nearly this precise question was so decided in Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468, 14 Sup. Ct. 155, 37 L. Ed. 1148. It was there held that, in...