Trianon Hotel Co. v. Keitel

• Decision Date: 02 March 1943
• Docket Number: 38312
• Parties: Trianon Hotel Company, Appellant, v. Elmer J. Keitel, Sr., Andrew J. Murphy, Sr., Harry P. Drisler, Legal Representatives of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of the State of Missouri, and John Louis Christian, Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

169 S.W.2d 891

350 Mo. 1041

Trianon Hotel Company, Appellant, v. Elmer J. Keitel, Sr., Andrew J. Murphy, Sr., Harry P. Drisler, Legal Representatives of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of the State of Missouri, and John Louis Christian, Respondents

No. 38312

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 2, 1943

Rehearing Denied April 6, 1943.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Paul A. Buzard Judge.

Affirmed.

Arthur Miller, Alton Gumbiner, David L. Sheffrey and Roscoe C. Van Valkenburg for appellant; Miller, Gumbiner Sheffrey & Van Valkenburgh of counsel.

(1) The decision, award and findings of the Unemployment Compensation Commission are not supported by competent evidence, but are contrary to the undisputed evidence and therefore should have been in favor of appellant and against respondents. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 162 S.W.2d 838; A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 40 S.W.2d 601; Yancey v. Egyptian Tie & Timber Co., 95 S.W.2d 1230; Wallingford v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 88 S.W.2d 361. (2) The claimant did not qualify or establish himself as being legally within the scope of the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law so as to be legally entitled to its benefits. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184; Mo. Stat. Ann., Sec. 13194 -- 3, p. 4770. (3) The evidence did not establish the relationship of employer and employee, or master and servant between appellant and claimant respondent. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184; Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 P.2d 201, 129 A. L. R. 511; Manus v. Kansas City Distributing Corp., 74 S.W.2d 506; Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay, 223 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199. (4) The appellant was not the employer of the claimant for claimant was an employee of William Cook, who was an independent contractor under contract with appellant. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184; Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 P.2d 201, 129 A. L. R. 511; Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199; Manus v. Kansas City Distributing Corp., 74 S.W.2d 506. (5) Claimant's unemployment was not caused by appellant. Mo. Stat. Ann., Sec. 13194 -- 2, p. 4770 (Annual Pocket Part); Mo. Stat. Ann., Sec. 13194 -- 10, p. 4770 (Annual Pocket Part).

George A. Rozier, Chief Counsel, and Mahlon Z. Eubank, Assistant Counsel, for respondents; Harry G. Waltner, Jr., of counsel.

