Trustees of Boston University v. Board of Assessors of Brookline

• Decision Date: 09 February 1981
• Parties: TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BROOKLINE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 510

416 N.E.2d 510

11 Mass.App.Ct. 325

TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BROOKLINE.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 12, 1980.

Decided Feb. 9, 1981.

Evan Y. Semerjian, Boston, Kenneth R. Berman, Boston, with him for plaintiff.

Casimir deRham, Jr., Boston, Francis E. Ackerman, Boston, with him for defendant.

Before ARMSTRONG, GREANEY and KASS, JJ.

GREANEY, Judge.

This case concerns the status of Boston University's real estate tax exemption for the home presently occupied by its president at 132 Carlton Street in Brookline. In 1974, the Legislature amended G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third (e ), by St.1974, c. 811, § 2, to deny tax-exempt status to property owned by a qualifying educational institution and occupied or used as a residence for its officers unless the property "is ... part of or contiguous to real estate which is the principal location of such institution." ¹ The act was expressly made applicable to taxes due in 1975. Based on the amendment, the Brookline assessors valued the property, assessed taxes thereon to the University's trustees for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977, and denied the trustees' applications for a statutory exemption in each of the three years. The Appellate Tax Board (board) heard appeals (under G.L. c. 58A, § 7), from the assessors' decisions on a statement of agreed facts and exhibits. ² The board determined that the "Massachusetts Turnpike Extension (a public way) separates the locus from most of the real estate which is owned and occupied by (the University) for its charitable and educational purposes," and that the University's "(r)eal estate ... located north of the Massachusetts Turnpike Extension and Commonwealth Avenue constitutes the (University's) principal location." The board also found that the Carlton Street property was separated from this location "by an intervening parcel of real estate owned by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority," and that, as a result, it was neither "part of" nor "contiguous to" the main campus within the meaning of the statutory exemption. On this appeal, the University argues that the board incorrectly defined and applied the pertinent concepts in the statute, and that the Legislature could not constitutionally enact a provision which retroactively removed the exemption for fiscal 1975. We hold that the board's decision was correct and that the statute's limited retroactivity was proper.

1. Merits of the exemption.

(a ) The University's "principal location." The proper starting point for the board's analysis was a determination of the University's principal location. The Legislature left that term undefined in the statute, undoubtedly because of the practical difficulties inherent in fashioning a definition which could be uniformly applied to the Commonwealth's numerous educational institutions, several of which, like Boston University, are dispersed throughout large urban areas. We believe that ascertainment of the University's principal location involved essentially a question of fact and that it was intended that the board have a measure of discretion in resolving the question.

The record before the board revealed that the University's Charles River campus is comprised of approximately 121 parcels of property spread throughout Boston and Brookline. Many of these parcels do not abut other University property and the entire campus is intersected by public ways. Seventy-nine parcels (roughly sixty-five per cent of the total), are clustered north of both the Massachusetts Turnpike Extension and Commonwealth Avenue. This group includes the majority of the University's schools and colleges, its administrative and admissions offices, a number of student residence halls and faculty residences, the George Sherman University Union, the Mugar Library, and many other facilities. That board's determination that the core of the University was located in the unified area north of the Massachusetts Turnpike Extension and Commonwealth Avenue, which encompassed the aforedescribed facilities, cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or inconsistent with the agreed facts. ³ The board's findings of fact are "final ... at least where those findings are not mutually inconsistent." Board of Assessors of Hamilton v. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of America, Inc., 367 Mass. 301, 302, 325 N.E.2d 568 (1975), and cases cited. G.L. c. 58A, § 13. Since that aspect of the decision is not erroneous under the relevant standard of review, the University's contention that the area should have included other facilities in the vicinity of the main campus was properly rejected by the board.

(b ) Definition of "part of" or "contiguous to." Once the University's principal location was fixed, the board was required to ascertain whether the Carlton Street property was a "part of" or "contiguous to" that location. This necessitated interpretation of each of these terms, and application of the interpretations, once arrived at, to the agreed facts. The board determined that "(t)he usual and ordinary meaning of the words 'part of' ... is a portion, division or segment of a whole(,) ... whole mean(ing) that which is not divided or disjoined." ⁴ It defined "contiguous" as "import(ing) 'actual contact, something that adjoins' ... or 'touching along boundaries.' " ⁵ It then held that the intervening parcel of real estate owned by the Turnpike Authority between the locus and the main campus defeated the University's entitlement to the exemption.

The board's interpretation of these terms was properly guided by the settled principle that " 'a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.' " Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Commn., 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975), quoting from Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Boston, 369 Mass. 542, 546, 340 N.E.2d 858 (1976), and cases cited. The creation or elimination of exemptions from the real property tax involves questions of policy. In enacting c. 811, the Legislature obviously intended to implement a policy which would restrict the availability of tax exemptions for officers' residences owned by educational institutions, thereby bringing more of these properties onto the municipal tax rolls. ⁶ The provisions of the statute set out a convenient brightline test suited to the accomplishment of these aims; previous standards keyed to the premises' use and relationship to the institution's programs were abandoned. See generally Annot., Educational Tax Exemption Living Quarters, 55 A.L.R.3d 485, 516-525 (1974). The board acted properly in adopting accepted lexical definitions of the statute's key terms in furtherance of readily perceived legislative goals. See G.L. c. 4, § 6, In General and Third; Moy v. Jack Madden Ford Sales, Inc., 4 Mass.App. 102, 105, 342 N.E.2d 718 (1976); Andover Consultants, Inc. v. Lawrence, --- Mass.App. ---, --- n.4 ^a, 406 N.E.2d 711 (1980). Cf. Commonwealth v. W. Barrington Co., 5 Mass.App. 416, 418-419, 363 N.E.2d 1120 (1977). The board was not required to adopt the University's requests for more sweeping definitions which would have exempted the property as long as it was "near" the main campus or part of it in a functional sense. ⁷ If these interpretations had been accepted, they would have effectively nullified the dominant objectives of the legislation.

(c ) Application of those definitions to the locus. We were concerned at argument that the board's decision might be given an impractical reading and construed as holding that separation of an officer's residence from the main campus only by a public way (even a large public way such as the turnpike) would defeat an otherwise valid claim of exemption. It cannot escape our attention, however, that the agreed exhibits show the Carlton Street property to be about one-third of a mile away from the nearest parcel in the cluster constituting the University's principal location. To reach the main campus from the president's home one must cross Lenox Street and traverse the Carlton Street bridge which overpasses a private railroad, the turnpike extension and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's trolley tracks. This intervening one-third mile can be viewed as a rectangle which is bordered on the north by Commonwealth Avenue, on the south by Lenox Street, on the east by St. Mary's Street, and on the west by Essex Street. In addition to the streets and railways named above, the rectangle also contains several other privately owned parcels of land located on Lenox Street and Commonwealth Avenue which separate the locus from the main campus. "The board's ultimate conclusions are (to be) upheld whenever they are warranted by the evidence." Board of Assessors of Hamilton v. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Club of America, Inc., 367 Mass. at 302, 325 N.E.2d 568, and cases cited. This intervening maze of streets and real estate obviates our initial concern and supports the board's ultimate conclusion regardless of its reliance on the Turnpike Authority's property. Cf. Assessors of Boston v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn R.R., 319 Mass. 378, 379, 66 N.E.2d 36 (1946); Treasurer of the County of Norfolk v. County Commrs. of Norfolk, 7 Mass.App. ---, --- - --- ^b, 387 N.E.2d 1175 (1979).

(d ) The law governing exemptions. We also consider the board's decision to be consistent with settled principles applicable to the grant of...