Tredwell v. City of Waterloo

• Decision Date: 14 November 1933
• Docket Number: No. 42043.,42043.
• Citation: 218 Iowa 243,251 N.W. 37
• Parties: TREDWELL v. CITY OF WATERLOO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

218 Iowa 243

251 N.W. 37

TREDWELL

v.CITY OF WATERLOO.

No. 42043.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 14, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; George W. Wood, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages to the automobile of plaintiff and for injuries to his person resulting from an automobile accident which he charges was due to the defective condition of a public street in the defendant city. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Miller, Miller & Miller, of Des Moines, and Pike, Sias, Zimmerman & Butler and A. G. Reid, all of Waterloo, for appellant.

Frank W. Edwards and Milton F. Fields, both of Waterloo, for appellee.

STEVENS, Justice.

The cause of action here involved was brought by appellee to recover damages to his automobile and for injuries to his person resulting from an accident occurring on a public street in the city of Waterloo caused, as alleged by him, by defects and obstructions in such public street. The details of the occurrence are not at present important.

One of the defenses set up by defendant in its answer was the statute of limitations. So far as material to the present controversy, section 11007 of the Code of 1931 is as follows:

“Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:

1. In actions for injuries from defects in roads or streets-notice. Those founded on injury to the person on account of defective roads, bridges, streets, or sidewalks, within three months, unless written notice specifying the time, place, and circumstances of the injury shall have been served upon the county or municipal corporation to be charged within sixty days from the happening of the injury.”

The foregoing statute applies only to injuries to the person, but section 6734 of the Code applies to damages to property and contains similar provisions and limitations. The accident in question occurred shortly after midnight on July 5, 1930; but the petition in this case was not filed in the office of the clerk of the district court until more than a year had expired. The question, therefore, goes directly to the sufficiency of the written notice which was served upon the appellant city within the required time. The following is a copy of the notice which was signed by appellee and his attorney:

“To the City of Waterloo, Iowa:

You are hereby notified that the undersigned claims damages of you for personal injuries and for injury to his automobile, which occurred on or about July 6th, 1930, on Washington Street in the city of Waterloo, Iowa, at or near a point on said street known as 738 Washington Street. That the said damage was occasioned by the dangerous condition of the said street. That there were deep holes in the street and in the traveled portion thereof. That there was a tree stump and the trunk of a tree and other parts of trees on the traveled portion of said street, which made the said street dangerous for travel.

That there was no warning sign or light to indicate the condition of said street.

That the complainant entered the said street from the LaPorte Road paving at night time, and upon encountering the said holes and other obstructions, was compelled to and did strike a telephone service pole, which did the damage complained of.”

The particular in which the aforesaid notice is claimed to be defective is that it fails to state the place at which the evidence snows the injuries were received. We gather from the record that Washington street referred to in the notice has a length of many blocks. The exact place of the accident is designated in the notice as at or near a point on said Washington street known as No. 738. The accident in fact occurred at or near No. 1738, approximately 3,000 feet from the point designated in the notice.

[1] The reason for the statute is twofold; that is, to limit the time within which actions for personal injuries may be brought against municipalities, and to provide a method by which early and sufficiently definite information of the circumstances of the accident and the cause of the injuries may be conveyed to the municipality. Unless action is commenced within three months after the date on which personal injuries are received as the result of defects in a public street, a written notice specifying the time, place, and circumstances of the injury must be served by the injured party upon the municipality. This statute is mandatory in character and must be complied with. The question here involved has many times been considered and discussed by this court.

[2] Conceding that the notice as to time and circumstances of the accident meets the requirements of the statute, is it sufficiently specific as to place? In none of our previous cases has there been such wide disparity in the place designated and the place at which the injuries were actually received. It has repeatedly been said by this court that the purpose of the statutory notice is to convey to the municipal officers prompt information of the time, place, and circumstances of the injury so that the necessary investigation may be had. Neeley v. Town of Mapleton, 139 Iowa, 582, 117 N. W. 981;Blackmore v....