(1) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9432 (A) (b), Laws 1941, pp. 620, 621; A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184, 348 Mo. 147. (2) The jurisdiction of the courts is confined to questions of law; and the finding of the Commission, if supported by competent evidence, is conclusive on this court. Sec. 9432 (i), R. S. 1939; A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184; Jackson v. Curtis-Wright Aeroplane Co., 334 Mo. 805, 68 S.W.2d 715; State ex rel. Buttiger v. Haid, 330 Mo. 1030, 51 S.W.2d 1008; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 40 S.W.2d 601; Elihinger v. Wolfe, 230 Mo.App. 648, 72 S.W.2d 114; Id., 337 Mo. 9, 85 S.W.2d 11; Buckner v. Quick Seal Co., 233 Mo.App. 273, 118 S.W.2d 101; King v. Woolworth Co., 132 S.W.2d 668; Murphy v. Doniphan Tel. Co., 347 Mo. 372, 147 S.W.2d 616; Dempsey v. Horton, 337 Mo. 379, 84 S.W.2d 621; Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145 Mo. 502, 46 S.W. 968, 43 L. R. A. 505; St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dillard, 328 Mo. 1154, 43 S.W.2d 1034. (3) The business agent, Cook, is an agent or employee of the appellant and the claimant is an individual employed to perform or assist in performing the work of Cook. Sec. 9423 (g), R. S. 1939; Barnes v. Real Silk Hosiery Co., 341 Mo. 563, 108 S.W.2d 58; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, sec. 2; 2 C. J. S., Agency, sec. 2e, p. 1029; Allied Mut. Liability Co. v. DeJong, 209 A.D. 505, 205 N.Y.S. 165. (4) Collector of internal revenue rulings are not controlling. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184; Murphy v. Menke, 165 S.W.2d 653; Murphy v. Midwest-Mushroom Co., 168 S.W.2d 75; Capital Building & Loan Assn. v. Kansas Comm., 83 P.2d 106, 148 Kan. 446, 118 A. L. R. 1212. (5) Casual employment is not exempted under the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law. Kellogg v. Murphy, 164 S.W.2d 285; Sec. 1227, R. S. 1939; Denny v. Guyton, 327 Mo. 1030, 40 S.W.2d 562; Stoll v. First Natl. Bank of Independence, 345 Mo. 582, 134 S.W.2d 97; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A. L. R. 1327; Secs. 9423 (h) (1), 9427 (a), R. S. 1939. (6) Appellant's assignment of error -- "Claimant's unemployment was not caused by appellant." Sec. 9422 (as clarified), Laws 1941, pp. 566, 569; Secs. 9423 (m) (1) & (2), 9430, 9431, R. S. 1939; Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199; Sec. 108.06 (4), Laws of Wisconsin 1933; Secs. 9433 (a), 9439, R. S. 1939; Sec. 9427 (c), R. S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 588-589; Sec. 9427 (c) (1), R. S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 588-589; Sec. 9429 (f) (1) (2), R. S. 1939. (7) The Meyer case. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199; Sec. 9423 (i) (1) and (5) (a), (b) and (c), R. S. 1939; A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 152 S.W.2d 184, 348 Mo. 147; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 5 N.W.2d 743; Sec. 9423 (n), R. S. 1939; Margulis v. Natl. Enameling & Stamping Co., 324 Mo. 420, 23 S.W.2d 1049; Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 116 P.2d 929; National Tunnel & Mine Co. v. Utah Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 39, 102 P.2d 508; McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P.2d 568; Mulhausen v. Bates, 109 Wash. 304, 114 P.2d 995; In the Matter of the Eligibility for Benefits of Foy, 116 P.2d 544; McKinley v. Payne, 143 S.W.2d 38; Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560; Young v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 10 S.E.2d 412; A. George Miller, Inc., v. Murphy, 42 N.E.2d 78; Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N. J. L. 487, 12 A.2d 702, affirmed, 126 N. J. L. 368; Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 479, 2 S.E.2d 584; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. State Unemployment Compensation Comm., 116 P.2d 744; Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial Comm., 102 P.2d 300; Life & Casualty Co. Tennessee v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 16 S.E.2d 357; Brannaman v. International Service Union Assn., 118 P.2d 457; National Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 14 S.E.2d 689; In re Mid America Co. (Interpreting Illinois Statute) 31 F.Supp. 601; Sec. 645, R. S. 1939.

Bradley, C. Dalton and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

BRADLEY

John Louis Christian made application to the Unemployment Compensation Commission for benefits. Trianon Hotel Company was the alleged employer. A claims deputy and a referee found for the claimant, Christian, and the hotel company appealed to the commission, which also found for the claimant. The hotel company took steps to have the matter reviewed in the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed the finding of the commission. The hotel company appealed to this court.

The appellant hotel company operates the Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City. The commission and claimant contend that claimant was an employee of the hotel company within the meaning of the unemployment compensation law, and entitled to benefits as such employee. The hotel company, on the other hand, contends that claimant was not its employee, but was the employee of one William Cook who, the hotel company says, bore the relation of independent contractor to it.

This court's jurisdiction of this appeal is not questioned in the briefs, but whether or not such question is raised, it is our duty to determine such question when it arises on the record. Murphy et al. v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405, 142 S.W.2d 449; Perkins v. Burks et al. (Mo. Sup.), 61 S.W.2d 756; Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gate City Bldg. Corp. et al., 342 Mo. 206, 114 S.W.2d 1023. Our rule 15 requires that an appellant's brief contain "a concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked." In observance of this rule the hotel company, in the brief, says that jurisdiction of this appeal is in the supreme court and cites, as supporting, Sec. 9432A, Laws 1941, p. 621, and A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184. Subdivision (b) of Sec. 9432A, among other things, provides that "an appeal (in an unemployment compensation case) may be taken from the decision of the circuit court or court of common pleas to the Supreme Court of this state in the same manner, but not inconsistent with the provisions of this law as is provided in civil cases." In the original unemployment compensation act, Laws 1937, p. 574, subdivision (i) of Sec. 11, the appeal provided for was "to the appellate court of this state" instead of "to the Supreme Court of this state", as it now appears in Sec. 9432A, supra.

The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, in all cases, is fixed by Sec. 12, Art. 6 of the Constitution, when read in connection with Sec. 5 of the Amendment of 1884. Sec. 12 of Art. 6 provides, among other things, that in all cases where "any State officer is a party", and in all cases "involving the construction of the revenue laws of this State", the appeal lies to the supreme court. And if the present appeal lies to the supreme court, it is because of one or both of the grounds...