Trinity River Authority v. URS Consultants, Incorporated-Texas

• Decision Date: 22 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. D-4376,D-4376
• Citation: 889 S.W.2d 259
• Parties: TRINITY RIVER AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. URS CONSULTANTS, INC.--TEXAS F/K/A URS/Forrest and Cotton, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 259

889 S.W.2d 259

TRINITY RIVER AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. URS CONSULTANTS, INC.--TEXAS F/K/A URS/Forrest and Cotton, Inc., Respondent.

No. D-4376.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Feb. 16, 1994.

Decided April 28, 1994.

Rehearing Overruled June 22, 1994.

Kenneth J. Lambert, Craig A. Eggleston, Dallas, for petitioner.

William Charles Bundren, Dallas, for respondent.

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by GONZALEZ, HIGHTOWER, HECHT, CORNYN, GAMMAGE, ENOCH and SPECTOR, Justices.

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.008 bars suits against architects or engineers for defective design of an improvement to real property unless brought within ten years after the improvement is completed, regardless of when the defect is discovered. The issue presented is whether this statute of repose violates either the Texas or United States Constitution. We hold that, as applied in this case, it does not, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 869 S.W.2d 367.

I

In May 1972, respondent URS Consultants, Inc. ¹ ("URS") contracted with petitioner Trinity River Authority ("Trinity") to design improvements to a sewage treatment plant operated by Trinity. An equalizer basin wall designed by URS was completed and put into service at the plant in 1976. On March 11, 1990, the basin wall collapsed, spilling a large amount of raw sewage and causing extensive property damage to the plant and surrounding area. Contending that the basin wall was negligently designed, Trinity brought suit for damages against URS on March 6, 1992.

URS subsequently moved for summary judgment on the basis of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.008, which bars such suits against architects or engineers brought more than ten years after the improvement is completed. The motion for summary judgment was based solely on Trinity's pleadings, which indicated on their face that more than ten years had elapsed since completion of the basin wall. The trial court rendered summary judgment for URS, and the court of appeals affirmed.

II

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.008 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A person must bring suit for [personal injury or property damage] against a registered or licensed architect or engineer in this state, who designs, plans, or inspects the construction of an improvement to real property or equipment attached to real property, not later than 10 years after the substantial completion of the improvement or the beginning of operation of the equipment in an action arising out of a defective or unsafe condition of the real property, the improvement, or the equipment. ²

This statute, which bars claims against an architect or engineer after ten years even if the alleged design defect was undiscoverable before that time, is commonly referred to as a "statute of repose." See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 654 n. 1 (Tex.1989). Unlike traditional limitations provisions, which begin running upon accrual of a cause of action, a statute of repose runs from a specified date without regard to accrual of any cause of action. One court has characterized statutes of repose as "a substantive definition of, rather than a procedural limitation on, rights." Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1983). Statutes similar to section 16.008 have been enacted in a majority of states in response to a perceived need to protect designers and builders from the threat of claims arising many years after completion of a project. ³

Trinity does not contest that URS is a design professional covered by section 16.008. The sole issue, therefore, is whether the statute is constitutional. Trinity raises challenges under the Texas constitutional guarantees of open courts, equal protection, and due course of law, as well as the federal equal protection and due process clauses. Trinity also claims that section 16.008 is a "special law" in violation of the Texas Constitution.

III

The Texas Constitution guarantees the right to "open courts" as follows:

All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.

Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. This provision has appeared unchanged in every Texas Constitution. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex.1986) (citing 1 George Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 45 (1977)). It includes at least three separate constitutional guarantees: 1) courts must actually be operating and available; 2) the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through unreasonable financial barriers, and 3) meaningful remedies must be afforded, "so that the legislature may not abrogate the right to assert a well-established common law cause of action unless the reason for its action outweighs the litigants' constitutional right of redress." Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex.1993). It is the third guarantee that is at issue here.

In Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex.1955), we articulated the relevant test as follows:

[L]egislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well established common-law causes of action for injuries to one's "lands, goods, person or reputation" is sustained only when it is reasonable in substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare.

Accord Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.1977); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex.1983). The Court noted in Sax that a litigant challenging a statute on open courts grounds must satisfy two criteria: "First, it must be shown that the litigant has a cognizable common law cause of action that is being restricted. Second, the litigant must show that the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute." 648 S.W.2d at 666.

The first step in our open courts analysis, therefore, is determining whether section 16.008 abrogates a well-established common law cause of action. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, it does not. Although it is clear that an owner of a structure had a right at common law to recover property damage resulting from negligent design or construction, see, e.g., Newell v. Mosley, 469 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pierson v. Tyndall, 28 S.W. 232 (Tex.Civ.App.1894, no writ), that right is abrogated by section 16.008 only to the extent it historically could have been asserted ten years after completion of the improvement. The traditional rule in Texas, however, has been that such a cause of action accrues, and the two year negligence limitations period begins to run, as soon as the owner suffers some injury, regardless of when the injury becomes discoverable. See Houston Water-Works Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36 (1888). In Kennedy, the defendant cut an arch in plaintiff's building while installing a water pipe in 1884. The arch, being concealed, was not discoverable until it eventually caused the building to settle and crack. Plaintiff brought his negligence action in 1887, three years after the alleged negligence but within two years after the injury became manifest. The Court concluded that the action was barred by limitations:

If ... the act of which the injury was the natural sequence was a legal injury,--by which is meant an injury giving cause of action by reason of its being an invasion of a plaintiff's right,--then, be the damage however slight, limitation will run from the time the wrongful act was committed, and will bar an action for any damages resulting from the act.... [A] mere want of knowledge by the owner of injury to his property does not prevent the running of the statute.

8 S.W. at 37-38. In other words, because the negligently cut arch constituted a legal injury, limitations began to run immediately. Accord Olson v. Passero, 402 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 98-99 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 855 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir.1988).

The holding in Kennedy is consistent with the general rule that a cause of action accrues as soon as the defendant's wrongful act effects some injury. See Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.1990). The discovery rule, under which the cause of action is deemed not to accrue until the injury becomes discoverable, is merely an exception to this general rule. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.1990). Although we have adopted the discovery rule for certain causes of action, see, e.g., Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex.1967) (medical malpractice based on leaving a foreign object in the patient's body); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex.1988) (legal malpractice), we have not previously done so for actions based on negligent design or construction of an improvement to real property.

Taking Trinity's allegations as true, it suffered a legal injury in 1976 when it received a defective structure built to URS's negligent design specifications. Under the traditional rule as set forth in Kennedy, this type of action is assertible only during the two year period following completion of the improvement. As to such a case, section 16.008, which bars actions brought ten years after completion of the improvement, does not abrogate the right to bring a well-established common law action.

We emphasize that we are expressing no opinion on whether, if squarely presented with the issue, we would adopt the discovery rule in a case such as this. Rather, we hold that, because the discovery rule had not been adopted for negligent design cases at the time section...