Troncosa v. State
Decision Date | 15 February 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 04-81-00391-CR,04-81-00391-CR |
Citation | 670 S.W.2d 671 |
Parties | Rudy Benny TRONCOSA, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Shirley Ehrlich, Ehrlich & Garcia, San Antonio, for appellant.
Bill White, Dist. Atty., Richard Fox, Robert Arellano, Roy Carper, Asst. Criminal Dist. Attys., San Antonio, for appellee.
Before CADENA, C.J., and CANTU and DIAL, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for arson. Trial was to a jury but the punishment was assessed by the trial court at five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellant sets forth four grounds of error which basically may be categorized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and a challenge to the trial court's holding his confession admissible.
The challenge to the court's finding of admissibility of appellant's confession raises numerous contentions. Essentially, they are that the court's holding is not supported by proof of voluntariness because waiver of constitutional rights was never established and because the confession was shown to be the product of illegal detention.
The evidence introduced on the motion to suppress reflects that the interior of a vacant building located at 1023 South Alamo Street in the city of San Antonio was set afire on March 25, 1981, with the aid of a flammable liquid which was poured on the floor at the top of the stairs. No one saw appellant at the scene of the fire and his fingerprints were not found at the scene.
On March 26, 1981, Alfredo Castro, Jr., an investigator for the San Antonio Fire Department, Arson Bureau, and a certified peace officer, was at a location known as the "Friendly Spot," about a block and a half from the location of the fire. In the process of conducting his investigation, Castro came into contact with appellant there.
The owner of the Friendly Spot advised Castro that he had never seen appellant there before. Castro then approached appellant, identified himself and requested identification. Appellant presented Castro with identification that appeared to be partially burned. Castro questioned him about it, his place of residence and employment. Appellant then left the premises.
On April 8, following the receipt of information from an unidentified source that appellant was hanging around bars at the intersection of Flores and Martin Streets, Castro and his partner Robert Robinson proceeded to that location.
At about 11:30 p.m. appellant was seen by Robinson and Castro on the sidewalk at the intersection of Flores and Travis. Robinson called him over to their car, read him the Miranda 1 warning, placed him in the car and drove him to the arson office located in the San Antonio Police Department.
At the arson office, appellant was once again read the Miranda warning. Following about an hour and a half of interrogation, an incriminating statement was obtained from appellant.
The record is silent as to the procurement of an arrest warrant or the existence of probable cause to arrest appellant. Moreover, the State does not argue the existence of either but rather assumes the posture that an arrest did not occur until the obtaining of appellant's confession. The testimony discloses no more than the flagrant arrest of a suspect known to frequent bars at a particular intersection.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by the trial court as required by TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979) recite in pertinent part:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) The defendant was arrested as the result of an arson investigation on April 8, 1981.
(2) The defendant was not interrogated at the time of his arrest, but was given a warning as to his constitutional rights.
(3) The defendant was immediately transported to the arson investigation office where he was again advised of his rights.
* * * (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court then concludes that the confession obtained was voluntary and admissible as a matter of law.
Nowhere in the court's findings or conclusion is reference made to the legal basis for appellant's detention although the court recognizes that an arrest had indeed taken place prior to the warning and interrogation.
The State seeks to circumvent the requirement of a warrant and of probable cause by arguing that appellant was never arrested or detained without his consent until after the statement was given.
The State seeks to circumvent the requirement of a warrant and of probable cause by arguing that appellant was never arrested had indeed taken place prior to the warning and interrogation.
The State argues that "appellant voluntarily accompanied the investigators to the police station, was never told that he could not leave, was not handcuffed, was not threatened, abused, or pressured, and was not placed under arrest until after giving his statement voluntarily."
The record does not verify the State's position.
At the Motion to Suppress hearing, officer Castro testified:
Officer Robinson testified:
* * *
* * *
It is apparent that the officer's concept of a voluntary accompanying is based upon an erroneous belief that a person is not under arrest until and unless handcuffs are applied. The following excerpt from Robinson's testimony illustrates.
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977) provides:
(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.
(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.
No evidence was adduced that at the time of appellant's detention, an offense was being committed and therefore, the State may not rely on Article 14.01.
Nor is there evidence to sustain the curtailment of appellant's movement upon a finding of probable cause from some other source. At best, the record contains a reference to receipt of information about appellant from an unidentified source.
Probable cause is necessary to arrest a person without a warrant and the standard is no less stringent than that needed to obtain a warrant. In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 435 (Tex.1977).
The test applicable in determining whether there is probable cause for arrest without a warrant is whether facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information was sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense. Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (on rehearing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979).
An inarticulate hunch, suspicion or good faith of the arresting officer is insufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest, search or temporary detention. Fatemi v. State, 558 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
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