Trumbly v. State, 1737
| Decision Date | 09 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 1737,1737 |
| Citation | 515 P.2d 707 |
| Parties | Calvin B. TRUMBLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Olof Hellen and Bryan Timbers, Asst. Public Defenders, Herbert Soll, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Daniel W. Hickey, Asst. Atty. Gen., John E. Havelock, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR and BOOCHEVER, JJ.
After having initially been charged with a felony, appellant Trumbly pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of simple assault. Thereafter, Trumbly was sentenced to 120 days imprisonment. Service of this period of incarceration was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of two years. Among the conditions of probation which were imposed, Trumbly was required to report periodically to his probation officer and was prohibited from leaving a designated geographical area without prior consent of this officer.
Shortly after imposition of sentence, Trumbly failed to report as required and left the State of Alaska without having obtained the requisite approval. The probation service then moved to revoke Trumbly's probation. A revocation hearing was held at which Trumbly personally appeared and was represented by counsel. During the course of the hearing, Trumbly admitted that he had not reported as required, and that he had departed the State of Alaska without approval of his probation supervisor. Trumbly's defense to the effort to revoke his probation was that of insanity. It was Trumbly's position that he suffered from a mental disease or defect which deprived him of the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the conditions of probation. At the hearing Trumbly produced expert psychiatric testimony in support of this defense. No rebuttal or contradictory psychiatric evidence was introduced by the State of Alaska.
One of the arguments advanced by the state in opposition to Trumbly's defense of insanity was that the defense is inappropriate in a probation revocation proceeding. Enlarging on this thesis, the state contends that the purpose of a probation revocation hearing is not to adjudicate criminal responsibility, and that it is not necessary to show the probationer acted with any particular mens rea in violating the conditions of his probation. Thus, the state would have us conclude that the defense of insanity is not available in a probation revocation hearing since this type of proceeding has been traditionally limited to adjudication of guilt or criminal responsibility.
At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the superior court decided that Trumbly's probation should be revoked. Trumbly was then sentenced to six months incarceration, execution of the sentence was suspended and Trumbly placed on probation. A condition of probation was that Trumbly was to serve 30 days in a correctional facility. Trumbly now brings this appeal from the superior court's revocation of his probation.
Taking a narrow view of the case, the superior court's revocation order could be affirmed on the ground that, as trier of the fact, the superior court was not bound to accept Trumbly's expert psychiatric testimony. 1 In other words, it was within the exclusive province of the trial judge, as fact determiner, to evaluate Trumbly's psychiatric testimony and to accord to it such weight as he deemed appropriate. Thus, assuming the defense of insanity is available in a probation revocation hearing, we believe the trial judge could reasonably have discounted Trumbly's expert testimony, and concluded this evidence was insufficient to put the state to the task of proving Trumbly's sanity at the times he failed to report and departed from Alaska without permission.
On the other hand, we think the short answer to Trumbly's contention is that the defense of insanity is irrelevant to the issues which are to be determined in a probation revocation hearing. At such a hearing, the inquiry is focused on whether the probationer engaged in conduct violative of the conditions under which he was permitted to escape incarceration. We are not persuaded that a probationer should be able to prevail upon an assertion that his probation should not be revoked because mental illness renders him unable to conform his conduct to the terms of his probation. Conformity to reasonable and lawful terms of probation is a prerequisite to the continuation of probationary status.
A probation revocation hearing is not a criminal proceeding. 2 The focus of the hearing should be to determine whether the probationer violated one or more of the conditions of his probation and the appropriate disposition in the event it is determined that petitioner violated his probation. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 493 (1973) Chief Justice Burger wrote
'The first step in a (parole) revocation decision involves a wholly retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more of the conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation.
The requirement that probation revocation follow after a showing of 'good cause' 3 requires the trial judge to find that continuation of probationary status would be at...
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...554; State v. O'Meal (1977), 116 Ariz. 307, 569 P.2d 249; State v. Johnson (1973), 9 Wash.App. 766, 514 P.2d 1073; Trumbly v. State (Alaska 1973), 515 P.2d 707; State v. Oyler (1968), 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 709.) We agree with this Allegri was specifically ordered to obey the laws of the sta......
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